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Case No. 20140844-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
KHALID MOHAMUD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a conviction for one count of possessing a
prohibited item ilt a correctional facility, a second degree felony, Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-311.3 (West Supp. 2015). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
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INTRODUCTION
Prison guards found a crude knife in Defendant's sock.

Defendant

1noved to dismiss his prosecution for possessing a dangerous weapon after he
learned that any surveillance video of his crhne had been routinely recorded
over before he was charged. The h·ial court denied the 1notion, finding that
Defendant had not proven that the crime was caphued on video, and that even

if it had been, Defendant had not shown a reasonable probability that the
footage would have been exculpatory.
The underlying issue here is whether Utah's Due Process Clause required
the trial court to dismiss this prosecution under State v. Tiedemann because the
prison routinely recorded over any surveillance video of Defendant's crilne that
might have existed.

But that issue begs the question of whether Tiedemann

requires defendants to make a threshold showir1g of a reasonable probability
that lost evidence would be exculpatory, before a trial court must balance
various factors to determine whether a due process violation occurred.
Consistent with Utah Court of Appeals' authority, defense counsel conceded
below that Tiedemann required this threshold showing. Defendant now argues
that his counsel was ineffective for 1naking that concession.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was trial counsel i11effective for relying on court of appeals' precedent
interpreting State v. Tiedemann?

Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance claim raised for the first tirn.e
on appeal is reviewed for correch1ess. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ~11, 328 P.3d
841 .
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Constitution art. I, §7 states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts.
Defendant was being moved fr01n cell 609 to cell 610 in the Uinta 2 unit in

the Utah State Prison . R134:64-65,68. Officer Miller, a guard in the conh·ol
room, opened cell 609 and insh·ucted Defendant to place his personal property
in front of cell 610 and then secure hilnself in the adjacent shower cell by
co1npletely closing the door. R134:69,75-76. Miller wan ted Defendant secured
1.11 the shower because guards planned to transfer another inmate from cell 610
to cell 609. R134:68-69,84.
When Defendant did not secure the shower door, Miller told Defendant
to come to the section door so that other guards could handcuff him and
remove h im from the section w hile the oth er ilu11.ate was moved. R134:70-72.
Defendant's section- Section 6-conta1.11.s several cells in two tiers behind a
glass wall and a secure door.

R134:65-67; State's Exhibits (SE) l a & 2a

(Addendum E contains SEla & 2a, photos of the cellblock). The area in front of
the secure door, outside the section where the inmates are housed, is called the
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"horseshoe area" because it forms a horseshoe around the control room.
R134:66-67,80-82,98.

Officers Weaver and Auelua were watching the prisoner transfer fr01n
the horseshoe area. R134:81-82;98. When Defendant arrived at the section door,
Officer Auelua handcuffed hiln, signaled to Officer Miller to open the secure
door, and brought Defendant out of the section and into the horseshoe area.
Rl34:72,83,99.

As Officer Weaver watched Defendant, he noticed "a pretty good-sized
bulge" in Defendant's left sock. R134:83. When he asked Defendant what it
was, Defendant did not respond. R134:84. Weaver then instructed Defendant
to "step up against the wall." R134:84.
Defendant complied and Weaver bent down and removed a "shank"
fr01n Defendant's sock. R134:72-73,84-87,100-01. A shank is a crude, inmatefashioned metal knife.

R134:79.

The shank was "very thick," had been

sharpened to "a nice, sharp point," and had cloth wrapped around the opposite
end to form a handle. R134:87,lll.

For those reasons, Officer Heyborne, a

Departrn.ent of Corrections Investigator, described this shank as "a good oneor a bad one, if you want to look at it like that." R134:111. He believed that an
in1nate could use it to "kill s01nebody." R134:109 (Addendum F contains SE 4, a
picture of the shank) .
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Officer Auelua watched Officer Weaver re1nove the shank from
Defendant's sock. R134:101. Officer Miller, who was in the control room, saw
Weaver reach down to Defendant's ankle and then stand back up, but Miller
could not recall at trial wheth er he saw anything in Weaver's hand. R134:73.
Miller testified, however, that Weaver told hin1 that he had found a shank in
Defendant's sock. R134:73.
After discovering the shank, Officers Weaver and Auelua escorted
Defendant to a holding cell. R134:74,87,101. While they walked, Defendant
asked, something like "Why are you bringing me down here? What did I do?"
R134:94-95. The next day, Investigator Heyborne asked Defendant whether the

shank belonged to a cellmate. R134:109. Defendant "said it did not." R134:109.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Officers found the shank on 29 August 2013. R134:64,80,84. Forty-three
days later, on 11 October 2013, the State charged Defendant with one count of
possessing a prohibited item in a correctional facility. Rl-2. Defense counsel
entered an appearance on 15 October 2013. R4. On 6 November 2013, after
Defendant opted out of the early case resolution program, defense counsel
entered a second appearance and a discovery request. R9-10. The discovery
request sought a copy of "[a]ll video .. . recordings ... prepared in conjunction
with the prosecution of this case in the possession of any law enforcement or

,-

-:::>-

goverrunental agency."

R13.

Counsel submitted a supplemental discovery

motion on 9 January 2014 seeking "[a]ny and all videos."

R23.

"Soon

thereafter," the prosecutor told defense counsel that if any surveillance video of
Defendant's cri1ne ever existed, it had been routinely recorded over. R27.
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the alleged loss of the
surveillance video violated his rights under Utah's Due Process Clause as
interpreted in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106. R26-33. Tiedemann
held that" [i]n cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory," at trial court must balance:
"(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence"; against "(2) the
degree of prejudice to the Defendant" to detennine whether due process
required dismissal. 2007 UT 49, ,r 44.
Consistent with this language, the Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted

Tiedemann as requiring a defendant who claims that a loss of evidence violates
his due process rights to "first denwnsh·ate, as a threshold matter, that there is
'a

reasonable

probability

that lost or destroyed

evidence would

be

exculpatory."' State v. Otlcovic, 2014 UT App 58, ~24, 322 P.3d 746; see also St-ate

v. Jackson, 2010 UT A pp 328, ~if20-22, 243 P.3d 902.
During argument on the 1notion to dis1niss, the h·ial court asked defense
counsel whether Tiedemann required hi1n to make a threshold showing that any
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lost video would have been exculpatory. R137:9. Defense counsel conceded
"that is the standard as - as laid out in Tiedemann." R137:9.
The trial court denied Defendant's 1notion.

R137:14.

It found that

Defendant had not proven that any surveillance video ever existed. R137:14. It
further found that even if a surveillance video had existed, Defendant had not
shown a reasonable probability that the footage would have been exculpatory.
R137:14. (Addendum A is a copy of the transcript from the motion to dismiss

hearing).
A jury convicted Defendant as charged. Rll8. The h·ial court sentenced
Defendant to prison for one to fifteen years, to run consecutively to Defendant's
other sentences. R121. Defendant timely appealed. R125.
After Defendant filed his opening brief, the court of appeals certified the
case to this Court for determination.

R138.

Defendant's original appellate

counsel then withdrew and substitute counsel was appointed.

Substitute

counsel filed a supplemental brief. This brief responds to Defendant's initial
and supplemental briefs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that his h·ial counsel was ineffective for conceding that
State v. Tiedemmm required him. to make a threshold showing of a reasonable

probability tha t the allegedly lost surveillance video would have been
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exculpatory. He now argues that Tiedemann requires a h·ial court to conduct a
balancing test whenever a defendant argues that evidence was lost, regardless
of the nature of that evidence. Defendant criticizes his counsel even though the
Utah Court of Appeals had previously interpreted Tiedemann as requirin.g this
threshold showing. Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective.
The court of appeals correctly interpreted Tiedemann as requiring this
threshold showing.

The court of appeals' reading was consistent with

Tiedemann's language and sh·ucture, especially where the Vennont test that
Tiedemann used as a model imposed the same threshold requirement.

The

threshold showing also ensures that the due process analysis remains h·ue to its
touchstone - fundamental fairness . The loss or desh-uction of evidence can
result in a fundamental unfairness only when there is a reasonable probability
that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory. Requiring a h·ial court to
engage in a balancing test when the lost evidence would have been ilmnaterial
would be pointless.

Other states apply a silnilar threshold require1nent.

Because his counsel correctly characterized the law, Defendant cannot prove
that his counsel perfonned deficiently, or that he suffered any prejudice.
Defendant also cannot show prejudice because the h·ial court correctly
denied his motion for failure to satisfy Tiedeman.n's threshold showing. The h·ial
court first found that Defendant never proved that any surveillance video
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existed. Defendant does not challenge that factua l finding as clearly erroneous.
Nor did Defendant show a reasonable probability that if any video did exist, it
would have been exculpatory. Nothing demonsh·ated-or even suggestedthat a video would have showed anything other than the officers pulling a
shank from Defendant's sock. Defendant's motion to dismiss therefore sought
a windfall, not fundamental fairness .
Alternatively, even if Tiedemann does not require a threshold showing,
Defendant still carn1.ot prove that his counsel was ineffective. Counsel cannot
perform deficiently by relying on controlling court of appeals' precedent.
Defendant acknowledges that the court of appeals interpreted Tiedemann as
requiring a threshold showing in State v. Otkovic. But he argues that the court of
appeals held the opposite just over three years earlier in State v. Jackson. In fact,
there is no conflict betvveen Jackson and Otkovic; both read Tiedemann as
requiring a threshold showing. But even if those cases do conflict, Defendant
cannot prove deficient perfonnance where any conflict was not so clear that
counsel's failure to recognize and argue it was objectively unreasonable.
Nor can Defendant demonsh·ate prejudice. Even if the trial court should
have engaged in a balancing test, as Defendant argues, Defendant has not
shown that such a balancing would have weighed in favor of dis1nissal.
Because any video was recorded over as a 111a tter of routine, Defendant has not
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shown that the loss of any video was anything more than negligent. Nor has
Defendant proven prejudice where no evidence proved, or even suggested, that
any video would have been exculpatory.

ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR AGREEING
WITH CONTROLLING COURT OF APPEALS' PRECEDENT

In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,

,r,r12, 44-45, 162 P.3d 1106,

this Court

established the test for determining when the State's loss or destruction of
evidence in a criminal prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights
under the Utah Constitution.

As explained below, Tiedemann requires a

defendant to first establish "a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory." Id. if 44. If a defendant does so, a trial court
must then balance t,.,vo factors: (1) the State's culpability in losing the evidence.:
and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant. Id.
In arguing his motion to dis1niss, defense counsel conceded that
Tiedemann required him to make the threshold showing explained above before

the court engaged in any balancing. R28,30-32;R137:9 (Add. A) . The h·ial court
denied the motion because it found that Defendant had not proved that a video
ever existed, let alone established a reasonable probability that it would have
been exculpatory. R137:14. No evidence proved, or even suggested that the
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video would have shown anything other than the officers pulling a shank from
Defendant's sock.
Defendant now argues that his counsel was ineffective for conceding that
Tiedemann requires a threshold showing.

Supp. Br.Aplt. 5-10.

Defendant

acknowledges that before his prosecution, tbe court of appeals had expressly
held in State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, ~24, 322 P.3d 746, that Tiedemann
required this threshold showing.

Supp.Br.Aplt. 4; Br.Aplt. 10 n.1.

But he

contends that in an earlier opinion, State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 243 P.3d
902, the court of appeals had interpreted Tiedemann as not requiring a threshold
showing. Supp.Br.Aplt. 4; Br.Aplt. 10 n.1. Defendant faults his trial counsel for
not arguing his appellate counsel's interpretation of Jackson, and thus casting
"the law in the light most favorable" to Defendant's position. Supp.Br.Aplt. 5-6.
Defendant alternatively argues that if Tiedemann requires a tlu·eshold showing,
he satisfied it. Br.Aplt. 10-16. Under either scenario, Defendant argues that a
balancing test would show a due process violation requiring dismissal of his
charge. Br.Aplt. 10-24.
As explained below, Defendant has not proven that his coU11.sel was
ineffective. Nor has he proven that any due process violation occurred. On this
record, Defendant was seeking a windfall, not funda1nental fairness.
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A.

Tiedemann requires a threshold showing that lost evidence was
reasonably likely to be exculpatory.
To prove a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance

of counsel, Defendant must satisfy the familiar two-part test announced in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, i-f59,
796 Utah Adv. Rep. 4. He must show that: (1) his counsel rendered deficient
performance, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result. Id. To prove deficient
perfonnance, Defendant must show that his counseY s perforn1ance "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Bond, 2015
1

UT 88, i-162.

To prove prejudice, Defendant must "show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.

11

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Bond,

2015 UT 88, ~59.
Defendant has not proven either ele1nent, because his counsel correctly
interpreted Tiedemann to require him to make a threshold showing of a
reasonable probability that any lost evidence was exculpatory.

That

requirement ensures that the due process analysis remains grounded in
fundainental fairness .
1. The Tiedemann test.

In Tiedemann, this Court considered whether the State's destruction of
evidence violated the defendant1 s rights under Utah's Due Process Clause. 2007

-12-

UT 49, ,r,r30-31, 39, 44. Tiedemann was charged with murdering three people
in 1991. Id. i12. The State dismissed the charges after he was c01mnitted to the
Utah State Hospital because he was incompetent and unlikely to ever be
restored to competency. Id. ,r7. Two years later, following standard policy, the
state evidence custodian destroyed some of the physical evidence from the case.
Id. ,rs.
Over eight years after this evidence was desh·oyed, the prosecutor refiled
the murder charges after learning that Tiedemann was about to be released .
from the Utah State Hospital. Id. ,r 10. Tiedemann 1noved to dismiss the refiled
charges, arguing that the State's destruction of evidence violated his rights
under Utah's Due Process Clause. Id. ,r,r10, 31, 33. The trial court denied the
motion. Id.

iflO.

In resolving Tiedemann's interlocutory appeal, this Court considered
whether to adopt under the Utah Constitution, the United States Supre1ne
Court's analysis for determining whether the prosecution's loss or desh·uction
of evidence violates the Federal Due Process Clause.

Id. ,rif39, 44.

The

Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), that whenas here- the most that could be said about the lost or desh·oyed evidence is that
it was "potentially useful," a defendant must "show bad faith on the part of the
police" to establish a federal due process violation.

-13-

The Tiedemann court

refused to adopt Youngblood's test because it viewed the test as '"both too broad
and too narrow."' 2007 UT 49, ,144.
In formulating an analysis for lost evidence claims, the Tiedemann court
reviewed how alleged discovery violations under rule 16, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, are analyzed. Id. i-f 41. When a defendant claims that the
prosecution failed to fully disclose evidence in violation of rule 16, four
"nonexclusive factors" guide a h·ial court's evaluation of a motion to exclude
the undisclosed evidence. Id. The "culpability or bad faith of the state" is only
one consideration in that analysis. Id. The Tiedemann court then stated that the
rule 16 factors are "relevant" to a motion to dismiss based on lost evidence and
that this balancing "approach ... should govern" such claims. Id.
The Tiedemann court then agreed with Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
m Youngblood.

Id. ,I42. . '\Nhile he concurred in Youngblood's result, Justice

Stevens believed that its rule was "1nuch broader than necessary." 488 U.S. at
60 (Stevens,

L concurring).

He was concerned that there 1night be cases where

a defendant could not prove bad faith, but where the loss of evidence was
"nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a cri1ninal trial fundamentally
unfair." Id. He also observed that it was unlikely that Youngblood suffered
prejudice because his h·ial counsel had emphasized that testing of the lost DNA
evidence 111ight have exonerated Youngblood, and the jury was instructed that
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if it found that the state lost relevant evidence, it could '"infer that the true fact
is against the State's interest."' Id. at 59-60. Finally, Justice Stevens noted that,
"even without the prophylactic sanction" of dismissal, the state "has a strong
incentive to preserve" evidence whose true character cannot be discerned
absent testing, because the state bears the ultiinate burden of proof. Id. at 59.
The Tiedemann court then observed that eight other states had also agreed
with Justice Steven's concurrence that Youngblood's test was too broad. 2007 UT
49, if 42. In interpreting their state due process clauses, those states had rejected
the Youngblood analysis in favor of a balancing test in which police bad faith
was only one consideration. Id.
The Tiedemann court highlighted the Vennont Supre1ne Court's analysis,
which requires a defendant to make the threshold showing of "' a reasonable
possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' Id. if43 (quoting State
v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994)).

Under the Vermont test, if a

defendant can cross that threshold, a court must then balance three factors:
"'(1) the degree of negligence or bad faith on the part of the government; (2) the
importance of the evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at
trial."' Id. Like the Vennont test, the Tiedemann court concluded "that smne
balancing of factors on a case-by-case basis is required."
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Id.

if 44.

That

balancing "should en1brace the basic principles" previously "adopted under
rule 16 and the factors mentioned by other states." Id.
The Tiedemann court then announced the Utah test which, as explained,
requires a h·ial court to balance the State's culpability in losing the evidence and
the prejudice to the defendant, if the defendant can first show a reasonable
probability that the lost evidence would be exculpatory. Id. The Court stated:
In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it
necessary to require consideration of the following: (1) the reason
for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a
whole, irtcluding the strength of the remaining evidence.

Id.
The Tiedemann court emphasized that "funda1nental fairness" is the
''touchstone" for the "balancing process." Id. ,-r45. It therefore observed that the
State's behavior n1ight be "so reprehensible" that a sanction would be required
even where the prejudice was "slight or only speculative." Id.

Conversely,

where prejudice "is extre1ne" a sanction might be required despite a lack of any
wrongdoing by the State. Jd. The Court re1nanded the case to allow the trial
court to apply this newly-announced tes t. Id.
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2. Requiring a threshold showing is consistent with
Tiedeman.n's language and structure, the intent of the Due
Process Clause, and other states' approaches.

Relying on isolated statements frmn Tiedemann, Defendant argues that the
opinion" did not require defendants to make a threshold showing that there is a
'reasonable probability' that the destroyed evidence 'would be exculpatory."'
Br.Aplt. 10 n.1; see also Supp.Br.Aplt. 3.

Rather, Defendant contends that

Tiedemann requires in every case '"some balancing' of the rule 16 factors and
those factors adopted by other states." Br.Aplt. 10 n.1. Defendant misreads

Tiedemann.
While some language in Tiedemann. appears to support Defendant's
reading, closer analysis reveals that the opinion requires a defendant to make a
tlu·eshold showing of a reasonable probability that lost evidence would be
exculpatory before courts 1nust engage in the balancing test. This reading is
consistent with the overall language and sh·ucture of the opinion, the intent of
Utah's Due Process Clause, and the approach that other state courts have taken
after abandoning Youngblood.
a. Tiedemann's language and structure.

In introducing the Tiedem.ann test, the Court stated that "smne balanciJ.1.g
of factors on a case-by-case basis is required." 2007 UT 49, i-f 44. But the Court
spoke only i11 general terms of considerations that the new balancing test
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"should embrace." Id. Those general considerations were "the basic principles"
that the Court had adopted under a rule 16 analysis, and the factors that other
states had "1nentioned." Id.
But read in context, this general language does not require a tr·ial court to
engage in a balancing test whenever a defendant claiJ.ns that any piece of
evidence has been lost. Although this introductory language establishes that a
multi-factored balancing test will generally apply, it does not detail the specific
factors that compose that test or the circu1nstances under which that test will
apply. Id. Rather, that specific direction comes later.
Although the Court did specifically mention the rule 16 analysis, it spoke
only iJ.1 terms of "the basic principles" - not the specific factors-that underlie
that analysis.

Id.

And for good reason.

The rule 16 factors do not lend

themselves to wholesale incorporation into a lost evidence analysis because
they are designed to address whether the prosecution has ainbushed a
defendant by failing to disclose existing and inculpatory evidence before trial.

See id. 1f 41 (quoting State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)). For exa1nple,
the first two rule 16 factors exan1ine (1) '"the extent to which the prosecution's
representation [of the existing evidence] is actually in.accurate'" and (2) '"the
tendency of the 01nission or misstaten1ent to lead defense counsel into tactics or
sh·ategy that could prejudice the outcome."' Id. (alteration in original).

-18-

But

whether a defendant has had notice of and a fair opportunity to address the
prosecution's inculpatory evidence says nothing about how the loss of
potentially exculpatory evidence m1pacts a defendant.
The Tiedemann court's highlightin.g of the Vennont test further
undennines Defendant's reading. As mentioned, the Tiedemann court detailed
the Vermont test in the paragraph im1nediately preceding its announcement of
the newly-adopted Utah test.

Id. ~43. The Vennont test plainly requires a

threshold showing of '" a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be
exculpatory."' Id. (quoting Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-43). It is difficult to believe
that the Court would highlight a test that contains a threshold requirement and
then, without any explanation or analysis, adopt a test that 01nits that
require1nent.

Id.

Thus, the more cohesive reading of Tiedemann is that the

Court highlighted the Vermont test as a model for the Utah test it announced in
the next paragraph.
The Court announced the Utah test in ,I44. See id.

if 44.

That paragraph's

opening sentences explain that the Court agreed with the Vermont approach
and therefore a multi-factor balancing test would now govern lost evidence
clai1ns. See id.

-1 9-

The final sentence of Tiedenzann's paragraph 44 then announces the Utah
test.

See id. As stated, that sentence begins with the threshold test used by

Vermont:

In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the
destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the 1nateriality and
importance of the 1nissing evidence in the context of the case as a
whole, including the strength of the re1naining evidence.

Id. (en1.phasis added).
Two characteristics of this sentence show that the Tiedemann. court
intended it to establish the newly-adopted governing test. First, as 1nentioned,
it incorporates the threshold require1nent from the Vermont test that the Court
had just highlighted. Second, it details the specific factors that Utah courts
must balance.

Those factors "e1nbrace the basic principles" of the rule 16

analysis and "the factors mentioned by other states" :

the State's level of

culpability, the importance of the evidence, and the potential iinpact of its loss
on a defendant. See id.
Defendant's attempt to find the applicable test elsewhere in Tiedemann is
illogical. If the opening sentences of paragraph 44 establish a general balancing
test that applies to any lost evidence claim-without any threshold showil.tg of
a reasonable likelihood that the evidence would be exculpatory-then
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defendants who can make that threshold showing appear to have a higher
burden than those who cannot. Under Defendant's reading, a defendant who
claims that the State lost any piece of evidence, regardless of its nature, can
obtain relief based on a balancing of various nonspecific factors.

But if a

defendant shows a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would be
exculpatory, he must then satisfy "two additional factors" in order to obtain
relief. Br.Aplt. 9, 10 n.1. The Tiedemann court could not have intended to make
relief more difficult to obtain for defendants who could show that lost evidence
was reasonably likely to be exculpatory, than for defendants who could not
make that showing.
Defendant notes that Tiedeman.n's paragraph 45 states that a sanction for
lost evidence could be appropriate even when a defendant suffers '"slight or
only speculative"' prejudice. Supp.Br.Aplt. 3 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,
iJ45). But this acknowledgement does not undermine the State's reading that a
defendant must make a threshold showing. When, as in this case, the true
character of the lost evidence is impossible to ascertain, the prejudice ele1nent
will necessarily involve sorn.e degree of speculation. Thus, a defendant could be

entitled to relief if the prosecution's behavior in losing evidence is
"reprehensible," even though the evidence 1nay be just as potentially
exonerating as it is incriminating. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, iJ45.
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In sum, although so1ne isolated portions of Tiedernann appear to support
Defendant's reading, a more cohesive reading supports the conclusion that
Tiedemann requires a threshold showing.
b. Fundamental fairness does not guarantee access to all
evidence regardless of its nature.

The fact that due process focuses on fundainental fairness reinforces the
conclusion that Tiedemann requires a threshold showing.

A trial

is

fundan1entally unfair only when a defendant is denied access to material
evidence, or evidence that has at leas t a reasonable probability of being
material. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ,I39, 979 P.2d 799 (holding that no due
process

violation

occurred

where

undisclosed

evidence

was

not

"constitutionally material").
Defining the require1nents of due process with precision is difficult, if not
impossible. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). This is
because due process "is not a teclu1ical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to tiine, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such
procedural protections as the particular situation den1.ands." In re Baby Girl T.,
2012 UT 78, ifl6, 298 P.3d 1251 (quotation and citation omitted).
In the context of a defendant's access to evidence, due process does not
require that a defendant have access to every scrap of evidence, regardless of its
nature. Rather, due process requires access only to 1naterial evidence.
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For exa1nple, when a defendant shows that the prosecution failed to
disclose existing evidence, a due process violation occurs only if the defendant
can also show that the undisclosed evidence "is material to guilt or to
punishment." State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Utah 1986) (citing Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). And even when that is the case, due process
only entitles the defendant to disclosure of the evidence and a retrial, n ot a
dis1nissal.

Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, i)94, 128 P.3d 1123 (Brady violation

entitled defendant to capital resentencing). Indeed, dismissal is a "harsh" and
"drastic remedy."

Bonneville Toiuer Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie

Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). Dis1nissal should be appropriate
"only when no other sanction would reach a fair result." People v. Roan, 685
P.2d 1369, 1371 (Colo. 1984) (desh·uction of defendant's blood samples in
vehicular homicide prosecution did not require dismissal).
Likewise, when a defendant claims that pre-indichnent delay made it
difficult or impossible for him to access favorable evidence, he must show
"actual prejudice" to demonsh·ate a due process violation. State v. Hales, 2007
UT 14, iJ49-55, 152 P.3d 321. This requires a showing of something more than
mere "speculation" that the delay resulted in a loss of favorable evidence. Id.
~[51.

•
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And when a defendant claims that the government's refusal to reveal an
infonnant' s identity denies hin1 access to necessary evidence, a due process
violation occurs only if the defendant makes "smne showing that disclosure of
an informant's identity is material and essential to his defense." State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Again, a defendant's inability to access evidence
that might be 1nerely helpful is insufficient to show a due process violation. See
id.

The Tiedemann court recognized that "fundamental fairness" is the
"touchstone" for analyzing whether a loss of evidence violates Utah's Due
Process Clause.

2007 UT 49, i144-45.

A trial has the potential to be

fundamentally unfair only if lost evidence is exculpatory, or at least has a
reasonable probability to be so.

If the State loses neuh·al or inculpatory

evidence, there is nothing fundamentally unfair about requiring a defendant to
stand trial.

Such a loss has no effect, or only a beneficial effect, for that

defendant.
When there is no way to discern the h·ue nature of lost evidence, then its
potential to exculpate will always equal its potential to inculpate. But a loss of
evidence can be fundamentally unfair to a defendant only if there is at least a
reasonable probability that the evidence would have been exculpatory. This
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threshold showing therefore grow1ds the Tiedemann test ir1 the principles that
Utah's Due Process Clause protects.
c.

Other states require a threshold showing.

For this reason, other states that do not follow the Youngblood analysis
require the sa1ne threshold showing. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, for
example, explained that "it makes sense" to require a defendant to "bear the
initial burden of demonstrating the exculpatory nature" of the evidence he
clahns the prosecution has lost. Commonwealth v. Williams, 919 N.E.2d 685, 694
(Mass. 2010). Massachusetts has crafted a balancing test si1nilar to the one that
the Tiedemann court am1.o unced: weighing "the Commonwealth's culpability,
the 1nateriality of the evidence, and the prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 695.
But a Massachusetts court rn.ust balance these factors only if a defendant 1neets
the" tlu·eshold burden" of showing"' a reasonable possibility, based on concrete
evidence rather than a fertile hnagination,"' that the lost evidence would have
been exculpatory. Id. 693-94 (quoting Commonweall-h v. Neal, 464 N.E.2d 1356,
1364 (Mass. 1984)).
Silnilarly, New Mexico requires a defendant to show that the lost
evidence "is in some way detenninative of guilt" before a defendant can show a
due process violation. State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975, 978 (N.M. 1992). And as
1nentioned, Verrn.ont requires a defendant to fil·st show '"a reasonable
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possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' Delisle, 648 A.2d at
642-43.

Tiedemann's threshold require1nent is consistent with these states'

approaches.
Defendant argues that the loss of evidence should excuse him from _
making a threshold showing.

Br.Aplt. 12.

actually undennine his argument.

But the cases that he relies on

All three require defendants to show a

reasonable probability that lost evidence would be exculpatory.
Defendant quotes the Vennont Supreme Court's statement in State v.

Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Vt. 1994), that "' the lost evidence may be potentially
exculpatory only because it has not yet been tested or examined." Br.Aplt. 12.
But at explained, even though actual testing might have shown that lost
evidence was in fact exculpatory, Delisle nevertheless requires a defendant to
make a threshold showing of "a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence
would be exculpatory." 648 A.2d at 642-43.
Defendant also notes that in People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298-99
(Colo. 1980), the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that when "evidence has
been destroyed, it is impossible for the court to detennine whether it would
have exculpated the defendant" and therefore "it is not necessary that the
defendant prove the exculpatory value of the evidence." Br.Aplt. 12. But that
court continued, "defendant, however, must at a 1nir1in1um establish the
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reasonable possibility that the evidence could have been of assistance to the
defense." Morgan, 606 P.2d at 1299.
Finally, Defendant observes that in People v. Handy, 988 N.E.2d 879, 88283 (N.Y. 2013), the New York Court of Appeals held that a jury should be
insh·ucted that it may draw an adverse inference against the state when it has
destroyed evidence.

Br.Aplt. 12.

But Handy declares that such a result is

appropriate only when the evidence is "reasonably likely to be 1naterial."
Handy, 988 N.E.2d at 882.

Thus, Defendant cites no authority for the

proposition that the loss of evidence should relieve a defendant of the burden to
show at least a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been
exculpatory.
B.

Because Tiedemann requires a threshold showing, Defendant has
not proven that his trial counsel was ineff ectiv~.
1.

Counsel cannot be deficient for correctly interpreting the law.

Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for conceding that
Tiedemann required a threshold showing. Supp.Br.Aplt. 5. But as explained, it

is Defendant, not his trial counsel who misreads Tiedemann . Because his h·ial
counsel correctly interpreted the law, Defendant cannot prove that his counsel
performed deficiently. See Strickland ·v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

-27-

2. Because the trial court correctly applied the appropriate legal
standard, Defendant cannot prove prejudice.

Likewise, Defendant has not proven prejudice.

As noted, to prove

prejudice, Defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability" that but for
counsel's performance, "the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outc01ne." Id.
Defendant carn1ot prove prejudice here because, had h·ial counsel made
the arguIYtent his appellate counsel nmv says he should have 1nade, the trial
court would have properly rejected it and required Defendant to satisfy

Tiedemann's threshold showing. See 2007 UT 49, ~44.
More importantly, Defendant cannot show prejudice because- as the
h·ial court found-he did not show a reasonable probability that any lost
evidence would have been exculpatory. R137:14 (Add. A). First, Defendant
never showed that a video ever existed. R137:14. That alone defeats his claim.
But even assmning that a video did exist, Defendant did not show a reasonable
probability that it would have been exculpatory.
a. Defendant did not prove that a surveillance video ever
existed.

As 111entioned, the trial court prilnarily denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss because it found that he had not shown that a video ever existed.

-28-

R137:14. Defendant has not argued, let alone demonsh·ated, that this findiJ.1.g

was clearly erroneous.
Only one wih1ess testified at the hearing on Defendant's motion to
dis1niss: Officer Heyborne, the Departn-tent of Corrections Investigator. R137:2.
Defendant called no wimesses. R137:2,8. Heyborne testified generally about
surveillance cameras at the prison, but could not give many specifics.

He

testified that "most" of the prison facilities have surveillance cameras. R137:4.
He explained that the Uinta 2 unit has some surveillance ca1neras, but he knew
only "approxi1nately where s01ne of the cameras are." R137:4-5. He was not
sure whether the cameras were recording on the day in question and he did not
view any video recordings from that day. R137:5. He did not know whether
there was any video recording of this incident. R137:5.
Heyborne testified that surveillance camera footage is saved for
"approximately 30 days and then .. . recorded over." R137:4. This was " the
protocol" as he understood it. R137:4.
On cross-examination, Heyborne explained that his investigation of this
incident consisted of reviewing the guard's reports and interviewing
Defendant. R137:6. He filed his report and closed his investigation within three
weeks of the incident.

R137:5-6.

I-:le explained that h e did not review the

surveillance footage because he "didn' t think of it." R137:7. He said that he
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knew this case would be forwarded to the Dish·ict Attorney to screen for
charges. R137:8.
In denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, the h·ial court 1nade a factual
finding that "[t]here is no evidence the cameras were on or ... off at the ti1ne."
R137:14. It also found that there was "nothing to indicate what the ca1nera ...
would have seen" and "if it would have even seen this incident."

R137:14

(Add. A) .
This Court will overturn a trial court's factual findings "only if they are
clearly erroneous."

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81; ~58, 150 P.3d 480.

Defendant does not even allege, let alone prove, that the trial court's findings
here were clearly erroneous. Br.Aplt. 15-16.

Instead, he merely references

Investigator Hey borne' s testimony that '"most"'

prison facilities

have

surveillance cameras and that "these cameras 'record[] and[] are on."' Br.Aplt.
15 (quoting R137:4) (alterations in original). But Defendant ignores Heyborne's
testi1nony that he did not know where the surveillance cameras were located in
the Uinta 2 unit, whether they were recording when officers found the shank in
Defendant's sock, or whether they would have recorded the incident in any
helpful detail. R137:4-5.
Defendant h·ies to rely on h·ial testimony to undermine the court's pretrial findings. Br.Aplt. at 15. That testimony, of course, came too late, especially
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where Defendant never renewed his 1notion to dis1niss. Regardless, although
Officer Miller testified at trial that surveillance cameras in Uinta 2 cover the
horseshoe area, he did not testify that the cameras were working properly that
day. R134:75. And even assuming that the ca1neras were properly functioning,
Defendant presented no evidence that the cameras would have captured the
particular area where he was standing-over against a wall-when officers
seized the shank.

Rl34:84.

And even if the cmneras covered that location,

Defendant did not present any evidence about the quality of the footage or the
anwunt of detail it would have depicted.

Presmnably the cameras focus

primarily on the area opposite the horseshoe area where the inm.ates are
actually housed.
Presenting this kind of evidence would not have been difficult.
Defendant could have requested existing footage from the Section 6 cameras to
show exactly where they cover and in what detail.
But rather that produce that evidence, Defendant asks this Court to
silnply assume that a surveillance cmnera captured the incident in helpful
detail. Br.Aplt. 16 n.3. He also argues that other "courts have been reluctant to
question a video's value based on claims that the video did not capture the
disputed incident in its entirety." Id.
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There are two proble1ns with Defendant's argument. First, Defendant
seeks to substitute speculation for evidence. But Defendant had the burden to
show that surveillance video existed. Speculation cannot satisfy that burden.

See Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981) (a party "cannot meet its
burden of proof by speculation") .
Second, the cases that Defendant relies on are distinguishable because
they both involve situations where it was undisputed that a video ca1nera
captured at least a portion of the event at issue. There is no such evidence here.
Defendant notes that the court in People v. Handy, 988 N.E.2d 879, 883
(N.Y. 2013), was unwilling to "unquestioningly accept

11

a jail officer's

representation that a lost surveillance video caphued only" a 'very s1nall part"'
of an altercation between that officer and the defendant. Br.Aplt. 16 n.3. But
that officer had reviewed the video before it was lost, thereby establishing that
the video in fact captured at least part of the altercation, and that the officer
himself believed that the video was potentially important. Id.
Likewise, Defendant notes that the court in Pettit v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.3d
1099, 1103, 1111 (D. Ariz. 2014), assu1ned that the video of an incident involving
prison guards who were transferring an irnnate would have been relevant to
the in1nate's civil rights clai1n despite testilnony that the video camera's view of
the incident w as obscured. Br.Aplt. 16 n.3. But there was no dispute that the
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prisoner h·ansfer was videotaped. Pettit1 45 F.Supp.3d at 1103. And the guard
in charge of the transfer inunediately took the tape to her supervisor and
reported that another guard had behaved unprofessionally. Id. The supervisor
reviewed the video 1 ordered it to be erased, and testified that the cainera' s view
was obscured at the 1noment when a guard was alleged to have used excessive
force. Id.
Unlike Handy and Pettit, Defendant produced no evidence here that a
video cam.era captured any details of his crime.

R137:14.

Nor is there any

evidence that an officer viewed any video footage before it was routinely
recorded over. Defendant therefore has not established any basis on which this
Court could reasonably infer that any surveillance footage existed, let alone that
it would have been helpful. Consequently, Defendant has not shown that the
trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.
When a party fails to challenge a h·ial court's factual findings as clearly
erroneous, this Court will accept those findings as true. See Brown v. State 1 2013
UT 42, ~[58, 308 P.3d 486. This Court can therefore affirm on the ground that
Defendant did not prove that a surveillance video even existed.
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b. Even if a video existed, Defendant did not show a
_reasonable probability that it would have been
exculpatory.
Even assmning that a video existed that actually captured smne of the
details of Defendant's crime, Defendant still has not shown a reasonable
probability that the footage would have been exculpatory. Defendant argues
that he easily" satisfied Tiedemann's threshold requirement because the video
II

"would have had unique exculpatory value" where it captured the

II

events

directly in question" and was therefore "the best evidence of what actually
occurred." Br.Aplt. 14, 15. But the fact that the video was "the best evidence"
of what happened does not mean that it would be exculpatory. It is at least just
as likely that it would have inculpated Defendant by conclusively confirming
the three officers' testilnony.
Defendant advocates for "a low initial burden" requiring him to show
only "smnething slightly greater than a 1nere possibility that the surveillance
video had substantive exculpatory or iinpeach1nent value." Br.Aplt. 13.

He

contends that requiring a "high threshold showing is inconsistent" with both
Tiedemann and "notions of fundainental fairness." Br.Aplt. 12.

Like the due process standard, criteria like "'reasonable certainty' or
reasonable probability' elude quantification." State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 71 20,
63 P.3d 56.

While this Cour t "cam1ot define the precise liinits" of the
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"reasonable probability standard," it has explained that this "standard lies
somewhere between '1nere possibility' and '1nore likely than not."' Id. (citing

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987)).
But w herever a "reasonable probability" falls on that continuum, the trial
court h ere correctly denied Defendant's motion because Defendant did not
prove that a video even existed, let alone show anything beyond a "mere
possibility" that it would have been exculpatory. This cam1o t be enough to
trigger a due process analysis because there is no thing fundamentally unfair
about the loss of evidence that has only a "1nere possibility" of being
exculpatory.

See Commonwealth v. Meas, 5 N.E.3d 864, 876-77 (Mass. 2014)

(affirming h·ial court's finding that defendant did not satisfy threshold showing
to h·igger due process balancing where his clailn that lost videotape would be
exculpatory was"' fairly speculative'").
Defendant argues that "at the very least, there is a reasonable probability
that the video would have contained evidence that could have been used to
hnpeach the testimony of th e correctional officers" because the officers testified
"nearly a yeai- after" the crhne. Br.Aplt. 14. But that argument presupposes
that the officers' testimony would have been inconsistent with the video. As
stated, the video was at least as likely to support the officer's testi.Inony. And it
1nay well have shown no thing. Defendant never contends that the video would
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have impeached the officers' testilnony that Defendant had a shank in his sock.
Br.Aplt. 14-15.
Just as Defendant produced no evidence that a video ever existed, he
produced no evidence that if it did, it captured anything that would have been
exculpatory. Again, producing this evidence would not have been difficult.
Defendant could have testified at the hearing on his 1notion that the officers
were lying when they said they found a shank. He also could have testified
that the officers planted the shank. He offered no such evidence. 1
But Defendant did not have to testify to establish a reasonable probability
that any video that had existed would have impeachment value. Rather, he
Although trial counsel 1nused that Defendant might waive his Fifth
A1nendment right to silence by testifying at the hearing, R137:10, that would
not have been the case. The United States Supre1ne Court has held that a
defendant does not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying at a
pretrial hearir1g on a 1notion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth
Amend1nent violation. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). The
Court reasoned that it was "intolerable that one constitutional right should have
to be surrendered in order to assert another." Id. Although Simmons was
decided in a Fourth A1nendment context, other courts have recognjzed that
Simmons applies outside of that context because the Court referred generally to
a defendant's assertion of a "constitutional right," . and not specifically to his
Fourth A1nendment rights. See United States v. Garcia, 721 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.
1983) (applying Simmons to defendant's testimony at preh·ial hearing on double
jeopardy claim); Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1388 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that Simmons would apply to defendant's pretrial testirn_ony
regarding insanity defense and incmnpetency claim); United States v. Inmon, 568
F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1977) (applying Simmons to defendant's preh·ial testi1nony
regarding double-jeopardy claim).
1
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could have relied on testilnony from other inmates who could have witnessed
the events frmn their cells. As shown in State's Exhibits la and 2a, inmates can
see the horseshoe area from the window in their cell door. SE la & 2a (Add. E).
Defendant, however, produced no evidence that any video would have
directly hnpeached the officers' testimony that they reh·ieved a shank from his
And if the "impeachment" Defendant generally alludes to concerns

sock.

merely the background details of the officers' testilnony (like where they were
standing or the timing or sequence of events leadil1g to discovery of the shank)
Defendant has not explained why his right to due process would require
dis1nissal based on the loss of his ability to i111peach the officers on insignificant
details.
Defendant argues that the loss of evidence will often "preclude the
defendant from demonsh·ating with specificity how the destroyed evidence
would be exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 12; see also Supp. Br. at 2. But Tiedemann was
tailored to address this difficulty. By requiring that a defendant show only a

"reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,"
Tiedemann accounts for the fact that the true nature of the lost evidence can
never be precisely known. 2007 UT 49, if 44 (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that "the exculpatory value of the video was greater
because no other cmnparable evidence existed that could in1peach the
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testimony of the correctional officers" here. Br.Aplt. 14. Again, Defendant has
not shown that any helpful, let alone impeaching video, actually existed.
Rather, Defendant merely posits that a surveillance video existed "that likely
captured the incidenf' and "that any impeach1nent evidence contained in the
video was necessary for his defense." Br.Aplt. 16 (emphasis added). But this
speculation does not establish a reasonable probability that any video existed,
let alone that it would have been exculpatory. Moreover, as explained, if the
officers' testimony was truly impeachable, Defendant could have established
that through his. own, or other irunates' testimony.
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective,
because his counsel correctly interpreted Tiedemann to require a threshold
showing and the trial court correctly found that Defendant failed to satisfy that
showil'lg. Defendant did not establish a reasonable probability that any video
existed, let alone that it would have been exculpatory.

Dismissing this

prosecution based on this record would have given Defendant a wil'ldfall and
therefore been fundamentally unfair.
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C.

If Tiedemann does not require a threshold showing, Defendant

still has not proven that his counsel was ineffective for relying
on controlling court of appeals' precedent.
But if Tiedem.ann did not require a threshold showing, Defendant still
cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective. Counsel cannot be deficient for
reasonably relying on controlling court of appeals' precedent.
This Court 1nust evaluate counsel's conduct from his "perspective at the
thne." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To" es tablish a clain1 of ineffectiveness based
on an oversight or 1nisreading of law, a defendant bears the burden of
demonsh·ating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or
her trial counsel's performance was deficient. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228
(Utah 1993).
1.

There is no conflict between Jackson and Otlcovic.

When counsel argued his n1otion to dismiss, the court of appeals had
interpreted Tiedemann as requiring a threshold showing. It had done so in both

Otkovic and Jackson.

Defendant therefore has not proven that his counsel

perfonned deficiently by relying on controlling precedent. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689; Dunn, 850 P.2d 1228.
As 1nentioned, Defendant concedes that the court of appeals in Otkovic
expressly interpreted Tiedemann as requiring a defendant to prove,

11

as a

threshold 1natter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or desh·oyed
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evidence would be exculpatory."' 2014 UT App 58, if24 (quoting Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, ii44).

The court of appeals had also done so over three years earlier, albeit
implicitly, in State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 243 P.3d 902.

Defendant

incorrectly argues otherwise. Supp.Br.Aplt. 4.
In Jackson, the defendant hit his estranged girlfriend with his car, then
backed up and appeared to be maneuvering to hit her again. 2010 UT App. 328,
~[2. The victim's son1 who was accompanied by his pit bull dog 1 gave the dog to

his 1nother and tried to stop Jackson by opening the front passenger door of
Jackson's car and h·ying to hit hhn. Id. Jackson pulled a knife and cut and
stabbed the son and, as the son retreated, continued to chase and stab him. Id.
if3. On seeing this, the victiin released the pit bull and the dog chased Jackson.

Id. Jackson stabbed the dog in the throat, attacked the victim again, and then
fled. Id.
Before trial, the State released Jackson's car to the lienholder who cleaned
and sold it before Jackson could exam.me it. Id. ,IS. Jackson moved to dismiss,
arguing that he intended to argue self-defense and that the State had violated
his due process rights by allowing evidence "crucial" to that theory to be
desh·oyed. Id. Jackson argued that he could have shown that there was canine
blood in the car, which "would have corroborated his claim that the pit bull
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attacked hi1n." Id. The trial court denied the 1notion to dismiss and Jackson
appealed. Id. ,ri[s, 19.
In explaining the Tiedemann test, the court of appeals first stated that
"courts should consider the 'nonexclusive factors' outlined in rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. ,r20 (quoting Tiedemann., 2007 UT 49,

,r41). The court also quoted those factors. Id. The court of appeals then stated:
"Additionally, if a defendant establishes 'a reasonable probability that lost or
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,' courts also need to consider" (1) the
State's culpability for the loss and (2) the prejudice to the defendant.

Id.

(quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,r44).
Defendant reads Jackson as requiring a balancing of the rule 16 factors
whenever a defendant asserts a lost evidence claim under Tiedemann, regardless
of the nature of the evidence. Supp.Br.Aplt. 4. He contends that the two factors
addressing (1) the State's culpability and, (2) the prejudice to the defendant,
cmne into play only if a defendant makes the reasonable probability showing.
Supp.Br.Aplt. 4. Defendant misreads Jackson .
Granted, the court of appeals did not explicitly hold that Jackson had to
satisfy Tiedeman.n's threshold showing that the lost blood evidence was
reasonably likely to be exculpatory. But the court of appeals' analysis shows
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that it assumed that Jackson had satisfied that threshold require1nent.

Jackson, 2010 UT App 328,

See

,r,rs, 20-21.

The court of appeals set the stage for its analysis by acknowledging
Jackson's argmnent that the blood evidence in the car "was crucial to his selfdefense theory." Id.

if 5.

The court further explained that Jackson had claimed

"that the car may have contained some of the pit bull's blood, which blood
allegedly would have supported his self-defense theory by potentially
establishing that the son and pit bull attacked first." Id.

if21.

The court of appeals then limited its analysis to the two factors that a
court must analyze only after a defendant has satisfied the threshold showing.

Id. ,r,[21-22. It did not analyze the rule 16 factors . Id. As Defendant concedes,
the court of appeals conducted only a "two[-]step" analysis. Supp.Br.Aplt. 4 .
The court of appeals' analysis therefore assumed that Jackson had made a
threshold showing of a reasonable probability that the lost blood evidence
would be exculpatory. The court first acknowledged Jackson's argument that
the lost evidence was crucial to his defense, and it then limited its analysis to
the two factors that a court must analyze only after a defendant satisfies the
threshold showing. Jackson is therefore consistent with the court of appeals'
later explanation of Tiedemann in Otkovic.
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Thus, when Defendant's trial counsel argued the motion to dismiss here,
the only two cases to apply the Tiedemann test had both held that the test
required a threshold showing that lost evidence was reasonably likely to be
exculpatory.

Defendant cannot prove that his counsel's perfon11ance was

objectively unreasonable where counsel simply relied on conh·olling precedent.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Dunn, 850 P.2d 1228.
2.

Even if Jackson and Otlcovic conflict, Defendant still cannot
show that his counsel performed deficiently.

As noted, Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not
casting "the law in the light most favorable" to him and arguing his appellate
counsel's view of how Jackson interpreted Tiedemann, rather than relying on

Otkovic's interpretation.

Supp.Br.Aplt. 5-6. But even if Jackson and Otkovic

conflict, Defendant still has not proven deficient performance because any
conflict between Jackson and Otlwvic was not so obvious that counsel's failure to
recognize and argue it was objectively unreasonable.
As explained above, counsel could have reasonably interpreted Jackson as
holding that Tiedemann did require a threshold showi11.g, especially where

Jackson did not explicitly state that such a showing was unnecessary. The fact
that the court of appeals in Otlcovic later explicitly interpreted Tiedeman n as
requiring a tlu·eshold showing-and did so without distinguishing Jacksonfurther supports the reasonableness of counsel's interpretation of the applicable
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law. See Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, ~24. At the very least, Otkovic establishes
that (1) Tiedemann did not obviously require a balancing test in every lost
evidence case; and (2) Jackson had -not obviously interpreted Tiedemann
otherwise.

Counsel could •therefore reasonably conclude that Jackson and

Otkovic did not conflict.
But even if every reasonable counsel would have recognized a conflict
between Otlwvic and Jackson, Defendant still has not proven that his h·ial
counsel performed deficiently.

Counsel does not perform deficiently by

following a reasonable, but ulti1nately erroneous interpretation of unsettled
law. Rather, it is "universally recognized" that "an attorney is not liable for an
error of judgment on an unsettled proposition of law." Smith v. Singletary, 170
F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 836 (8th
Cir. 2014) (" A failure to raise arguments that require the resolution of unsettled
legal questions generally does not render a lawyer's services outside the wide
range of professionally cmnpetent assistance sufficient to satisfy the Sixth
A1nend1nent.").
Defendant argues that his counsel was obligated to advance the
interpretation of Tiedemann that was most favorable to hin.1. Supp.Br.Aplt. at 89. But he cites no authority for that position. Nor can he, because it conflicts
with the Strickland standard.

Strickland is grounded in reasonableness and
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therefore asks only "whether an attorney's representation amounted to
incom.petence under 'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated
frmn best practices or 1nost common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
105 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment creates
"no expectation that cmnpetent counsel will be a flawless strategist or
tactician." See id. at 791. Defendants "have a :i;ight to a competent lawyer, but
not to Clarence Darrow." United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2003).
Under Defendant's logic, defense counsel 1nust pursue an ideal course.
The Sixth Amendment, however, requires only that counsel pursue a
reasonable course. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. As
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held, while "it might have been ideal for
counsel to ... assert an interpretation of [a case] that would benefit his client, the
fact is that he was not deficient in failing to do so" because the case could "be
reasonably analyzed in two different ways." State v. McMahon, 519 N.W.2d 621,
628 (Wisc. App. 1994). Consequently, even if Jackson conflicted with Otkovic,
Defendant has not shown that his h·ial counsel's reliance on Otkovic was
objectively unreasonable and therefore deficient.
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3.

Defendant cannot show prejudice because he has not shown
that a balancing of the Tiedemann factors would have
required dismissal.

Even if Defendant were correct that (1) Tiedemann does not require a
threshold showing, and (2) his counsel performed deficiently because he
mu·easonably failed to recognize that fact, Defendant still cannot prove
prejudice. Defendant has not proven that a balancing under Tiedemann would
have required dismissal.
Defendant argues that "the relevant Tiedemann factors weigh in favor of
dismissal."

Br.Aplt. 17.

But although Defendant contends that Tiedemann

mandates a balancing of various factors, including those relevant to an analysis
under rule 16, Utah Rules of Crilninal Procedure, Defendant discusses none of
those factors. Br.Aplt. 17-24. Rather, he li.111.its his discussion to the two factors
that a court must analyze only after a defendant shows a reasonable probability
that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory: (1) the reason for the loss
of the evidence; and (2) the prejudice to the defendant. 2 Id.

2

Defendant likely ignores the rule 16 factors because, as mentioned, they
are not particularly helpful in evaluating the i.111.pact of lost or destroyed
evidence.
Rather, those fac tors are d esigned to evaluate whether . the
prosecution has an1.bushed a defendant by withholding inculpatory evidence.
See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41 (citing State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah
1994)). To the extent that the rule 16 factors are relevant, however, they weigh
against dis1nissal.
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a. The loss of any video was, at best, merely negligent.
Defendant argues that "the State's failure to preserve the video was
beyond negligent."

Br.Aplt. 17 (balding and capitalization omitted).

But

defense counsel conceded below that, at worst, the State acted only with" some
degree of negligence." R30.

The first factor considers "the extent to which the prosecution's
representation [of the existing evidence] is actually inaccurate." Id. (alteration
in original). The record here contains no evidence that the prosecution
1nisrepresented the existing evidence. The prosecution told Defendant early on
that any surveillance video had been recorded over. R27.
The second factor considers "the tendency of the omission or
misstaten1ent to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could
prejudice the outcome." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41. Again, there was no
omission or misstatement that could have led defense counsel to believe that a
video existed. Within three months of the charge being filed, and a full seven
months before trial, Defendant understood that any surveillance footage had
been lost. Rl-2,27;R134:1. Indeed, Defendant 1noved before trial to dis1niss the
charges on that basis. R26-33.
The third factor considers "the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting
pertinent information or 1nisstating facts." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if 41. The
prosecution in this case did not mnit any pertinent information and 1nade no
n1isstate1nent regarding the existence of the video . Moreover, as explained
below, the loss of any video resulted frmn mere negligence.
Finally, the fourth factor considers "the extent to which appropriate
defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or 1Ttisstated
evidence." Id. Admittedly, no ainount of defense investigation here could have
discovered the video, assmning that it ever existed, because charges were not
filed until after any video would have been recorded over. As explained,
however, Defendant never proved that there ever was any video for the defense
to discover. Thus, none of the rule 16 factors apply, let alone weigh in favor of
dismissal.

Defendant contends that Investigator Heyborne should have preserved
any surveillance footage because he knew that the case boiled down to

0

the

word of an officer against [Defendantf' and that Defendant had "refused to
confess." Br.Aplt. 18.

Actually, Defendant had tacitly admitted to Heyborne

that he possessed the shank when he told Heyborne that the shank did not
belong to a cellmate. R134:109. Nor is there evidence that Defendant denied
possessing the shank Moreover, this case did not boil down to the word of an
officer against Defendant-two officers wih1essed the crime and a third saw
most of the details, although he did not see the shank being removed from
Defendant's sock. Heyborne thus could have reasonably concluded that this
was a routine case that did not require additional investigatory efforts beyond
the interviews that he conducted. Consequently, Defendant has not shown that
the State's failure to preserve any surveillance video that might have existed
was anything but negligent.
Defendant argues that the prison should have saved any surveillance
footage because videos "are often critical to the preparation of a defense'' and
"discovery requests for video recordings are ordinary and routine." Br.Aplt. 19.
Certainly it would be better practice for the prison to save relevant surveillance
footage whenever an inn1ate cmmnits a crime. But the failure to do so here is, at
best, mere negligence. The evidence showed that any video that existed was
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recorded over as a matter of routine.

R137:4.

And, as Justice Stevens

recognized in his concurring opinion in Youngblood, "even without a
prophylactic sanction such as dis1nissal ... the State has a strong incentive to
preserve" evidence whose h·ue character is unknown because the State bears
the ulti1nate burden at h·ial.

See 488 U.S. at 59 (Stevens,

J.,

concurrirtg).

Tiedemann' s first factor therefore weighs against dismissal.
b. Defendant did not prove that the loss of any video
prejudiced him.

Defendant argues that loss of the alleged video was prejudicial because
the video was 1naterial and iinportant and likely would have changed the
outcome of his trial.

Br.Aplt. 20.

But as shown above, Defendan·t never

explains in any detail, let alone de1nonsh·ates, why this is so.
Defendant contends that the video was "highly probative of what
actually happened." · Br.Aplt. 20. But "what actually happened" is that officers
found a dangerous weapon in Defendant's sock.

Defendant points to no

evidence in the record that would demonstrate otherwise. Two officers saw the
shank in his sock, Defendant tacitly admitted that he possessed the shank, and
Defendant never contradicted that tacit ad1nission.
Defendant does observe that, as the officers led him to a holding cell after
discovering the shank he remarked "s01nething like, 'Why are you bringing me
down here? What did I do?"' R134:94-95. But such remarks do not necessarily
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amoun t to a denial of possessing the shank. Instead, Defendant could have
been questioning only whether his possession of the shank justified taking him
to a holding cell.

Moreover, these remarks preceded Defendant's tacit

adn1ission that officers in fact found a shank in his sock, thus de1nonsh·ating
that his expressions of incredulity were just grandstanding. R134:108-09.
Defendant further argues that the video was "critical impeachment
evidence" because "the State's case was based on the testiinony of the
correctional officers." Br.Aplt. 21, 23. But as explained, Defendant never shows
how any video would have been impeaching. Rather, given this record, the
n1ost reasonable inference is that any surveillance video would have supported
the officer's testimony and conclusively proven Defendant's guilt.

The

prosecutor here would have likely been grateful to have any surveillance
footage that existed. Loss of the video therefore 111ost likely helped, rather than
harmed Defendant. Accordingly, Tiedeman.n's second factor does not weigh in
favor of dis1nissal.
In stun, even if Tiedemann did not require a threshold showin.g,
Defendant has not proven that his counsel was deficient. Nor has Defendant
proven that he suffered any prejudice because he has not shown a reasonable
probability that a balancing of the Tiedemann factors would require dismissal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affinn.
Respectfully sub1nitted on November 30, 2015.
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Utah Attorney General
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1

2:07 p . m .

May 15 , 2014

2

P ROCE E DI NGS

3

4

5

THE COURT:

All right , we are on the record in the

6

matter of the State of Utah vs . I'(halid Moharnud, set f or a

7

motion to dismiss hearing .

8

submitted by counsel .

9

Mr . Barraza, I will let you argue your motion .

10
11

MS. WITI':

Your Honor , the State does have one

witness that it would like to call

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. WITT:

14

I ' ve read both of the memoranda

That ' s fine .
- - regarding the policy at the corrections

facility .

15

THE COURT:

Sure .

16
17

to the stand .

18

THE COURT:

Come forward and be sworn , please .

19

* * *

20

BRYAN HEYBORNE ,

21

called as a witness by the State, having been duly sworn, was

22

examined and testified as follows :

23

DIRECT EXAMINATION

24

BY llf.tS . WITT :

25

Q.

Investigator Heyborne , if you could state your

..__ _ __ _ _ _J
3

1

first -- your name and spell your last name for the record .

2

A.

Bryan Heyborne , H- e - y-b-o-r-n-e.

3

Q.

And who are you currently empl oyed with?

4

A.

Utah Department of Corrections .

5

Q.

And how long have you been in their employment?

6

A.

Almost 20 years .

7

Q.

And what is your duties with the Department of

8

Corrections?

9

A.

I ' m an investigator .

10

Q.

Now, as an investigator do you -- do you deal with

11

surveillance within the , um, correctional facility?

12

A.

Uh-huh .

13

Q.

So if you could explain to the Court, how does the

14
15

surveil lance or cameras work in t he -- in the prison?
A.

Um, they record - - most , not all faci lities in the

17

recordings are on, are saved for about approximately 30 days,

18

and then they a re recorded over .

19

Q.

20

department?

21

A.

That ' s the protocol as I understand i t , yes .

22

Q.

Now, um, in t he Uintah 2 floor , is this an area

23

Okay .

And is thi s a no1.711al policy within your

within the Department of Corrections?

24

A.

Uh-huh .

25

Q.

And do you know where the cameras are located in that

4

1

a r ea?

2
3

4

5

A.

I know approximately where some of the cameras are,

Q.

Okay .

yes .
And so if those cameras were going at that

t i me there would have been a recording for the fi r st 30 days ?

6

A.

Possibly .

7

Q.

Okay .

8

But you don ' t know i f those camer as were

actua l ly r e cording that day ?

9

A.

Not for a fact , I do not .

10

Q.

Okay .

11

Did you ever view any recordings for

August 29th of 2013?

12

A.

I did not .

13

Q.

So - - so you have no knowledge whether or not there

14
15

was an actual recording made?
A.

r✓i~.

16

17

I do not .
VUTT :

Okay .

j'1 ou

.

I ha~Je nothing rur-c.ner ,

your Honor .

18

THE COURT:

19

MR . BARRAZA :

20

Thar1k

Mr . Barraza?
Yes , just a follow-up on a coupl e of

things .

21

* * *

22

CROSS- EX.Z\MINATION

23

24

25

BY MR . BARR..2\ZA :

Q.

So the date of the alleged violation in this case ,

urn, is August 29th of 2013 ; is that right?

5

1

A.

Correct .

2

Q.

And the -- you submitted a report when you completed

3

your investigation , correct?

4

A.

Correct .

5

Q.

And what was the date on that?

6

A.

September 16th, 2013 .

7

Q.

So that would have been within the 30- day per iod?

8

A.

Correct .

9

Q.

And you interviewed, um, some witnesses on this case ,

10

correct , as part of your investigation?

11

A.

Just the defendant .

12

Q.

Oh , you -- okay , so you didn ' t take any statements

13

from any of the other officers or guards?

14

A.

No .

15

Q.

You collected their reports?

16

report?

17

A.

Officer Cory Weaver .

18

Q.

Any of the other officers submit a report?

19

A.

Not to my knowledge , no .

20

Q.

And, um, so the extent of your investigation was to

21

I just collected their reports .
Um, who submitted a

Do you recall?

collect these reports and then speak with the defendant?

22

A.

Right .

23

Q.

Um, and as far as you were concerned that ' s all that

24

you needed to do, or was there -- was there a reason why you

25

didn I t investigate this surveillance v i deo?

6

1

A.

Frankly, I didn ' t think of it .

2

Q.

I ' m sorr y?

3

A.

I said, frankly , I didn ' t think -- think to look for

4

it .

5

MR. BARRAZA:

6

questions , your Honor .

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. WITT:

9

THE COURT:

Oh , okay .

Fair enough .

Any redirect?
Um, if I coul d have a moment , your Honor.
You may .

10

* * *

11

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

12

13

BY MS .

No further

w"IT'r :

Q.

Um, when you investigate incidents like the one that

14

occurred on August 29th , do those always -- are those always

15

sent to screening for charges in the District Attorney ' s

16

Office?

17

A.

Meaning a weapons case or just any case in general?

18

Q.

Any case or a weapons case .

19

A.

It depends -- it depends on the severity .

20

Q.

.So there are - - are there some cases in which a shank

21

rnight be found which is not .sent forward to the District

22

Attorney ' s Office for screening?

23

1-L

lf.rS . WI~r :

24
25

I believe that there have been cases, yes .
Okay .

I have no -- nothing further , your

Honor .

7

1
2

3

4

RECROSS-EX.~TION
BY MR. BARRAZA:

Q.

Is that a rare thing that you find a - - a weapon in

the prison and it 1 s not prosecuted?

5

A.

It depends on whe r e it 1 s found .

6

Q.

Okay .

7
8

9

So what would distinguish that from -- from

the case here?
A.

Well , for example , if you find a shank i n a common

area, and you don 1 t know who it is tied to, and there is no

10

other evidence , it may not get forwarded for screening .

11

is no one to --

12
13

14
15

Q.

There

Did you have any doubt that this case would be

forwarded to screening?
A.

No .

MR . BARRAZA:

Thank you .

16
17

you , Mr . Heyborne .

18

Any other witnesses?

19

MS. WITT:

20

THE COURT:

21
22

I have nothing further , your Honor.
Al l right .

Mr . Barraza, you may argue

your motion .
MR.

BA._AA..~ :

Well , your Honor, um, I am kind of

23

mostly submitting on my brief

24

THE COURT :

25

MR.

BAR.'R..~ :

That's fi ne .
--

but just a couple of points , um,

8

-

1

that were elicited here in court today .

2

30-day window that ' s the policy for them to , um, keep these

3

recordings , um , this investigation was concluded well within

4

t hat time , and so , um, that recording would have been available

5

had the investigator, um, sought that out, UJTI, knowing that

6

those -- this would likely be charged criminally and wou ld be

7

an important part of the investigation .

8

in -- in the State I s motion , the State mentioned that the video

9

is not that vital , because there were other, um, guards , urn ,

10

-

Um, additionally ,

involved at the time.

11

-

Urn, even with the

However , I did want to point out -- well , and we have

12

heard today that only one guard actually submitted the report

13

on this, and, um, at the preliminary hearing I believe that

14

tha t officer, Mr. Weaver , indicated that , um, while there were

15

four guards involved in a shift change, not all of them were

16

present at t 11e tiiTle tt1at tr1e -- the item i-;as discovered in this

17

case.

18

So , other -- other than that , I will submit it .

19

THE COURT:

Just a question for you , Mr. Barraza.

20

Don 't you have to show on behalf of Mr . Moharnud that there is a

21

reasonable probability that that destroyed videotape would be

22

excu lpatory?

23
24

25

MR. ~.RRAZA :

That is -- that is the standard as --

as laid out in Tiedemann .
THE COURT:

And -- and what have you shown me to

9

1

convince me that in fact this videotape that wasn't saved, it

2

was obviously recorded after the 30 days, would contain

3

exculpatory evidence?
MR. BARRAZA:

4

Well, and we are in a bit of a bind,

5

your Honor, to be -- to be blunt about it, because this video,

6

aside from Mr. Moharnud's own testimony, urn, there is no way for

7

us to actually proffer that, because without him actually

8

taking the stand and -- and waiving his right against self

9

incrimination or his right to remain silent.

And so while

10

while I -- I understand where the Court is coming from on that,

11

we still believe that that video is potentially exculpatory,

12

reasonably -- we have a reasonable belief that it is and would

13

be necessary in presenting our defense in this case.

14

THE COURT:

15

Ms. Witt?

., r

I✓.!=: •

.L 0

w"ITT:

All right.

Thank you.

Yes, your Honor .

Um, your Honor, I think

17

you -- you pointed out one of the biggest issues that we have

18

here is whether or not this video has a reasonable probability

19

of having exculpatory evidence in it.

20

has been unable to prove that there was a reasonable

21

probability that there was anything else exculpatory on that

22

video.

23

I think, urn, the Defense

This video, .urn, is just a video, and as the State

24

cited to State v. (inaudible), which is 2014 UT App 58, is that

25

only a showing of possibility that it could have been

10

..)

1

exculpatory is not sufficient to show that there was a

2

reasonable probability.

3

video which may or may not have been able to show that the

4

defendant was or was not in the car or was doing something

5

while he was in the car.

In that case it was involving an ATM

This is the same situation.

6

They are saying that

7

there is a possibility that there was a video, and we had

8

testimony from the officer that there might not have been a

9

recording, but they don't know, because they didn't look, that
this could show something else.

10

The Defense also stated in his argument that it's

11

12

only the testimony of -- of the defendant that -- that could

13

have shown that there could have been exculpatory, um, evidence

14

on the video.

15

to talk about what or why that shank _was found, where it was

J.6

1

found.

However, the defendant was given an opportunity

lmd, in fact, he was asked by the -- the investigator

17

whether or not it was his cellmate' s shank, and he said it was

18

not.

19

So based on that I don't think there is anything in

20

his testimony and what he has told the officers during the

21

investigation that would have even raised the possibility to

22

even close to a reasonable probability that there would be

23

exculpatory evidence on the video.

24
25

In addition, there were -- not only were there, you
know, three or four additional officers than the one who

11

1

testified at the preliminary hearing, there were also other

2

inmates that could be potential witnesses for him, who could

3

possibly shed additional light on this, if he is saying that

4

there is exculpatory evidence out there.

5

Urn, the Defense kind of made it seem as if Officer

6

Weaver, who was the one who testified at the preliminary

7

hearing, would be our only witness, and it wouldn't if it goes

8

to trial, because we have the additional correctional officers

9

who were present, and the Defense has the right to contact all

10

the other inmates who were present during this switch of

11

inmates, urn, to get their testimony in this case.

12

G

Urn, number two, your Honor, I -- we -- he also said

13

that we were negligent.

14

negligent whatsoever.

15

case, we filed the case the first initial appearance was in

16

October, v-1hich was well over 30 days after this.

17

And I don't think the State was
When we first received and filed the

When we filed this case we had no idea that there was

18

a video in evidence.

There was nothing in the police report.

19

Urn, I call it a police report but the correctional facility

20

report that there was a video of the incident that occurred.

21

So the State was not negligent, because the State had no idea

22

that there may or may not have been a video when we received

23

the case for screening.

24

It was not until November 6th when LOA was appointedr

25

and they sent out their initial discovery asking for videos r we

12

1

still didn't have a video.

2

within -- even if -- we -- it still wasn't within the 30 days.

3

So by the time it actually got appointed an LDA and the LDA

4

requested a video, the video, if there was one, was not in

5

existence anymore, because it was past the 30 days.

6

State was not negligent, because there was nothing in our file,

7

nothing from the Department of Corrections to even indicate

8

that there was a video available.

9

And even if we had, it wasn't

But the

Um, in addition, I don't think there is any prejudice

10

to the defendant, because, as I stated earlier, there were

11

additional corrections officers and there were other inmates

12

present that he could testify on his behalf.

13

14

15

THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Witt.

I will give you the

last word, Mr. Barraza.
MR. BA'RE@..zA:

If I could respond to one point the

Um, the te:nn "State" not only refers to the DA' s

16

State made.

17

office in this case, but it also applies to whatever law

18

enforcement agency is involved in the case, whether that would

19

be the local sheriff's office or in this case the -- the

20

investigators at the State Prison.

21

negligence we just heard that the video was not investigated,

22

because the investigator simply didn't think to look.

23

think that falls well within the negligent standard as

24

described in Tiedemann.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

And -- and regarding the

And so I

As I indicated in my initial

13

1

query to Mr. Barraza, what has the Defense shown to indicate

2

there was any reasonable probability that the destroyed video

3

would be exculpatory?

4

was significant.

5

exculpatory.

And, um, I think Mr. Barraza' s response

He said he believes it is potentially

That doesn't meet the standard of the case law.

Um, there is not even evidence that there was a

6
7

videotape.

There may have been a videotape.

There is no

8

evidence the cameras were on or they were off at the time.

9

nothing to indicate what the camera -- what the video would

Um,

10

have seen, if it would have even seen this incident.

11

just simply isn't enough to sustain the motion to dismiss.

12

going to deny the motion, and I'm going to have you prepare the

13

appropriate order, Ms. Witt.

14

MS. WITT:

15

THE COURT:

16

1iiv1here are

17

There

Yes, your Honor.
Do you want to set this for hearing?

we on the case, Mr. Barraza?
MR. BARRAZA:

I think we are ready to set it for

18

trial at this point.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BARRAZA:

21

THE COURT:

All right.

23

THE CLERI<:

How far out do you want to set it?

24

THE COUR'"r:

When do you want to set it?

25

MR. BARRAZA:

22

I'm

All right.

A one-day trial?

Yes.
What do we have for a one-day

trial?

I'm kind of booked through mid June so

14

1

I think into July.
We could probably do it on a -- I guess

THE COURT:

2

3

it doesn't matter what day we do it, since it's an all-day

4

trial.

5

how long is Mr. Mohamud going to be in the Utah State Prison?

The 16th, 17th, 30th, 31st?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BARRAZA:

9

THE COURT:

10

No?

Throughout what?
2017.
Oh, so it doesn't matter if it goes into

August, September?
THE CLERK:

August 13th?

12

THE COURT:

How is August 13th?

13

MR. BARRAZA:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. WITT:

., ,,.

17

How long

I got to be there throughout 2017.

11

.LO

August?

That will work.
Is that okay with the State?

Yes, your Honor, I believe so .

Tr::E COu'"R.T:

.All right, we will set it for

is this

a jury trial?

18

MR. BARRAZA:

19

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Jury trial on August 13th at 8: 30.

20

do a final pretrial conference on August 7th at 1:00.

21

else we need to address today?

Let ' s

Anything

I don't believe so.

22

MR. B.ZffiRAZA:

23

THE COURT:

24

(These proceedings were concluded at 2 : 22 p. m. )

Thank you, counsel.

25
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Synopsis
Background: Defendant was charged with
three counts of murder. He filed a motion
to suppress statements he made to police,
and a motion to dismiss based on the
state's destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence. The Third District Court, Salt Lake,
Judith S. Atherton, J., denied the motions.
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal.

West Headnotes (9)
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Criminal Law
Statements, confessions, and
admissions
(?

Criminal Law
Admission, statements, and
confessions
,.;:=.

In reviewing the trial court's denial
of a motion to suppress illegally
obtained statements, the Supreme
Court reviews the trial court's factual
findings for clear en-or and it
reviews its conclusions of law for
c01Tectness.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durham, CJ.,
held that:

Il1

defendant's initial waiver of his Miranda
rights was clear, unambiguous, and voluntary;

12 Cases that cite this headnote

11]

on remand the trial court was required to
consider the degree of prejudice to defendant
based on the State's destruction of evidence;
and

[21

Criminal Law
,,__=, Arguments and conduct of
counsel

IJJ per separate majority opinion of Durrant, J. ,

Criminal Law

defendant reinvoked his right to remain silent
as to all questions concerning female murder
victim, and thus all of defendant's responses

,= Arguments and conduct of
counsel

j ,J.::. :..

Whether the State's destruction
of potentially exculpat01y evidence
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violates due process is a question of
I.aw that the Supreme Court reviews
for con-ectness; however, because
this question requires application
of facts in the record to the
due process standard, the couii
incorporates a clearly erroneous
standard for the necessary subsidiary
fa ctual detern1inations. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 5, 1.±.

Defendant adequately preserved for
appellate revi ew his claim that
the State 1s destTuction of evidence
violated state law, where defendant
raised the issue in the trial comi, and
the trial court addressed the issue.

6 Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

6 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Criminal Law
,= Particular Cases

Constitutional Law
= Resolution of non-constitutional
questions before constitutional
g,uestions
Constitutional Law
•= Examination of state constitution
before federal constitution

Defendant 1s
initial
waiver of
his Miranda rights was clear,
unambiguous, and voluntary· the
interrogating officers read defendant
his .Miranda rights and asked him
if he understood them, defendant
answered in the affirmative, and the
officers did not us e coercive tactics
to gain the Miranda waiver.

If
state
statutes,
rules ,
or
constitutional principles preclude
the state action in question, there
is no need to assess the federal
constitutionality of that action; this
analytical approach is known as the
primacy model.

12 Cases that cite this headnote
1 Cases that ci te this headnote
[7]

· [4]

Criminal Law
,_;= Waiver of rights

The burden rests on the State to show
that a suspect1s waiver of Miranda
rights was clear and unambiguous, as
well as voluntary.
1 Cases that ci te thi headnote

15]

Criminal Law
.= Arguments and conduct in
o-eneral
0

Criminal Law
( = Sanctions for destruction or loss

On remand the trial court was
required to consider the degree of
prejudice to defendant based on
the State's destruction of evidence,
in light of the materiality and
importance of the miss ing evidence
in the context of the case as a
whole, including the strength of the
remai ning evidence, to determine
whether to dismiss charges again t
defendant based on the destruction of
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evidence. \\fest's U.C.A. Const. Art.
l,__§_]_; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 16.

and thus defendant's answers to
questions concerning male victims
were admissible; defendant stated
that he loved female victim, when
officers questioned defendant as to
what happened to female victim
defendant stated "I don't want to
talk about it," and officers sought
clarification as to what defendant
did not want to talk about and
infom1ed defendant that he could
choose which questions he wanted
to answer. (Per separate opinion of
Dun-ant, J., writing for the majority.)
U.S .C .A. Const.Amend. 5.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

Criminal Law
<i..F- Sanctions for destruction or loss
In cases where a defendant has
shown a reasonable probability that
lost or destroyed evidence would be
exculpatory, courts should consider
the following when detennining
whether to dismiss the case: (1) the
reason for the destruction or loss of
the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part
of the State; and (2) the degree of
prejudice to the defendant in light of
the materiality and importance of the
missing evidence in the context of
the case as a whole, including the
strength of the remaining evidence.
1,:~ 1-.e~r1·1~~c
0
..i
~:•-e •-LUI.)
3 1....,ases
lJ1al•- l.,!l
11 QUI Vl

[9]

Criminal Law
-= Particular cases
Criminal Law
;-=, Clarification of invocation
Defendant reinvoked his right to
remain silent as to all questions
concerning female murder victim,
and thus all of defendant's responses
to police questions concernrng
female victim were inadmissible
in murder prosecution, however
defendant failed to reinvoke his right
to remain silent as to questions
concerning two male murder victims,
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DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION
~

1 Edgar T iedemann is charged with three
counts of murder, a first degree felony.
This court granted Tiedemann's petition for
interlocutory appeal from two pretrial orders.
First, he appealed the pretrial order denying
his motion to suppress statements allegedly
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obtained in violation of the state and federal
constitutions and Miranda v. Arizona. 384
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
( 1966). Second, Tiedemmm appealed the order
denying his motion to dismiss based on the
State's destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence.

BACKGROUND

ii 2 The State alleges that on November 2, 1991
Tiedemann shot and killed Susan Sessions,
Charles Timerbem1an, and Scott Bunnell. 1
Sessions, Timerberman, and Bunnell were
staying at Tiedemann's West Valley trailer
home for the night. Following the shootings,
the police took Tiedemann into custody where
two police officers, Detective Ron Edwards
and Sergeant Ed Spann, questioned him about
the killings. In the course of questioning,
Tiedemann confessed to the murders.
~

3 The interrogation was videotaped and
transcribed in part. The officers began
the inte1Togation by reading Tiedemann his
Miranda 1·1108 rights. When asked if he
understood his rights, Tiedemann answered
in the affirmative. 1 The officers then asked
Tiedemann if he understood that he could
stop the questioning at anytime, to which
he responded "ya." The officers then asked
Tiedemann if he still wished to speak with
them at that time, and Tiedemann agreed. When
asked by the officers if he was intoxicated,
Tiedemann stated that he was intoxicated
on Toluene, a paint thinner. The officers
proceeded with the interrogation.

Iv:::•.:

- -- ~- .. - ··------·-----·-

----·~

1 4 As the officers

continued the questioning,
they asked Tiedemaim about the shootings .
Specifically, Detective Edwards asked, "What
happened to [Ms. Sessjons]?" Tiedemann
answered, "I don't want to talk about it."
Detective Edwards responded, "You don't want
to talk about it?" and Tiedemann responded,
"No." Sergeant Spann, attempted to clarify
exactly what Tiedemann did not want to
talk about by asking, "What is it that you
don't want to talk about?" Before Tiedemann
responded, Sergeant Spann continued with,
"You said murders in West Valley, where in
West Valley?"

ii

5 Sergeant Spann tried agam to clarify
Tiedemaim's response by asking, " [w ]hat part
do you and what pait don't you want to talk to
us about?" Again, before Tiedemann clarified,
Detective Edwards asked, "Edgar do you
remember me reading [you your] rights earlier
and you signing a waiver for us to search your
home?" Tiedemann answered, "Ya." Detective
Edwards continued questioning Tiedemann
about the murders.

16

During the course of the interrogation,
Tiedemann stated that he had "all kinds" of
"mental problems." He informed the officers of
a stroke he had in 1988. He told the officers,
"I think I'm Adolf Hitler." He also claimed
that "the devil" told him to shoot the victims.
At the end of the intenogation, Tiedemann
affim1ed that the police had not threatened him
or promised anything, but that he made the
statements of his own free will. The entire
intenogation lasted less than one hour.

ii

7 The State originally charged Tiedemann
with two counts of aggravated murder and one

State v . Tiedema n n, '162 P.3 d 11 06 (2 007)

----·-----

581 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2007 UT 49

count each of attempted aggravated murder,
aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated sexual
assault. The charges were dismissed seven
months later after Tiedemann was declared
incompetent to stand trial. At that time,
the State did not anticipate refiling charges
because, based on his competency evaluation,
Tiedemann was unlikely to ever be found
competent to stand trial. Tiedemann was then
civilly committed to the Utah State Hospital.

il

l O In October 2002, the district attorney's
office was notified that Tiedemam1 was going
to be released from the Utah State Hospital.
The State subsequently recharged him with
three counts of murder, declining to refile the
other felony counts. Following a preliminary
hearing, the trial court found Tiedemann
competent to stand trial and denied 1-11 09
his pretrial motions to suppress his testimony
and to dismiss the case due to destruction
of evidence. This court granted Tiedemann s
petition for interlocutory appeal from both
rulings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code section 78-2- 2(3)(h) (2002).
1

, 8 Two years later, in April 1994, the state
evidence custodian notified the investigating
officer that physical evidence from the case
would be destroyed unless an objection was
filed \'Vitl1i11 tl1irty days. The officer 111ade 110
objection, and the evidence was destroyed. The
destroyed evidence included two revolvers,
a Code R kit, a victim's wallet, heroin, an
audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit,
drug paraphernalia, various items of victims 1
clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on
one victim 1s bed, a bottle of green liquid, a
one gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber
bullets, bullet fragments, shell casings, hair
and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from
Tiedemann and one of the victims.
~

9 Not all of the evidence was destroyed. The
evidence given to the defense in this proceeding
included autopsy photos and reports on all three
victims, toxicology reports on the victims, a
rape report from St. Mark's Hospital, photos
taken of weapons and ammunition, firearm
analysis reports, transcripts of interviews taken
from one of the shooting victims and the sexual
assault victim, witness statements, a videotape
of the interview with the sexual assault victim,
and a videotape and photos of the crime scene.

f J.::.., ·

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ill ,r

11 In reviewing the trial court's denial
of Tiedemann's Motion to Suppress Illegally
Obtained Statements, we review the trial court's
factual findin c:,°s for clear error and we review
its conclusions of law for coITectness. State v.
Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995).

Ill

~

12 Whether the State's destruction of
potentially exculpatory evidence violates due
process is a question of law that we review for
con-ectness. "However, because this question
requires application of facts in the record to the
due process standard, we incorporate a clearly
erroneous standard for the necessaiy subsidiary
factual determinations." Chen v. Ste1,vart, 2004
UT 82. 5I 25. 100 P.3d 1177.

ANALYSIS

ii

13 This case presents two issues: first,
whether T iedemann va li dly waived his
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Miranda ri ghts and, if so, whether he
subsequently, unambiguously invoked hi s right
to remain silent; and second, whether the
destruction of evidence in this case violated
Tiedemann's due process ri ghts under the state
and federal constitutions. The court addresses
these issues as foll ows: Part I of this opinion
treats the Motion to Suppress the Confession
as it relates to (A) whether Tiedemann waived
his right to remain silent, and (B) whether
Tiedemann subsequently reinvoked his right to
remain silent; Part II deals with the destruction
of evidence. This opinion contains the majority
as to Part IA. The majority opinion of the court
as to Part IB is contained in the separate opinion
of Justice DmTant, j o ined by Justices Nehring
and Parrish. The dissenting view in Part IB
of this opinion is mine alone. Part II of this
op inion contains the majority view of the court
on the destruc tion of evidence question. In a
separate opinio n, Justice Wilkins dissents as to
Part IB and as to Part II.

I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE CONFESSION

ii 14 We fi rst address whether the district comi
was co1Tect in denying Tiedemann's request to
suppress his confession. T iedemann argues that
he never gave a voluntary waiver of hi s right
to remain silent, but rather, that the police took
adva ntage of hi s kn own mental impairment
to improperly evoke a wa iver and confession
from him. T iedemann also argues that, even
if he gave a valid initial waiver, he later
unambiguously raised his right to remain silent,
and the offi cers failed to honor that request in
violation of his due process rights.

ii

15 This court addressed the threshold
requirements for a valid waiver of A1iranda
rights and a subsequent invocation of those
rights in State v. L evva. 95 1 P. 2d 73 8 (Utah
1997). L eyva firmly established that "[t]he
questions of waiver of M iranda rights and
of postwaiver invocation of those rights are
entirely separate." Id. at 743 . W e therefore
address Tiedemann's initial waiver and the
subsequent raising of his right to re main silent
separately. If the initial waiver w as not valid,
the statements must be suppressed. If, however,
the initial waiver was valid, we must dete1mine
if Tiedemann later validly invoked his right to
remain silent.

•
A. Tiedemann 's Initial Waiver Was Valid

Ill

Hl 1

16 With regard to the initial
waiver of Miranda rights, this court has
noted, in accordance with federal case law,
that a " ' heavy burden ' rests o n law
enforcement officers ' to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived'
his M iranda rights." Leyva. 951 P.2d at 743
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436,
475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1 966)).
The burden therefore rests on the State to show
that a suspect's waiver of Miranda rights was
clear and unambiguous, as well as vo luntary.

ii

17 In this case, the interrogating officers
read Tiedemann his rights and asked him
if he understood them. Tiedema nn, although
*1110 appearing distant and wi th his head
lowered, answered in the affim1ative. Further,
Tiedemann responded in the affirmative to
each of the fo llowing questions: (1 ) "Do you
understand that you can stop this qu estioni ng at

•

State v. Tiedemann , ·t 62 P.3d 1106 (2007)
581 TJtah -Adv.

Rep ..25,-2067 UT 49 ··

anytime?" (2) "If you cannot afford an attorney,
we will provide one for you. Do you understand
that?" and (3) "Do you still wish to speak to us
at this time?"

any way , we conclude that Tiedemann
effectively waived his Miranda rights.
Ill

B. Tiedemann Unambiguously
Reasserted His Right to Remain Silent

4il 18 In its Memorandum Decision, the district

court concluded that the officers did not use
coercive tactics to gain the Miranda rights
waiver. Having reviewed the transcript and
video of the intenogation, we agree. The
officers did not use "false friend" or "half truth"
tactics. They made no threats or promises.
The interrogation was less than one hour in
length. The officers did not deny any special
requests by the defendant. We could not
find a single instance in which the officers
mistreated Tiedemann or acted unethically in
any way. Although Tiedemann was admittedly
intoxicated at the time and was later found
to be incompetent to stand trial, his mental
condition alone, absent some abuse by the
officers, is not enough to render his waiver
invalid. See Colorado v. Connellv, 479 U.S.
157, 167, 107 S .Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 4 73 (1986)
("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession
is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.") ; State v. Rettenberger, 1999
UT 80. 'ii 17, 984 P .2d l 009 ("Although ...
a determination of involuntariness cannot be
predicated solely upon a defendant's mental
state, his mental state is relevant to the extent
it made him more susceptible to mentally
coercive police tactics ." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
4il 19 Because Tiedemann's waiver was clear and

unambiguous, and because he was not coerced

r- ~'..:. ..

ii

20 Because Tiedemann validly waived his
Miranda rights, in order for this comi to
reverse, I believe we must conclude that his
later attempt to invoke his right to remain
silent was unambiguous. The right to tem1inate
questioning is a "critical safeguard" of the
right to remain silent guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. 1 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, l 03, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
underscored the importance of a suspect's
right to end an interrogation and provided
general operational guidance when it stated
that questioning must stop once a suspect
"indicates in any manner, at any time ... during
questioning, that he ·wishes to remain silent."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,473 74, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): see also
Moslev, 423 U.S . at 100, 96 S.Ct. 321.
~

21 The more difficult question, one
left unanswered in Miranda, is how law
enforcement officials are to know when a
suspect has given a sufficient "indication" of
a wish to remain silent. The United States
Supreme Court answered this question in Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct.
235 0, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). Mr. Davis was
accused of beating a sailor to death with a pool
cue after the sailor had reneged on a billiards
wager. Id. at 454, 114 S.Ct. 2350. After waivinot,
his Miranda rights and submitting to an hour
and a half of interrogation, Mr. Davis mused
'
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"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." Id. at 455,
114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court concluded that this
statement was too equivocal to serve as an
invocation of Mr. Davis' right to counsel. Id.
at 462. 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court held that a
suspect's reassertion of the right to counsel "
'requires, at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an expression
of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.'
" Id. at 4 59. 11 4 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting McNeil
v. Wis consin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct.
2204, 115 L. Ed.2d 158 ( 1991 )). Mr. Davis'
choice of the word "maybe" injected sufficient
equivocation into his comment to allow the
officers to continue questioning him.

if

22 I measure Ti edemann's statement "I
don't want to talk about it" against the core
*1111 Davis test as modified to encompass
the right to remain silent. I find it impossible
to extract ambiguity from the following
critical question and answer exchange between
Detective Edwards and Tiedemann :
Det. Edwards: What happened to [Ms .
Sessions]?
Tiedemann: I don't want to talk about it.
Det. Edwards: You don't want to talk about
it?
Tiedemann: No .

~

23 I find Tiedemann's statement, " I don't want
to talk about it," and subsequent confirmation
of his desire not lo talk about it an unambiguous
invocation of his right to remain silent.
Contrary to the view expressed by Justice
Wi lkins, I beli eve that this pivotal exchange
between Detective Edwards and T iedemann

/ .1., -

clearly passed the Davis test. The law cannot
deprive defendants of their constitutional rights
based on failure to use precise terminology.
Officers need to be alert to various statements
and behaviors expressed by defendants that
meet the required tlu-eshold of clarity. In
my view, Tiedemann met his burden to
unambiguously invoke his constitutional right
to remain silent with his statement "I don't want
to talk about it," followed by repeated silence
in response to subsequent questions.
~

24 What remains ambiguous, however, 1s
the scope of Tiedemann 1s invocation. The
antecedent of the pronoun "it" is unclear.
"It" could refer to "what happened to [Ms.
Sessions];" or "it" could refer to " [t]he
murders out there at West Valley," a response
Tiedemann made to a question only moments
before the exchange quoted above; or "it" could
refer to all of the events related to the murders.
The United States Supreme Court has extended
to criminal suspects "[t]hrough the exercise
of [this] option to tenninate questioning"
the right to "control the time at which
questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and
the duration of the inte1Togation." Mosley, 423
U.S. at 103- 04, 96 S.Ct. 321. I recognize
that interrogating officers who know that a
suspect has reclaimed his or her right to
remain silent but do not know the scope of
the reclamation have a diffic ult line to walk.
The di ffi culty arises because questions posed
by inte1Togators in this setting will seldom elicit
answers that clarify the scope of the suspect's
right to remain silent without also including
inculpatory statements. This problem may be
solved by disqualifying from consideration any
incu lpatory statements made in response to
questions posed by inte1Togators who are in the
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process of attempting to clarify the scope of a
reasserted right to remain silent. Such a rule
will re lieve law enforcement of the daunting
task of formulating questions that would clarify
the scope of the Miranda invocation but not
invite inculpatory statements.
~

25 Given Tiedemann's unambiguous
invocation of his right to remain silent,
but accompanied by ambiguity as to the
scope of such an invocation, I conclude
that th e police officers were entitled either
to stop their inte1Togation completely or to
properly seek clarification regarding the scope
of Tiedemann's invocation. Therefore, their

about." Infra ~ 6 I. But, in my view, the officers'
actions demonstrated that they recognized that
Tiedemann wished to invoke his "·1112 right
to remain silent. When their careful inquiry
failed to elicit clarity regarding the scope
of Tiedemann's invocation, Justice Wilkins
concludes, albeit based on his view that
Tiedemann's invocation was ambiguous, that
"the officers properly continued questioning."
Id. The better conclusion, in my view, is that
the officers should have respected Tiedemann's
invocation and ceased their interrogation when
their attempts to clarify the scope of the
invocation were unsuccessful.

question "\Vhat don't you want to talk about?" 1
was legitimate. However, on the two occasions
Tiedemann was asked to clarify what " it"
was that he did not want to talk about,
he was denied the opportunity to answer.
In the first instance, Sergeant Spann asked
Tiedemann two questions at once, "What is it
that you don't want to talk about?" and "You
Sa ;d 1n111-dp1-0 ;,.. Y,.V\/pd '',:, llp" n1hP[P i11 1Xfpst
Valley?" Tiedemann answered only the second
ques tion regarding the location of the murders.
In the second instance, Sergeant Spann asked
Tiedemann "[ w ]hat part do you and what
part don't you want to ta lk to us about?",
but before Tiedemann answered, Detective
Edwards asked, "Edgar[,] do you remember
me reading you[r] rights earlier and you
signing a waiver for us to search your home?"
Tiedemann answered only Detective Edward's
quest ion , and Detective Edwards continued
asking Tiedemann about the shootings.

~

~I 26 I agree with Justice \Vilkins that "the
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officers \Vere careful to inquire as to what
Tiedemann did, and did not , want to ta lk

f· i.:;. -

27 \Vith respect to the pauses following
questions posed by the officers during the
inteITogation as described by Justice Wilkins, I
agree that the "officers allowed ampl e time for
Mr. Tiedemann to respond" and that he "failed
to do so." Infra ~ 63. In my view, however,
Tiedernann's failure to respond underscored his
unambi guous invocation of his right to remain
silent.

~

28 I also wish to comment on the majority's
interpretation of th e word "it" in Tiedemann's
statement "I don't want to talk about it. "
As amply illustrated by the fact that there
are three separate opinions on this particular
issue, I think this court's ability to accurately
deten11ine the meaning of the pronoun " it"
is limited. In addition, I believe that the
majority's instruction to the di strict court to
retroactively app ly its interpretation through
a systematic question-by-question parsing of
the intenogation trnnscript will be difficult and
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~

29 Following Tiedemmm's invocation of
his right to remain silent and before the
officers continued their inteITogation, the
officers should have clarified what, if anything,
Tiedemann was willing to talk about. Having
failed to do so, the officers were not, in my
view, entitled to continue their inteITogation.
Because I conclude that Tiedemann was
denied the opportunity to clarify the scope
of his unequivocal invocation of his Miranda
rights, I also conclude that all of Tiedemann's
interrogation subsequent to his statement "I
don't want to talk about it" should be
suppressed, and therefore dissent from the
opinion of Justice DmTant for the majority of
the court on this question.

II. DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

,r

30 Tiedemann argues that the State's
destruction of evidence 1s a violation
of Federal Due Process under the Fifth
Amendment because the evidence may have
been exculpatory , no comparable evidence
sti 11 exists, and the destruction was done in
bad faith. Tiedemann therefore asks that the
trial court ruling be reversed and the charges
dismissed.

~

31 In tl1 e alternative, Tiedemann asks this
court to look to article L section 7 of the
Utah Constitution and adopt an analysis that
considers several factors , including the State's
culpability in destroying the evidence, the
significance of the evidence destroyed, and the
prejudice of the destruction to the defendant.

A. State Constitutional Standard

,r

32 Tiedernann's brief in this matter clearly
raises and extensively briefs state law claims.
The State argues that Tiedemann failed to
preserve his state law arguments before the trial
court. The State further contends :
This Court should also decline to
address defendant's state constitutional claim
because he has not adequately developed
it using "historical and textual evidence,
sister state law, and policy arguments in
the fom1 of economic and sociological
materials to assist [the Comt] in arriving
at a proper interpretation of the provision
in question." Society o(Separationists, Inc.
v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6
(Utah I 993). While defendant does cite to
sister state law, he fails to analyze his
claim within "the unique context in which
Utah's constitution developed." Indeed, he
does not even mention that the language of
the *1113 federal and state due process
clauses are identical or explain why, given
that circumstance, the clauses should be
interpreted differently.

(first alteration in original) (quoting State
v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 n. 5 (Utah
Ct.App.1990)) . We have quoted the State's
argument at length because we wish to address
what we view as a fundamental misconception
of the logic of and proper approach to state
constitutional law development.

151 lfil.

~

33 First, the preservation argument
is clearly inapplicable here. The State concedes
in its brief that Tiedemann did in fact request
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that the trial court decide the question as
a matter of state law, and the trial court's
memorandum decision indicates as much.
Second, the State's position that the analysis
of federal constitutional provisions constitutes
the default interpretive stance of this court visa-vis state law is not correct. The fact that
the state and federal constitutional language
is identical does not require a claimant
to create some threshold for independent
analysis of the state language. This court,
not the United States Supreme Corni, has the
authority and obligation to interpret Utah's
constitutional guarantees, including the scope
of due process, and we owe federal law no
more deference in that regard than we do
sister state interpretation of identical state
language. See, e.g., State v. DeBoov, 2000
UT 32, ~ l?, 996 P.?d 546 (recognizing that
article L section 14 of the Utah Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment contain identical
language, but stating that the com1 "will
not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a
different construction where doing so will more
appropriately protect the rights of this state's
citizens"). Furthermore, it is part of the inherent
logic of federalism that state law be interpreted
independently and prior to consideration of
federal questions. Hans A. Linde, First Things
First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U . Bait L.Rev. 379, 383-84 (1980); see
also FVest v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d
999, l 006 (Utah 1994) ("By looking first
to state constitutional principles, we also act
in accordance with the original purpose of
the federal system."). This is so because
the State cannot, conceptually, deny rights
guaranteed by the federal constitution if the
state action complained of is unlawful as a
matter of state law. Thus, if state statutes, rules,

,·.:.-:.·.,·

or constitutional principles preclude the state
action in question, there is no need to assess
the federal constitutionality of that action. See
Linde, supra at 383. This analytical approach
is known as the "primacy model," West, 872
P.2d at 1005- 07, and we have endorsed it
in a number of cases, see, e.g., id. at 100607. 1020-21 (adopting the primacy model in
the defamation context); State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774. 781-84 (Utah 1991) (addressing
defendant's claim under article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution before proceeding to his
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution); Amax Magnesium
Corp. v. Tax C01nm'n, 796 P.2d 1?56, 1261
(Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cmmot
withstand attack under the state constitution,
there is no reason to reach the federal
question."). We have, however, historically
relied on other approaches, usually because of
the way in which such issues have been framed
by the parties. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 464-65. 471 (Utah 1990) (plurality
opinion) (conducting a federal constitutional
analysis of the defendant's unlawful search
claim before conducting a state constitutional
analysis, and concluding that the search was
reasonable under the federal constitution but
not under the state constitution).

if

34 Federal constitutional discourse and
vocabulary have dominated constitutional
criminal procedure cases for so long that it
continues to be difficult for lawyers to shift
their perspectives in state cases . A recent
example of such difficulties in Utah was
commented on by Justice Stevens in his
separate opinion in Brigham Citv v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943. 164 L.Ed.2d 650
(2006)(Stevens, J., concmTing). That case was
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on appeal from this court's review of a search
and seizure question in Brigham Citv v. Stuart,
2005 UT 13, 122 P.3d 506, rev'd, 547 U.S. 398,
126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). In
our opinion, we noted the line of Utah cases
in which we have concluded that Utah's search
and seizure provisions (which are identical to
those in the federal constitution) provide "a
greater expectation ,;:1114 of privacy than
the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." Id. 1110- 11.
We criticized the failure of the appe ll ant to
raise and argue the state claims, and observed:
"Where the parties do not raise or adequately
brief state constitutional issues, our holdings
become inevitably contingent." Id. 1 12.

1

35 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari "in light of differences
among state courts and the federal courts
of appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth
Amendment standard governing warnmtless
entry by law enforcement in an emergency
situation." Brigham City , 126 S.Ct. at 1947. In
his separate opinion, Justice Stevens addressed
what he viewed as the futility of the Court's
exercise in granting certiorari and resolving the
federal question:
Our holding today addresses
only
the limitations placed by the Federal
Constitution on the search at issue; we have
no authority to decide whether the police in
this case violated the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has
made clear that the Utah Constitution
provides greater protection to the privacy of
the home than does the Fourth Amendment.
And it complained 111 this case of
responden ts' failure to raise or adequately

brief a state constitutional challenge, thus
preventing the state courts from deciding
the case on anything other than Fourth
Amendment grounds.... The fact that this
admonishment and request came from the
Utah Supreme Comi in this very case
not only demonstrates that the prosecution
selected the wrong case for establishing the
rule it wants, but indicates that the Utah
Supre,ne Court would probably adopt the
same rule as a matter of state constitutional
law that we reject today under the Federal
Constitution.

Id. at 19 50 (Stevens, J., concuning) ( emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted).
~

36 The State's resistance to this court's
treatment of the state constitutional issues
raised in this case reflects the same shortsightedness des_cribed by Justice Stevens in
Brigham City. The federal law on this question
will serve only as a contingent rule in Utah
until this court has settled the primary question
of state law, and all paiiies, including the
State, are well-advised to assist this court in its
obligations to interpret that law.
llj[ 3 7 Furthern1ore, we reject the State's
suggestion in its brief that there is a fonnula
of some kind for adequate framing and
briefing of state constitutional issues before
district courts and this comt. 2 We have
on numerous occasions cited with favor the
traditional methods of constitutional analysis.
See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 947 P .2d 630,
633 (Utah 1997) ("In interpreting the state
constitution, we look primarily to the language
of the constitution itself but may also look
to ' historical and textual evidence, sister state
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law, and policy arguments in the form of
economic and sociological materials to assist
us in arriving at a proper interpretation of
the provision in question.' " ( quoting Soc 'v
of Separationists v. FVhitehead, 870 P.2d
916, 921 n. 6 (Utah 1993))). We have also
frequei1tly noted that mere mention of state
provisions wi 11 not suffice. We disagree,
however, with the trial court's suggestion in
its Memorandum Decision that Tiedemman's
failure to offer analysis of the "unique context
in which Utah's Constitution developed [ or
to show] why this State's Constitution should
be interpreted differently than the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution" precluded treatment of the state
claim. Historical arguments may be persuasive
in some cases, but they do not represent
a sine qua non 111 constitutional analysis.
Further, we do not require some showing ·
that federa l analysis is flawed in order to
undertake independent state interpretation,
although we have occasionally *1115 used
such arguments to bolster our conclusions. See,
e.g., Larocco, 794 P .2d at 467- 70 (plurality
opinion) (recognizing "significant confusion"
in federal search and seizure law and taking the
opportunity to simplify search and seizure rules
under the Utah Constitution by interpreting
article I, section 14 to provide greater privacy
protections with regard to automobile searches
than the federal constitution); State v. Watts,
750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8 (Utah 1988)
("[C]hoosing to gi ve the Utah Constih1tion
a somewhat different construction [than the
federal constitution] may prove to be an
appropriate method for insulating the state's
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment
by the federal courts."). In theory, a claimant

•
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could rely on nothing more than plain language
to make an argument for a construction of a
Utah provision that would be different from
the interpretation the federal courts have given
similar language. Independent analysis must
begin with the constitutional text and rely on
whatever assistance legitimate sources may
provide in the interpretive process . There is no
presumption that federal constmction of similar
language is correct.
,i 38 In this case, Tiedemann clearly raised
the state constih1tional question and submitted
arguments, albeit ones the trial court found
unpersuasive, below. Likewise, in his brief
on appeal, Tiedemann has devoted a separate
section of his brief to the issue of state
due process requirements in the context of
destruction of evidence by the State. He has
cited Utah due process cases and decisions
from other state courts construing their due
process requirements, including a number of
states that have rejected the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Comi in interpreting
federal law. Given our call in Brigham City
for litigants to participate in the development
of state constitutional principles, we should not
decline to treat the claims properly raised here.

B. State Due Process
and Destroyed Evidence

111 ii 39

The question before us is whether a
defendant must show bad faith on the part of
the State in the loss or destruction of evidence
before he may seek a remedy under state law.

,r

40 It is a matter of clear Utah law that
criminal defendants are entitled to infonnation
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possessed by the State to aid in their
defense. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure imposes broad obligations
on prosecutors to produce such infonnation
or make it available to a deferidant. Utah
R.Crim. P. 16. We have on numerous occasions
enforced its requirements, and we noted in State
v. Knight:
The prosecutor's good faith
should not have had any
impact on the trial court's
determination of whether
the prosecutor had violated
his
discovery
duties.,.,
[T]he prosecutor's good
faith ignorance does not
excuse non-disclosure. If
any weight were given to
good faith ignorance, it
would only encourage afterthe-fact justifications for
nondisclosure.
734 P.2d 913,918 n. 5 (Utah 1987).
~

41 We have identified several factors under
rule 16 to guide a trial court's decision on
a motion to exclude prosecution evidence
because of a failure to fully disclose. State v.
Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). These
factors are also relevant to a motion, like the
one here, to dismiss charges for destruction
of evidence. The nonexclusive factors we
consider under rule 16 are

(1) the extent to which the
prosecution's representation
[of the existing evidence] is
actually inaccurate, (2) the
tendency of the omission or

1·-J : ,·

misstatement to lead defense
counsel into tactics
or
strategy that could prejudice
the
outcome,
(3)
the
culpability of the prosecutor
m
omitting
pe1iinent
information or misstating the
facts, and (4) the extent to
which appropriate defense
investigation would have
discovered the omitted or
misstated evidence.

Id. Our approach under rule 16 should govern
the destruction of evidence, and the culpability
or bad faith of the state should be only one
consideration, not a bright line test, as a matter
of due process under article 1, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution.

,i 42 Justice Stevens' separate concurrence in
Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct.
333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), argued *1116
that "there may well be cases in which the
defendant is unable to prove that the State
acted in bad faith but in which the loss
or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair." Id. at 61, 109 S.Ct. 333.
We agree with this assessment. Many states that
have explored this question under their state
clue process guarantees have also agreed. See,
e.g., Thorne v. D ep't o[Pub. Saf~ ty. 774 P.2d
1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989) (construing the due
process clause of the Alaska Constitution to
not require a showing of bad faith); State v.
Jvforales, 232 Conn. 707, 657 A.2d 585, 5949 5 ( 199 5) (concluding that the state due process
clause does not have the same meaning as the
federal due process clause and that it requires
a balancing of the materiality of missing
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evidence, the reasons for its unavailability,
the likelihood of mistake by witnesses or
juries, and the prejudice to the defendant);
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81. 87 (Del.1989)
( noting that rules regarding preservation of
evidence are generally matters of state law and
reaffirming prior test for balancing degree of
negligence or bad faith, importance of missing
evidence, and sufficiency of other evidence
in suppo1i of conviction); State v. Mataf'eo.
71 Haw. 183, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (1990)
(recognizing that due process inquiry must go
beyond Youngblood because, in some cases,
the state may destroy evidence, in good or
bad faith, that is so critical to the defense that
it makes the rule unfair); Convnonwealth v.
Henderson, 41 l Mass. 309, 582 N.E.2d 496,
496- 97 (1991) (holding that Massachusetts'
due process rule is stricter than the federal
rule and requires balancing of the government's
culpability, materiality of the evidence, and
potenti al prejudice to the defendant); State v.
&rguson. 2 S.W.3d 912, 914 (Teirn.1999)
(holding that "the due process principles of
the Tennessee Constit1.1tion are broader than
those enunciated in the [federal] Constitution"
and "fundamental fairness ... requires that the
State's failure to preserve evidence that could
be favorable to the defendant be evaluated
in the context of the entire record") ; State v.
Delisle. 162 Vt. 293, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43
{1994) (holding that where the defendant shows
a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence
would be exculpatory, state constitutional due
process standards require ba lancing of the
culpability of the governm ent, the prejudice
to a defendant, and the importance of the
lost evidence); State v. Osakalumi, 194 W.Va.
758, 461 S.E .2d 504. 512 (1995)_ (holding
as a matter of state constitutional law that

·

-·

"fundamental fairness requires [the court]
to evaluate the State's failure to preserve
potentially exculpatory evidence in the context
of the entire record"). 1
~

43 In Delisle, for example, the Vennont
Supreme Court rejected the use of the
Youngblood test as the standard under its
state constitution. Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643. In
rejecting the federal standard, the comi noted
that it believed Youngblood was "both too
broad and too nanow." Id. Specifically, the
court stated that Youngblood was too broad
because it required "the imposition of *1117
sanctions even though a defendant [ did not]
demonstrate[ ] [any] prejudice from the lost
evidence." Id. And it was too natTOW because it
"limit[ ed] due process violations to only those
cases in which a defendant can demonstrate
bad faith, even though the negligent loss of
evidence may critically prejudice a defendant."
Id. The cou1i therefore adopted its own test.
Id. Under the test, if a defendant demonstrated
"a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence
would be exculpatory," then the court would
determine the proper sanctions by balancing
"( 1) the degree of negligence or bad faith on
the part of the government; (2) the importance
of the evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of
guilt adduced at trial." Id. at 642-43.
[8]. ,i 44 Like the Vermont Supreme Court,
we believe that the federal rule adopted in
Youngblood is "both too broad and too narrow"
to serve as an adequate safeguard of the
fundamental fairness required by article L
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Thus,
we conclude that some balancing of factors
on a case-by-case basis is required. That
balancing should embrace the basic principles
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we have adopted under rule 16 and the
factors mentioned by other states. In cases
where a defendant has shown a reasonable
probability that lost or destroyed evidence
would be exculpatory, we find it necessary
to require consideration of the following: (1)
the reason for the destruction or loss of the
evidence, including the degree of negligence
or culpability on the paii of the State; and
(2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant in
light of the materiality and importance of the
missing evidence in the context of the case as a
whole, including the strength of the remaining
evidence.
~

45 The touchstone for the balancing process
is fundamental fairness. If the behavior of
the State in a given case is so reprehensible
as to wanant sanction, a sanction might be
available even where prejudice to the defendant
is slight or only speculative. If prejudice to
the defendant, on the other hand, is extreme,
fairness may require sanction even where
there is no wrongdoing on the pa1i of the
State. In between those extremes, we have
confidence that trial judges can strike a balance
that preserves defendants' constitutional rights
without undue hardship to the prosecution.
~

46 In this case, Tiedemann has not shown
any degree of culpability or bad faith on the
part of the State, and the reasons for the
loss of the evidence are entirely routine and
benign: the passage of a very long period
of time and the State's assumption, based on
expert testimony, that Tiedemann would never
become competent to stand trial. However, as
to the second category of considerations, the
trial court bas had no opportunity to review
them under the state due process clause, and

-·---·

neither party has briefed their application to the
facts here. Thus, we remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings on these matters.

CONCLUSION
~

47 Because the majority concludes that
Tiedemann's responses to certain questions
during his interrogation are admissible, we
remand this case to the trial comi to
detennine which responses are in that category.
Furthe1111ore, we reverse the pretrial order
denying Tiedernann's motion to dismiss based
on the State's destruction · of potentially
exculpatory evidence, and lik:e-i.vise remand that
issue for the trial court's consideration in light
of this opinion.

DURRANT, Justice, writing for the majority:

121

~

48 We agree with our colleagues
that Tiedemann validly waived his right
to remain silent. We further agree that a
defendant who wishes to invoke this right after
having waived it bears the burden of clearly
communicating that desire. We disagree as to
whether Tiedemann met this burden. Chief
Justice Durham is of the view that Tiedemann
did, in fact, clearly reinvoke his right to
remain silent and would therefore exclude all
of his answers to questions posed after that
reinvocation. Justice Wilkins is of the view
that Tiedemann did not clearly reinvoke hi s
right and would therefore exclude none of his
answers. We believe the better interpretation
lies in between these t,vo views.
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•~1118 ,I 49 A defendant controls his right
to remain silent. He may invoke it as to all
matters or only as to some. He may choose to
discuss some topics while eschewing others.
By stating "I don't want to talk about it,"
Tiedemann clearly indicated a desire not to
talk about something. The ambiguity lies in the
pronoun "it." What did Tiedemann not want to
talk about? Our reading of the transcript leads
us to conclude that, at a minimum, Tiedemann
did not want to talk about "what happened to
Suzie." To us this much is clear. It is far from
clear, however, whether he intended to asse1i
his right to remain silent beyond this, and we
believe the officers were therefore entitled to
seek appropriate clarification. But in seeking
that clarification, they were not entitled to
direct questions specifically to "what happened
to Suzie."

,I 50 The transcript reads as follows with respect
to Tiedemann's first indication that he wished
to reassert in some measure his right to remain
silent:
RE (Detective Ron Edwards):
Okay, do you know why we're going to
talk to you?
ET (Edgar Tiedemann):
Ya.
RE: What are we going to talk to you about?
ET: The murders out there.

RE: What murders?
ET: The murders out there at West Valley.

RE: Who are they?
ET: Suzie, Chuck and Scotty.
RE: Whose Suzie?
ET: She's the woman I love.
RE: That you love?
ET: Ya.

RE: What happened to her?
ET: I don't want to talk about it.

i! 51

The obvious candidate for the antecedent
of the pronoun "it" in "I don't want to talk about
it" is the immediately preceding question:
"What happened to her?" Thus, Tiedemann
effectively stated: "I don't want to talk about
what happened to Suzie." We believe this to
be the fairest interpretation of Tiedemann's
statement. But theoretically the antecedent of
"it" may have been "The murders out there at
West Valley," making Tiedemann's statement
the equivalent of "I don't want to talk about the
murders out there at West Valley."

~

52 Given this ambiguity as to the scope
of Tiedemann's reinvocation of his right to
remain silent, we believe the police officers
were entitled to seek clarification. And we think
the manner in which they did so was perfectly
appropriate. Sergeant Spann first asked, "What
don't you want to talk about?" .8. In response,
Tiedemann stated, "I love that woman so
much." Sergeant Spann again asked , "What
is it that you don't want to talk about? You
said murders in West Valley, where in West
Valley?" A di scussion then followed regarding
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Tiedernann's address and the fact that "Suzie
and Scotty and they just moved in last night."
Detective Edwards then again asked, "Okay,
what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What
don't you want to talk about, Ed?" After waiting
for a reply for close to ten seconds, Sergeant
Spann stated as follows:

Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk
about anything. We're asking you questions.
As Detective Edwards stated, you can
answer[ ] this question [ ], not answer that
question, answer this question, not answer
that question. You don't have to answer any
of our questions at all. You can stop at
anytime.
To this Tiedemann replied, "Okay."
Sergeant Spam1 added, "He made that clear
to you, right?" Tiedemann responded, "Ya."
,i 53 As we view the videotape, Tiedemann
was not denied the opportunity to clarify
the scope of his reinvocation of the right to
remain silent; rather, the officers gave him
multiple opportunities to clarify the scope of his
reinvocation. Further, the officers emphasized
to Tiedemann that he controlled his right, that
he could "answer this question, *1119 not
answer that question." The officers were not
deceptive, abusive, or intimidating. Nor did
they cut off Tiedemann's oppo1iunity to clarify
his reinvocation of his right to remain silent.
Despite this opportunity, at this point in the
inteITogation, Tiedemann had unambiguously
asserted his right to remain silent only as to
Suzie , but not as to the other victims. Therefore,
while the officers were precluded from asking
about Suzie, they were free to ask about the
other victims.

,i 54 Accordingly, we believe that Detective
Edwards was justified in posing the question
"Okay, we were called to your home on a
gunshot. We got in there and seen some
people. Who shot them?" Tiedemann could
have answered the question without reference
to Suzie, and the officers were entitled
to ask about the other victims. Tiedemann
stated, "Me," to which Detective Edwards
responded, "You did?" Tiedemam1 replied,
"Ya." Detective Edwards then asked, "Why
did you shoot them?" Again, Tiedemann could
have answered the question without reference
to Suzie, and the officers were entitled to ask
about the other victims. Instead Tiedemann
volunteered, "I shot Suzie cause I love her and
I shot the other two."
~

55 The interrogation then proceeded,
and the officers asked questions specifically
about Chuck and Debra. They then asked
another question that did not reference a
particular victim: "Okay, why? Why did you
shoot them?" Tiedemann again volunteered
infom1ation about Suzie: "I shot Suzie cause
I love her, I love her so much." At this
point in the interrogation, Detective Edwards
asked Tiedemann two questions specifically
about Suzie. Further, at various points in
the questioning that followed, the officers
asked Tiedemann questions specifically about
Suzie. We would exclude all of Tiedemann's
responses to such questions. But we would
allow Tiedemann's responses to all questions
that were not specifically about Suzie and could
have been answered as to the other victims
without reference to Suzie.

,i 56 We agree with all other aspects of the
majority opinion.
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, , 57 Justice PARRISH and Justice NEHRING
concur in Justice DURRANT'S opinion.

WILIUNS, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
~ 58 I respectfully dissent. Once Mr.
Tiedemann effectively waived his right to
remain silent, he was subject to police
interrogation until he unequivocally reinvoked
that right. Careful review of the record,
including the video recording of the critical
portion of the interrogation, makes only
one thing clear: Mr. Tiedemann was not
unequivocal in any attempt he may have
made to reinvoke his right to silence. As
a consequence, his statements to the police
intenogators after voluntarily waiving his
rights against self-incrimination may properly
be admitted in any trial relating to his multiple
murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault,
and rape charges.
~

59 All agree that Mr. Tiedemann voluntarily
and effectively waived his right to remain silent
when initially informed of his right to do so.
After carefully reconfirming the waiver and
Mr. Tiedemam1's understanding of the waiver
at the beginning of the video recording of
the interrogation, the officers ask him what
happened. Mr. Tiedemann answers a number
of questions, including some referring to one
of the murder victims, Suzie. When the officer
asks what happened to Suzie, Mr. Tiedemann
says be does not "want to talk about it."

il

60 The confusion, if any, arises from Mr.
Tiedemann's response. It is clear from review
of the interrogation video that the officers were

1-

J"'·, .

---

caref-t.11 to inquire as to what Tiedemann did,
and did not, want to talk about. Mr. Tiedemann
failed to clarify his ambiguous statements, and
the officers properly continued questioning.
Once Mr. Tiedemann was asked to clarify the
meaning of his "I don't want to talk about it"
statement, the officers were under no obligation
to probe forther when the defendant failed to
offer any clarification. Once he waived his right
to remain silent, Mr. Tiedemann assumed the
duty to clearly and unequivocally reinvoke that
right if that was his intention. An ambiguous
statement followed by non-responsive replies
to questions about what he does *1120 not
want to talk about does not shift the burden
back to the state to figure it out.

1

61 In addition, when the video of the
interrogation is viewed, it becomes clear that
the officers acted properly and gave ample time
for Mr. Tiedemann to respond to questioning.
The transcript records the questioning as
follows: "Okay, what don't you want to talk
about? Edgar? What don't you want to talk
about, Ed? Edgar, we're not going to force you
to talk about anything .... " What the transcript
fails to illustrate is the pauses between each
question to allow time to answer. Because
Mr. Tiedemann did not respond to any of the
questions, the transcript shows one question
after another. It could appear that the officers
were barraging Mr. Tiedemann with questions,
and that Mr. Tiedemann bad no time to process,
yet alone answer, the questions.

~

62 The unedited video, on the other hand,
shows that the officers allowed ample time for
Mr. Tiedemann to respond ; he simply failed
to do so. The officers paused between each
question, sometimes for up to ten seconds, to
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allow him to respond. Mr. Tiedemann failed to
clarify his equivocal statement.
~

63 As we have said before, "if the suspect
is not reasonably clear in his [attempt to stop
questioning after waiving his rights], officers
are not required to stop questioning or focus
on clarifying the suspect's statement." State v.
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah 1997). The
officers, in the case of Mr. Tiedemann, went
beyond what our law requires. When faced
with the ambiguous statement, the officers gave
Mr. Tiedemann ample opportunity to clearly
reinvoke his right to remain silent. Not only
did he fail to clarify his intent, he listened to
the officers explain again that he could stop
answering at any time and that they would not
force him to answer any question. Given this
reemphasis and patient inquiry by the officers,
however, he failed to clear the ambiguity, and,
in fact, continued to answer questions about the
murders and other crimes.
~

64 The law places a "heavy burden" on the
state to initially establish a suspect's !mowing
and voluntary waiver of the constitutional
right to remain silent in the face of police
interrogation, and rightly so. Id. at 743.
However, once a suspect has voluntarily and
lmowingly waived that right, any attempt to
reinvoke the right shifts the burden, and the
requirement of clarity, to the suspect. Id. In
other words, the law only requires the state
to prove the right was lawfully waived. He
who claims to reinvoke the right thereafter
must prove that it was clone with sufficient
clarity as to make it unambiguous. A statement,
taken in context, that a suspect doesn't want
to talk about "it," without more, is insufficient
to shift the burden back to the state. A careful

post-hoc parsing of the phrasing and language
by a reviewing court may be helpful, but it
would impose an unattainable burden on law
enforcement, and likely result in the need to
treat any suggestion as a "clear" re-invocation
of the right waived. Such a result is neither
required, nor useful.

1 65

In the parallel circumstance of a suspect
first waiving and then making an ambiguous
request for counsel, we reached the same
conclusion. Relying on reasoning from both
our prior decision in Leyva, and the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350.
129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), we observed that
the requirement
that
an
officer
limit
his
questioning to clarifying
a suspect's ambiguous or
equivocal invocation of the
right to counsel must
be limited to prewaiver
scenanos....
[A]fter
a
knowing
and voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights,
law enforcement officers
may continue questioning
until and unless the suspect
clearly requests an attorney.
In other words, police do
not need to limit their
questioning to clarifying
questions when a suspect
who has previously waived
his .Afiranda rights makes
an ambiguous request for
counsel. Furthem1ore, we
see no reason why this
same rule should be different
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for ambiguous assertions
of the right to remain
silent. Therefore, because
it
1s
undisputed
that
[the defendant] voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights,
the detectives were free to
question him until and unless
he unambiguously reinvoked
either his 1:1121 right to
counsel or his right to remain
silent.
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930. 935 n. 4
(Utah 1998) ( citations and internal quotations
omitted).

if

66 In the case before us, the officers were
unable to determine from his statement whether
Mr. Tiedemann wished to reinvoke his right
to remain silent. Due to the equivocal nature
of Mr. Tiedemann's statement, and despite
being under no obligation to do so, the officers
made reasonable attempts to understand what
he meant. They asked, "What don 1t you want
to talk about?" After allowing ample time
for Mr. Tiedemann to respond and clarify his
statement, which he did not do, the officers
continued with questioning, and Tiedemann
confessed to the murders. The officers were
well within the bounds of constitutional
behavior in doing so.

ambiguous. I do not read the record or view the
video recording of the event to reveal anything
other than that Mr. Tiedemann's statement was
ambiguous, at most. One could very easily .
conclude that the statement was more of an
expression of remorse and pain than one of
reinvoked rights.

,-i 68 Ultimately, Mr. Tiedemann knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent. The heavy burden that rests upon the
state to establish a valid waiver in the first
place shifts thereafter to the defendant to prove
a reinvocation of the waived right. Once he
waived his right to silence, this burden shifted
to Mr. Tiedemann. He failed to unequivocally
reinvoke his right, and his confession is
properly subject to admission.

1 69

I would affim1 the decision of the trial
court that the defendant failed to adequately
reinvoke his right to remain silent.

il

70 Moreover, given my analysis of the
admissibility of Mr. Tiedemann's confessions
to the various crimes with which he is
charged, I see no possibility, as a matter
of law, of any prejudice arising from the
State's destruction of any of the evidence over
the years. Consequently, I would affirm the
decision of the trial court on that matter as well.
~

,i 67 The trial court agreed that Mr.
Tiedemann's rein vocation of the right to remain
silent, if that was what it was intended to be,
was ambiguous. My colleagues concede that
the "scope of Tiedemann's invocation" was

t .. _1.,.;_.,

..

71 I would affim1.

All C itations
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Scott Bunnell died in February 2001 due to the injuries he sustained on November 2, 1991. Accordingly, with respect to
Mr. Bunnell , the original charge for attempted murder was changed to murder.
Although the transcript of the interrogation recorded Tiedemann's response as being "inaudible," a viewing of the video
reveals that Tiedemann, with head down and in a muffled tone, said "ya."
As this court noted in Leyva, because we have never established the existence of Miranda protections under the
Utah Constitution, issues concerning Miranda are analyzed using federal law and the provisions of the United States
Constitution . Levva. 951 P.2d at 743.
The transcript mistakenly substitutes "why" for "what."
For example, the majority opinion would admit Tiedemann's answer to the question "Why did you shoot them?" found
on page 3 of the transcript, because the question "did not reference a particular victim ." Infra 11 56. However. the same
question, when asked on page 34 of the transcript would not be admitted because it becomes clear from Tiedemann's
answer, "I don't know," and the very next question, "Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then?" that the officers were
referencing all three of the victims in the prior question. I question the wisdom of requiring the trial court to undertake
this sort of linguistic interpretation.
We likewise reject the court of appeals' suggestion in State v. Bobo , 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct.App.1990), that an attorney
must follow a set formula in order to adequately brief a state constitutional issue. Id. at 1273 n. 5 (instructing attorneys
wishing to raise state constitutional issues in their briefs to (1) analyze "the unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed"; (2) "demonstrate that state appellate courts regularly interpret even te xtually similar state constitutionai
provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution"; and (3) cite "authority from
other states supporting the particular construction urged by counsel").
Ironically, Arizona is one of the states that has adopted a bright-line bad faith requirement as a matter of state due
process. On remand from the United States Supreme Court in the Youngblood case , the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that "the Due Process Clause of the Arizona Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart. " State v.
Youngblood, 164 Ariz. 61, 790 P .2d 759, 762 (Ct.ApQ .1989) (citation omitted). The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed . In
State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 844 P .2d 1152 ( 1993 ). the court relied on prior state law, including the availability of
a jury instruction permitting inferences from missing material evidence favorable to the defendant, and held that "absent
bad faith on the part of the state , the failure to preserve evidentiary material which could have been subjected to tests ,
the results of which might have exonerated the defendant, does not constitute a denial of due process of law under the
Arizona Constitution. " Id. at 1158.
Other states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state law include California, People v. Cooper. 53 Cal.3d 771 . 281
Cal.Rptr. 90 . 809 P.2d 865, 886 (1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the court should not, as a matter of state
law, follow federal cases regarding destruction of evidence issues and instead applying Youngblood to defendant's
claims); Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealt/1. 951 S.W.2d 569. 572-73 (Ky.1997) {declining to reject Youngblood
approach ba sed on defendant's argument that the Kentucky Constitution used different wording than the federal
constitution). and North Carolina , State v. Ordal<. 330 N.C. 587. 411 S.E.2d 604 , 608 (1992) (rejecting defendant"s
destruction of evidence cla im under the North Carolina Con stitution because he fa iled to show bad faith) .
A revi ew of the vid eotape reveals that this was the actual question. not the question indicated in the transcript.
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Synopsis
Background : Defendant was convicted in a
jury trial in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Randall N. Skanchy, J.,
of attempted aggravated murder, cruelty to
animals, and assault. Defendant appealed.

Criminal Law
· ii= Hearsay
Criminal Law
( ;=. Hearsay

When reviewing rnlings on hearsay,
appellate court reviews
legal
questions regarding admissibility for
c01Tectness, questions of fact for
clear e1Tor, and the final ruling on
admissibility for abuse of discretion.

H oldings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held
that :

ill

any error in admitting officers' alleged
hearsay testimony and allegedly prejudicial
photographic depiction of victims' injuries was
not reversible error;

Criminal Law
,(,.., Evidence

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

[1]_State's alleged destruction of evidence did

Criminal Law
1t= Relevance

A trial court's ruling as to whether
the probative value of rel evant
evidence is substantially outweighed
by danger of unfair prejudice is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Rules of Evid., Rul e 403.

not warrant di sm issal of charges;

ill

trial court did not abuse its discretion
in reopening case to allo w State to present
evidence of defendant's identity with regard to
prio r conv icti on;

1 Cases that cite this headnote

BJ

two consecutive sentences of five years to
life for attemp ted murder conv ictions was not
an abuse of di scretion; and
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[3]

Criminal Law
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.~,, mjudice to ri ghts of accused in
general

[6]

Evidentiary enors on the part of the
trial court will only be reversed if
prejudicial.

A court should consider a motion to
reopen to take additional testimony
in light of all the circumstances and
grant or deny it in the interest of
fairness and substantial justice.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[41

Criminal Law
"-'~- Arguments and conduct of
counse l
Criminal Law
'= Arguments and conduct of
counsel
Whether the State's destruction
of potentially excu lpatory evidence
violates due process is a question
of law that appellate courts review
for correctness; however, because
this question requires application
of facts in the record to the due
process standard, appell ate courts
in corporate a clearly erroneous
standard for the necessary subsidiary
factual determinations. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Criminal Law
.,~ After submission of case to jury:
A motion to reopen to take additional
testimony when a case bas been
submitted to the court, but prior to
the entry of judgment, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.

Criminal Law
.;:"" Reopening Case for Further
Evidence

Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Criminal Law
( = Sentencing
Appellate court reviews sentences
for abuse of discretion, and abuse
of discretion may be manifest if
the actions of the trial judge in
sentencing were inherently unfair
or if the judge imposed a clearly
excessive sentence.
Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

Criminal Law
"--= Selection and impaneling
Criminal Law
"= Ju1y selection
Second Batson step, a deten11ination
of whether the State presented
a facially neutral reason for
peremptory strike, is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion, and the
third step, whether the State's actual
motivation was discriminatory, is
reviewed for clear error because it
involves a weighing of the evidence.
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[9]

Criminal Law
~= Admissions, declarations, and
hearsay; confessions

Any error in trial court's admitting
police officers' alleged hearsay
testimony under excited utterance
exception and pnor consistent
statement
exception
did
not
prejudice the outcome of attempted
murder trial and thus was not
reversible en-or; alleged hearsay
testimony was cumulative because it
reiterated the essence of testimony
presented by the victims or other
eyewitnesses, even if the exact
wording was different. Rules of
Evid., Rules 80l(d)(l)(B), 803(2).
Cases that cite this headnote

[10] Homicide
.-... Nature and imminence of danger
Homicide
•~= Amount of force

Even if defendant was not the first
aggressor, reasonable minds would
conclude that the risk of death
or serious injury after victim's son
retreated from defendant's car \Vas
not imminent and that defendant
used unreasonable and unnecessary
force to protect himself, and this
defeated his self-defense theory
in attempted murder prosecution;
eyewitnesses heard what sounded
like car crash and then observed
v1ct1111 on the ground saying
defendant had just hit her with
his car, and eyewitnesses also saw
i·._!.:.·:
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defendant get out of his car, chase
victim's son with butcher knife while
threatening to kill him, and then stab
the son in the back. West's U.C.A.
76-?-402(1).
Cases that cite this headnote

[11] Criminal Law
e= Documentary and demonstrative
evidence

Any en-or in trial court's admitting
photographic depiction of severe
injuries that defendant admittedly
inflicted, under rule providing for
exclusion of relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially
outweighed by danger of unfair
prejudice, did not prejudice the
outcome of attempted murder trial
and thus was not reversible eITor,
especially in light of the highly
descriptive eyewitness testimony
negating defendant's self-defense
theory. Rules of Evid., Rule 403 .
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[12] Criminal Law
•~= Sanctions for destruction or loss

No prejudice to defendant or bad
faith on part of State existed
to wan-ant dismissal of attempted
murder and other charges based
on State's alleged destrnction of
evidence in releasing defendant's
vehicle
to
lienholder,
which
cleaned vehicle's interior, potentially
destroying evidence of blood of

State v. Ja c kso n, 243 P. 3d 902 (2010)

669 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2010 ·uT App 328

victims' pit bull in vehicle, despite
claim that canine blood in vehicle
would have supported a self-defense
theory that the pit bull attacked first;
canine blood in vehicle could have
been attributed to having come from
defendant's person after he stabbed
pit bull in throat, causing profuse
bleeding, other strong evidence
supported finding that defendant
was aggressor when he left vehicle
and used objectively unreasonable
force, State photographed and
took blood samples from vehicle
before lienholder took vehicle, and
defendant apparently opted not to
have samples tested for presence of
canine blood. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule
l.Q.
Cases that cite this headnote

[13] Criminal Law
(= Sanctions for destruction or loss

When evaluating a motion to
dismiss based on destruction of
evidence, courts should consider
the nonexclusive factors outlined
in
discovery
rule:
(1)
the
extent to which the prosecution's
representation of the existing
evidence is actually inaccurate; (2)
the tendency of the omission or
misstatement to lead defense counsel
into tactics or strategy that could
prejudice the outcome; (3) the
culpability of the prosecutor in
omitting pertinent information or
misstating the facts; and (4) the
extent to which appropriate defense
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investigation would have discovered
the omitted or misstated evidence.
Rules Crim.Proc. , Rule 16.
Cases that cite this headnote

[14] Criminal Law
il.= Sanctions for destruction or loss

If a defendant establishes a
reasonable probability that lost
or destroyed evidence would
be exculpatory, court needs to
consider two additional factors when
evaluating a motion to dismiss based
on destruction of evidence: ( 1) the
reason for the destruction or loss of
the evidence, including the degree of
negligence or culpability on the part
of the State, and (2) the degree of
prejudice to the defendant in light of
the materiality and imp01iance of the
missing evidence in the context of
the case as a whole, including the
strength of the remaining evidence.
Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 16.
Cases that cite this headnote

[15] Criminal Law
o:= During or after close of argument

Trial court did not abuse its
discretion in reopening case to
allow State to present evidence
of defendant's identity with regard
to his prior conviction, even if
defense counsel's statements at trial
regarding prior conviction did not
technically amount to an admission
of identity and even if documents the
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State submitted during trial did not
conclusively prove identity; court's
actions were justified when defense
counsel's statements suggested that
identity was not an issue and when
defendant first disputed his identity
through additional briefing the court
allowed fo ll owing the trial.
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[16] Homicide
.,:..=.., Murder
Sentencing and Punishment
.:= Offenses Committed in One
Transaction, Episode, or Course of
Conduct
Consecutive sentences of five years
to life for two attempted aggravated
murder convictions arising from a
single criminal episode involving
defendant's estranged girlfriend and
her son was not an abuse of
discretion, where trial court heard
evidence that defendant previously
served time for killing his wife and
for a parole violation related to
another domestic violence incident,
and court was fully cognizant of the
details of the crime and the extent of
the injuries infl icted. \:Vest's U.C.A.
§ 76-3-401(2, 5) .
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[17] Jury
{= Peremptmy Chal lenges
In general, during the jury selection
process parties are permitted to

---·------·------------ - - - - - - - exercise their peremptory challenges
for virtually any reason, or for no
reason at all. Rules Crim.Proc .. Rule
l.filg_}.
Cases that cite this headnote

[18] Jury
,:;= Peremptmy challenges

Parties in a criminal action may not
discriminate against potential jurors
by exercising peremptory challenges
solely on the basis of race .
Cases that cite this headnote

[19] Jury
-::.=, Peremptory challenges

Courts employ a three-step analytical
process to evaluate merits of a
Batson challenge: (1) opponent of
peremptory strike must make out
a prima facie case by presenting
facts adequate to raise an inference
of improper discrimination; (2) if
opponent makes out a prima facie
case, proponent of strike must
provide a facially neutral reason
for its use of the strike; and (3)
if proponent succeeds in providing
a facially neutral explanation, the
trial court then must evaluate all
evidence before it and determine
whether explanation for strike was
actually a pretext to disguise a racial
motive.
Cases that cite this headnote
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[20] Jury
.: =- Peremptory challenges
Second step of Batson mqmry,
requiring proponent of peremptory
strike to provide facially neutral
reason for strike, does not demand
an explanation that is persuasive or
even plausible, and need not rise
to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause.
Cases that cite this headnote

[21] Jury
,> Peremptory chailenges

A proffered reason for peremptory
strike will be considered facially
valid under Batson if it is (1) neutral,
(2) related to the case being tried, (3)
clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate.
Cases that cite this headnote

[22] Constitutional Law
"~= Peremptory challenges
Requirement that a proffered
explanation for peremptory strike be
legitimate to be considered facially
valid under Batson does not mean a
reason that makes sense, but a reason
that does not deny equal protection.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote

[23] Jurx
.= Peremptory cha! lenges
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Unless a discriminatory intent
is inherent 111 the prosecutor's
explanation for perempto1y strike,
the reason offered will be deemed
race neutral.
Cases that cite this headnote

[24] Jury
:i=- Peremptory challenges
In detern1ining whether a facially
neutral reason for peremptory strike
was a pretext for racial motive
under Batson, trial court needs
to undertake a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be
available.
Cases that cite this headnote

[25) Jurv
(;= Perempto1y challenges

Presence of one or more of the
following factors will tend to show
that the state's facially neutral
reasons for peremptory strike are
not actually supported by the record
or are an impennissible pretext for
racial motive under Batson: (1)
alleged group bias not shown to
be shared by the juror in question,
(2) failure to examine the juror or
perfunctory examination, assuming
neither the trial court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror,
(3) singling the juror out for special
questioning designed to evoke a
certain response, (4) the prosecutor's
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reason is unrelated to the facts of the
case, and (5) a challenge based on
reasons equally applicable to juror[ s]
who were not challenged.
Cases that cite this headnote

peculiar to any race and related to
case at hand.
Cases that cite this headnote

[29] Jury
r;:"" Peremptory challenges

[26] Criminal Law
.= Jury selection

Peremptory strike of prospective
juror due to his youth and hearing
impairment of being deaf in one
ear was not a pretext for racial
discrimination in prosecution for
attempted murder, even if State did
not strike several potential jurors
who were about the same age, where
only one of those other potential
jurors was also not man-ied, had
no children, and was not attending
college, and that potential jtu-or,
rather than subscribing to a car
magazine as did the challenged
juror, subscribed to a weekly news
magazine and did not indicate that he
had a hearing impai1111ent.

Appellate court will only set aside a
trial court's factual determinations as
to pretext in the use of peremptory
strike if those determinations are
clearly erroneous.
Cases that cite this headnote

[27] Criminal Law
•c= Mootness
Once the
State has offered
exp lanation for the peremptory
challenge and the trial court has
ruled on the ultimate question
of intentional discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the
defendant has made a pnma
facie showing of discrimination, as
required under first step of Batson ,
becomes moot.
Cases that cite this headnote

[28] Jury
,.= Peremptory challenges
Prospective juror1s youth and bearing
impairment of being deaf in one ear
were facially race-neutral reasons for
peremptory strike in prosecution for
attempted murder; reasons were not

i· J.:- •.

Cases that cite this headnote

[30]

Ji!n'.
'i:=

Peremptory challeng§

Although failure to examine the
juror or perfunctory exam ination
by the State is one factor the
court considers when determining
if the peremptory strike 1s a
pretext for racial discrimination, the
prosecutor's failure to voir dire the
prospective juror does not make
his facially valid explanation for
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dismissing him pretextual as a matter
oflaw.
Cases that cite this headnote
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2 On November 9, 2006, a mother and
her eighteen-year-old son returned home after
picking up some lunch. As the mother
began walking toward her apai1ment, she saw
Defendant, her estranged boyfriend, parked
nearby. She sat down on a curb and told her
son, who was still by their car retrieving his pit
bull, that Defendant was back. Defendant then
drove toward the mother, hit her with his car,
rolled back over her lower leg, and maneuvered
the car so it appeared Defendant was going to
hit her again. After giving his mother the pit
bull, the son tried to stop Defendant by opening
the front passenger door of Defendant's car and
trying to hit him. According to the son, he did
not make contact with Defendant.
~

AMENDED OPINION l
ORME, Judge:
~[ 1 Defendant Henry Louis Jackson was
convicted of several offenses, including
attempted murder. On appeal, he raises many
issues, including whether the trial court
improperly admitted hearsay and photographs;
whether the trial court erred in not dismissing
the case after the State "destroyed" evidence in
a vehicle used in the attempted murder; whether
the State was racially motivated in striking
a potential juror; and whether the trial court
erred in reopening the case and in sentencing
Defendant. We affi1111.

BACKGROUNDl

3 Defendant had a large knife and cut the
son's hand when the son tried to grab the
knife. Defendant then stabbed the son 1s ann,
whereupon the son retreated from the car and
started running away. 1 Defendant chased the
son and stabbed him again, inflicting additional
wounds to his back and chest. After seeing
Defendant stab her son in the back, the mother
released the pit bull, and the dog chased
Defendant. Defendant stopped pursuing the son
and stabbed the pit bull in the throat. Defendant
then approached the mother, "picked [her] up
by [her] shirt," and started dragging her toward
his car. 1 The mother testified that "he was
hitting me in the head with the back of the

-1:907 knife telling me now talk to me bitch." 1
After letting the mother go, Defendant left the
scene and was later arrested.
~] 4 Three eyewitnesses testified at trial , two
of whom were standing in a nearby doorway
and yelling for the son to come toward them
to safety and one who observed the events

•
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through her sliding-glass door. Co llectively,
the eyewitness testimony established that (1)
there was a loud bang that sounded Iike a
car crash; (2) the mother was on the ground,
appeared inj ured, and was saying Defendant
had hit her with the car; (3) Defendant,
armed with a knife, left his car and chased
the son while threatening to kill him; (4)
Defendant stabbed the son in the back with the
knife; (5) the pit bull approached Defendant,
and Defendant stabbed the pit bull; and (6)
Defendant then went back to the mother, who
could barely stand, held the knife to her neck,
and threatened to k ill her. D.

7[ 5 The State charged Defendant with two
counts of attempted aggravated murder, first
degree felonies, see Utah Code Ann. §
7 6- 5- 202(1 )(i)(iii) (Supp.2009) ( aggravated
murder), id. §§ 76--4-101, -102(l)(a) (2008)
(defining attempt and classifying attempt
offenses); one count of cruelty to animals, a
class B misdemeanor, see id. § 76- 9- 301(2)
(c), (3)(a) (2008); and one count of assault, a
class B misdemeanor, see id. § 76- 5- 102(1)(2 ). 1 Prior to trial, Defendant moved to dismiss
the case, claiming that the State bad destroyed
evidence by releasing his car to its lienholder,
which promptly cleaned the car and offered it
for sale before Defendant was ab le to examine
it. Defendant also claimed that the evidence in
the car was crucial to his self-defense theory.
He hoped to have obtained blood samples from
the car that, upon testing, would have revealed
canine blood in the car, which Defendant
claims would have corroborated his claim that
the pit bull attacked him , making se lf-defense
necessary. At the hearing on the issue, it was
clear that the State had taken blood samples
from the car and, although the State bad not

submitted the samples for testing, the State
indicated that it would "address the issue" if
Defendant wanted to. The trial court denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss, and the case
proceeded to tTial.

,r

6 During jury voir dire, the State exercised
one of its peremptory challenges on a
prospective juror who had a high school
education, worked as a mechanic, subscribed
to "Car and Driver" magazine, and was deaf
in one ear. Defense counsel objected to the
strike pursuant to Batson v. Kentuckv. 4 76 U.S .
79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986),
arguing that the prospective juror was the only
member of a minority group on the panel,
though defense counsel could not "hazard to
guess as to [the prospective jurorJ's racial
background." The State opposed the challenge
by stating it struck the prospective juror due
to his hearing problem and because he seemed
too young. The State also pointed out the
unlikelihood that the stricken juror would have
served in any event, due to his position within
the jury pool as number forty-six. In denying
Defendant1s Batson motion, the trial court
apparently detem1ined that the State was not
racially motivated for the reasons the State
offered.

,1 7 The trial, held in D ecember of 2007,
was bifurcated so that only evidence on
the underlying charges was presented to the
jury, which found Defendant guilty on all
counts. After the jury was released, the State
presented the trial court with its evidence on
the aggravating circumstance, i.e. , Defendant's
prior murder conviction. Defendant argued
that the prior crime was not murder, but
manslaughter. Defendant also *908 requested
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additional time for briefing his position on
the aggravating circumstance. \\Then Defendant
filed his brief, he challenged whether the State
had sufficiently established his identity with
regard to the previous conviction. At a hearing
in January of 2008, the trial court allowed
the State additional time to prove Defendant's
identity based on the court's determinations
that Defendant, having apparently conceded
the identity issue during trial by making
reference to Defendant's prior conviction,
raised the identity issue for the first time
after trial and that the witness who could
authenticate the prior conviction was on
military leave. The court also noted, in response
to Defendant's objection, that it did not think
the proceedings had been officially c1osed
because it had allowed Defendant additional
time for argument and submission of evidence.

,i 8 At the next hearing, in April 2008,
the trial court determined that the State had
established Defendant's identity as it related
to the previous murder conviction and, thus,
had proven the aggravating circumstance. The
court thereafter sentenced Defendant to two
consecutive sentences of five years to life for
the attempted aggravated murder convictions
and 180 days of jail time for the two class B
misdemeanors, with credit for time served .

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

reviewing rulings on hearsay, we review
"[l]egal questions regarding admissibility .. . for
coITectness, . .. questions of fact .. . for clear
eITor," and the final "mling on admissibility for
abuse of discretion." State v. Rhinehart. 2006
UT App 517, ,i 10, 153 P.3d 830 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant
also challenges the trial court's decision to
admit photographic evidence, asse1iing that the
relevance of the photographs was outweighed
by their prejudicial impact under rule 403 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, see Utah R. Evid.
403. "A trial comt's rnling under rule 403 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion." State v. Bluf£.
2002 UT 66, ~ 47, 52 P.3d 1210, cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1172, 123 S.Ct. 999, 154 L.Ed.2d 914
(2003). Evidentiary enors on the part of the trial
court will only be reversed if prejudicial. See
State v. Calliham. 2002 UT 86, ,r 45, 55 P.3d
573: State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah
1993).

Hl

,i 10 Defendant additionally claims that

the trial court eITed in denying his motion
to dismiss based on the State's dest1uction of
evidence. "Whether the State's dest1uction of
potentially exculpatory evidence violates due
process is a question of law that we review for
correctness . 'However, because this question
requires application of facts in the record to the
due process standard, we incorporate a clearly
enoneous standard for the necessary subsidiary
factual determinations.' " State v. Tiedemann,
2007 UT 49, ~ 12, 162 P.3d 1106 (citation

.[3]. il 9 Defendant first argues that omitted).
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay from
Ifil. J6l. ,i 11 Next, Defendant challenges the
two police officers, claiming that the testimony
trial court's decision to reopen the case to allow
did not fall within the excited utterance
the State to present additional evidence on the
or prior consistent statement exceptions. See
aggravating circumstance. "A motion to reopen
Utah R. Ev icl. 803(2), 80 l(d)(l)_(fil. \Vhen

Il l
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to take additional testimony when a case has
been submitted to the court, but prior to the
entry of judgment, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the [trial] court." Lewis v. Porter,
556 P.2d 496,497 (Utah 1976). "A court should
consider a motion to reopen to take additional
testimony in light of all the circumstances and
grant or deny it in the interest of fairness and
substantial justice." Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Evidentiary Claims
Failing Due to No Prejudice

1.21

~

14 Defendant has failed to demonstrate
prejudice with regard to his arguments that the
trial corni improperly admitted hearsay under
ill ~ 12 Defendant also asserts that the trial the criteria governing excited utterances, see
Utah R. Evid. 803(2), and prior consistent
court improperly entered consecutive sentences
statements, see id. R. 801 (d)(l )(B), and that
without considering all the relevant factors.
it improperly admitted photographs under
"We review sentences for abuse of discretion.
rule 403, see id. R. 403. See generally
'An abuse of di scretion may be manifest if
State v. Calliham. ?00? UT 86, ,I 45 . 55
the actions of the judge in sentencing were
P.3d 573 ("Notwithstanding error by the
inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a
trial court [in admitting evidence], we will
clearly excessive sentence.' " State v. Valdez,
not reverse a conviction if we find that
2008 UT Ap12 329, ,i 4, 194 P.3d 195 (citations
the error was harmless."). Defendant claims
omitted), cert. denied, ?00 P.3d 193 (Utah
the officers' testimony unfairly bolstered the
2008).
victims' testimony, particularly w ith regard
l.fil. ii 13 Finally, Defendant seeks reversal of to how the altercation began, to which no
other eyewitnesses testified. He reasons that
the trial court 1s ruling on his Batson *909
without the officers' testimony reiterating and
challenge, i.e., the court's determination that
reinforcing the victims' version of how the
the State was not racially motiva ted in striking
altercation began, the outcome of the case
the prospective juror. The issue presented only
would have rested on whether the jury found
involves analysis of the trial corni's decisions at
Defendant's self-defense theory, particularly
the second and third steps of its Batson review.
that he was not the first aggressor, more
The second step, a detennination of whether the
credible than the victims' testimony that
State presented a fac ially neutral reason for the
Defendant was the first aggressor when he ran
strike, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Valdez. 2004 UT A p ] ~ over the mother with his car.
95 P.3d 291 , rev'd on other grounds, 2006 UT
,i 15 Defendant's theory, however, fails to take
39. 140P.3d 1219.li The third step, whether the
into account the eyewitnesses who heard what
State's actual motivation was discriminatory, is
sounded like a car crash and who then observed
rev iewed for clear error because it involves a
the injured mother on the ground saying the
weighing of the evidence. See id. iJ 16.
Defendant had just hit her with his car. The
eyewitnesses also sav,1 Defendant get out of his

~. ....
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car, chase the mother's son with a butcher knife
while threatening to kill him, stab the son in the
back, stab the pit bull in the throat, and then put
the knife to the mother's throat while cursing
and threatening her.
[101 ~ 16 Even if Defendant was the first
aggressor, when faced with such evidence
reasonable minds clearly would conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the risk of
death or serious injury after the son retreated
from Defendant's car was not imminent and that
Defendant used umeasonable and unnecessary

force to protect himself. 2 This defeats his
self-defense theory. See Utah Code Ann. §
76- 2-402(1) (2008) ("A person is justified in
threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably
believes that force is necessary to defend
himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force. However,
that person is justified in using force intended
or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he or she reasonably believes
that force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person as a result of the other's imminent
use of unlawful force[.]"); id. § 76-2-402(5)
("In determining imminence or reasonableness
under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may
consider, but is not limited to, any of the
following factors: (a) the nature of the clanger;
(b) the immediacy 1:910 of the danger; (c)
the probability that the unlawful force would
result in death or serious bodily injury; (d) the
other's prior violent acts or violent propensities;
and (e) any patterns of abuse or violence in
the parties' rel ationship.") ; State v. Duran, 772
P .2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (discussing
that the use of force to protect oneself

must be "objectively reasonable") ( citation
and internal quotation marks omitted) . See
also State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah
1993) (dete1mining that even where the trial
court erred in admitting hearsay, "reversal
[wa]s not warranted" because any eITor
was harmless when "the record indicate[ d]
that there was ample evidence to convict
defendant even without" the hearsay and
the defendant therefore did not "show a
'reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings' ") ( citations
omitted).

1

I 7 In any event, the alleged hearsay
evidence was cumulative because it reiterated
the essence of testimony presented by the
victims or other eyewitnesses, even if the exact
wording was different. Contrary to Defendant's
assertion, the alleged additional evidence
provided by one of the police officers, insofar
as it went beyond the victims' own account
of events- namely, that the mother said
Defendant threatened to kill her after stabbing
the son-was also provided in an eyewitness's
testimony. See State v. Tho,nas, 777 P.2d
445, 449-50 (Utah 1989) (holding that hearsay
improperly admitted under the prior consistent
statement exception was cumulative and not
harmful in that it was unlikely to have changed
the outcome of the trial).

Jill

~I 18 The same 1s true of the

photographic evidence. Irrespective of whether
the photographs were properly admitted under
rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
'
see Utah R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice[.]"), Defendant has not
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demonstrated that the photographic depiction
of the severe injuries he admittedly inflicted
prejudiced the trial's outcome, especially in
light of the highly descriptive eyev:.ritness
testimony negating his self-defense theory. See
generally State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221
(Utah 1993) (stating that " [e]ven if we find
that the trial court's decision to admit [evidence
under rule 403] was 'beyond the limits of
reasonability,' we will reverse only if the enor
was hannful, i.e., if absent the error there is
a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more
favorable to the defendant") ( citations omitted).

II. Destruction of Evidence

l11J.

~

19 Defendant's argument that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
based on the State's destruction of evidence
is also unavailing. He claims that the State
violated his Due Process rights when it released
his car to the lienholder, which cleaned the
car's interior, potentially destroying evidence,
before Defendant had an opportunity to inspect
it.

·------ ------·· ______

,._.,

________

strategy that could prejudice
the
outcome,
(3)
the
culpability of the prosecutor
in
omitting
pertinent
inforn1ation or misstating the
facts, and (4) the extent to
which appropriate defense
investigation would have
discovered the omitted or
misstated evidence.

State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ~ 41,
162 P.3d 1106 (alteration 111 original)
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, if a defendant establishes "a
reasonable probability that lost or destroyed
evidence would be exculpatory," courts also
need to consider
( 1) the reason for the
destruction
or loss
of
the evidence, including the
degree of negligence or
culpability on the part of
the State; and (2) the
degree of prejudice to the
defendant in light of the
materiality and importance
of the missing evidence in
*911 the context of the
case as a whole, including
the strength of the remaining
evidence.

113] [14) ~ 20 When evaluating a motion
to dismiss based on destruction of evidence,
courts should consider the "nonexclusive
factors " outlined in rule 16 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
(1) the extent to which the

prosecution's representation
[of the existing evidence] is
actually inaccurate, (2) the
tendency of the omission or
misstatement to lead defense
counsel into tactics or

'.. ,.

,-•

-

~I

21 Here, the relevant factors favor the
State and, thus , countenance against dismissal.
Defendant claims that the car may have
contained some of the pit bull's blood, which
blood allegedly would have supported his self-
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defense theory by potentially establishing that
the son and pit bull attacked first. Although
Defendant may have been able to demonstrate
that pit bull blood would have been found
inside the car had the car not been returned
to the lienholder and cleaned, any such blood
within the car could have been attributed to
having come from Defendant's person after
he stabbed the pit bull in the throat. lQ
Additionally, even if pit bull blood was in
the car, the jury still could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
was guilty because the presence of pit bull
blood in the car would not have significantly
negated the other strong evidence suppmiing
that Defendant became the aggressor vvhen he
left the car, that any danger was not immediate
after the son retreated, and that Defendant's use
of force was objectively unreasonable. Thus,
Defendant has failed to establish that he was
prejudiced by any destruction of evidence.
~

22 Additionally, the facts here simply
do not speak of bad faith on the part of
the State. After the State photographed and
took blood samples from the car, it was
taken by the lien.holder and cleaned. This
procedure suggests normal, routine cataloguing
and disposition of evidence, not bad faith

destruction . 11 Moreover, although the State
chose not to test the retained blood samples,
Defendant could have had those samples tested
to see if any included canine blood, which
Defendant apparently opted not to do. When
considering that the presence of canine blood
likely would not have changed the outcome
of the trial and that the loss of the evidence
does not suggest bad faith 011 the State's
part, we affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant's motion to dismiss. See gen erally

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,i 45. 162 P.3d 1106
("The touchstone for the balancing process
is fundamental fairness. If the behavior of
the State in a given case is so reprehensible
as to warrant sanction, a sanction might be
available even where prejudice to the defendant
is slight or only speculative. If prejudice to
the defendant, on the other hand, is extreme,
fairness may require sanction even where
there is no wrongdoing on the part of the
State. In between those extremes, we have
confidence that trial judges can strike a balance
that preserves defendants' constitutional rights
without undue hardship to the prosecution.").

III. Reopening the Case

f15]

11 23 Defendant has not succeeded

111

showing that the trial court abused its discretion
in reopening the case to allow the State to
present evidence of his identity with regard
to his prior conviction. See Lewis v. Porter,
556 P.2d 496. 497 (Utah 1976) (stating that
a trial court's decision to reopen a case is
within "the sound discretion of the [trial]
court"). Even if defense counsel's statements
at trial regarding Defendant's prior conviction
did not technically amount to an admission
of identity, and even if the documents the
State submitted during the trial did not
conclusively prove his identity, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in reopening the
case. The trial court's actions were justified
when defense counsel's statements during the
relevant proceedings suggested that identity
was not an issue; when during trial the State
produced documents to establish Defendant's
prior conviction and stated its belief that
Defendant's name 011 *912 the documents
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sufficient to establish Defendant's prior
conviction and Defendant neither objected
nor argued that the evidence produced did
not establish Defendant's identity; and when
Defendant first disputed his identity through
additional briefing the court allowed following
the trial. Under these circumstances, where
Defendant essentially .misled the State and the
court, or at least fostered the State's and the
court's misperception that identity was not an
issue, it was entirely fair, and in the interest
of justice, for the trial court to exercise its
discretion and reopen the case so the State
cou ld admit additional evidence conclusively
establishing Defendant's identity . .U. See id. (" A
court should consider a motion to reopen to
take additional testimony in light of all the
circumstances and grant or deny it in the
interest of fairness and substantial justice .");
Davis v. Rilev, 20 Utah 2d 325 , 437 P.2d
453, 455 (1968) ("[W]hen a case has ... been
submitted to the court[,] whether [it] will
allow the presentation of further evidence is
ordinarily a matter of discretion .... The word
' discretion' itself imports that the action should
be taken with reason and in good conscience,
and with an understanding of and consideration
for the rights of the pa11ies, for the purpose of
serving the always desired objective of doing
justice between them.").

IV. Consecutive Sentences

ll il

ir

24 Defendant's argument that
the trial court abused its discretion 111
sentencin g him to "two terms of five years
to li fe consecutively," without "adequately
consider[ing]" his rehabilitative needs and
that bis convictions came from "one criminal

i·.le_:,::

episode," also fails. 13 "In detennining whether
state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall con.sider the
gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3--401(2) (2008) (emphasis
added) . The statute specifically authorizes
the court to "impose consecutive sentences
for offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode." [gJ 76-3--401(5).

,i

25 In this case, the court clearly
heard information regarding the likelihood
of Defendant's rehabilitation, i.e., the State's
evidence that Defendant's assault on the
mother was preceded by Defendant serving
time for killing his wife and for a parole
violation related to another domestic violence
incident. And at the sentencing hearing,
Defendant's counsel pointed out that the
convictions resulted from a single criminal
episode. Defendant has not provided any
detailed argument that the trial court's
consideration of these facts was inadequate.
Cf State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938
(Utah I 998) (detennining that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering consecutive
sentences when the record showed that
the defendant "did not inflict any physical
1'913
injuries" and "was incapable
of
inflicting serious injury" given the fact he
was using a pellet gun; "the amount of
money taken .. . was relatively small"; the
defendant's "prior criminal histmy consisted of
minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor
theft conviction"; "[the defendant] voluntarily
confessed and admitted responsibility" and
he "expressed a commitment and hope to
improve himself '; and the defendant's actions
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during his flight from justice demonstrated
"he ha[ d] the ability to improve himself and
become a productive, law-abiding citizen");
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah
1993) ("[T]he trial court abused its discretion
in failing to sufficiently consider defendant 1s
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme
youth and the absence of prior violent
crimes.") . Therefore we cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering
consecutive sentences based on inadequate
consideration of Defendant 1s rehabilitative
needs and the fact that a single criminal episode
defines the nature of the criminal activity for
which he was convicted. See generally State v.
Valdez. 2008 UT Aop 329, ~l 8, 194 P.3cl 195
("[A] trial court need not state to what extent
it considered each of the statutory factors at
the sentencing hearing.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 200
P.3d 193 (Utah 2008).
~

26 Defendant's argument that the court
"failed to consider that [the mother]1s injuries
were relatively minor" is also without merit.
The same judge presided over all relevant
proceedings, i.e., the underlying jury trial,
the proceedings regarding the aggravating
circumstances, and the sentencing hearing.
Therefore, the court was fully cognizant of
the details of the crime and the extent of the
injuries inflicted. C.f State v. Helms. 200?
UT 12, ~L~ 12- 13, 40 P.3d 626 (upholding
sentence when the record showed the trial
cou1i reviewed a presentence report that had
information regarding all the factors); ifLjJ
H ("[T]he fact [the defendant] views his
situation differently than did the trial court
does not prove that the trial court neglected
to consider the factors .... Indeed, ... sentencing

: J.:::,: ':

reflects the personal judgment of the court,
and consequently, a sentence imposed by the
trial court should be overturned only when it
is inherently unfair or clearly excessive."). In
sum, the record shows that evidence bearing
on all the statutory factors was before the trial
court and considered by it, and the evidence
readily supports the conclusion that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
consecutive sentences.

V. Batson Challenge

.[171 .[181

'il 27 Finally, irrespective of whether

Defendant waived his Batson chalienge, H see
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-99, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (detennining
Equal Protection Clause is implicated if
counsel uses peremptory challenges solely on
the basis of race), Defendant has not convinced
us that the State violated the Equal Protection
Clause in the course of jury selection. In
general, during the jury selection process
parties are "pennitted to *914 exercise their
peremptory challenges for virtually any reason,
or for no reason at all." State v. Cannon, 2002
UT App 18, ~ 6, 41 P.3d 1153. Accord Utah
R.Crim. P. 18(d) ("A peremptory challenge is
an objection to a juror for which no reason need
be given."). However, "parties in a criminal
action may not discriminate against potential
jurors by exercising peremptory challenges
solely on the basis of race." State v. Colwell,
2000 UT 8, if 14, 994 P.2d 177.
ill!_).
ill.I ID.l [23} ,i 28 Courts
employ a three-step analytical process to
evaluate th e merits of a Batson challenge. See
id. ~~! 17- 20; Cannon, 2002 UT ApQ.._j_..8_,_jl5!

U21.
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7-11. 41 P.3d 1153. The opponent of the
strike, Defendant here, "must first make out the
prima facie case by presenting facts adequate to
raise an inference of improper discrimination."
Colwell, 2000 UT 8. ~ 18, 994 P.2d 177. Then,
if the trial court determines that the opponent
met his or her burden of proving a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the proponent of
the strike, the State here, to provide a facially
neutral reason for its use of the peremptory
challenge. See id. ~ 19; Cannon. 2002 UT Ap_12.
.IBJ~ 9- 10, 41 P.3d 1153 . "This [second]
step ' does not demand an explanation that is
persuasive, or even plausible,' " Cannon. 2002
UT Ap_p_ll_,_~ 9, 41 P.3d 1153 (quoting Purkett
v. Elem. 514 U.S . 765. 768. 115 S.Ct. 1769,
131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam)), and "
' need not rise to the level justifying exercise
of a challenge for cause,' " Colwell. 2000
UT 8. ~ 22. 994 P.2d 177 (quoting Batson.
476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712). ·A reason
will be considered "facially vali d," Cannon.
2002 UT Apg 18, ~ 10, 41 P.3d 1153, if it
is "( I ) neutral, (2) related to the case bei ng
tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate," Colwell. 2000 UT 8, ~[ 22, 994
P.2d 177 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The requirement that the explanation
be legitimate does not mean "a reason that
makes sens e, but a reason that does not deny
equal protection ." Purkett. 514 U.S . at 769,
115 S.Ct. 1769 . "Unl ess a discriminatory intent
is inh erent in th e prosecutor's exp lanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral."
Id. at 768, l 15 S.Ct. 1769 (citation and intern al
quotatio n marks omitted). Accord Colwell.
2000 UT 8, j! 19,994 P.2d 177 .
_[24]_ [25] Jlil ~[ 29 Finally, under the third
step, if the State has succeeded in providing

:,--•·
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a facially neutral explanation, the trial court
then must evaluate all the evidence before it
and detennine whether the State's explanation
for its peremptory challenge, although facially
neutral, was actually just "a pretext to disguise a
racial motive." Can.non, 2002 UT App 18, ~ 11,
41 P.3d 1153. In doing so, "trial courts [need
to] 'undertake a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available.' "State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d
454,461 (Utah Ct.App.) (quoting Batson. 476
U.S . at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712) (additional citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
[T]he presence of one or
more of [the following]
factors ,;vill tend to show
that the state's reasons
are not actually supported
by the record or are an
impem1issible pretext: ( 1)
alleged group bias not
shown to be shared by
the juror in question , (2)
failure to examine the juror
or perfunctory examination,
assuming neither the trial
court nor opposing counsel
had questioned the juror, (3)
singling the juror out for
special questioning designed
to evoke a certain response,
(4) the prosecutor's reason
is unrelated to the facts of
the case, and (5) a challenge
based on reasons equally
applicable to jmor[s] who
were not challenged. [

15 ]
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'"915 State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517. 518- 19
(Utah 1989) ( citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). As this detem1ination rests
largely on credibility, an appellate comi
will only set aside a trial comi's factual
detenninations under step three if they are
clearly enoneous. See id. at 518.

,r 30 In this case, the trial court determined that
Defendant had made a prima facie case ofracial
motivation. The State then explained that it
used a peremptory challenge on the prospective
juror due to his young age and deafness in
his right ear. l.0. In denying Defendant's Batson
motion, the trial court apparently accepted
these reasons as facia!ly neutral and not given
as a pretext.

I11l.

a potential juror who "was 'quite elderly
[and] has difficulty hearing' " was "facially
valid because 'discriminatory intent [wa ]s [not]
inherent' in the prosecutor's explanation")
(first and third alterations in original) ( citation
omitted). See generally Purkett, 514 U.S . at
766, 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (discussing that the
prosecution struck a potential juror because
he had "long, ... curly, unkempt hair" and
"a mustache and a goatee type beard," which
characteristics made him ~:916 seem like he
would "not be a good juror," and he was
"suspicious to" the attorney, and detennining
that these reasons passed step two because
such physical characteristics were not "peculiar
to any race") (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, i1
10, 41 P.3d 1153 (determining that although the

I1fil ~[

31 Our analysis of this case's prosecution's explanation that it struck a juror
specific facts, then, begins with Batson's
because "he had difficulty explaining himself,
[and was] one of the more undereducated
second step because, as the paiiies agree,
people" on the panel was somewhat "suspect,"
once the State has "offered [an] explanation
it passed the facial neutrality requirement of
for the peremptory challenge[ ] and the trial
court has ruled on the ultimate question
of intentional discrimination, the preliminary
issue of whether the defendant has made
a prima facie showing [as required under
Batson's first step] becomes moot." State v.
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, ,-r 9, 58 P.3d
867 (first alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) , cert. denied,
67 P.3d 495 (Utah 2003). The State satisfied
Batson's second step by providing reasons for
its peremptory challenge, i.e., youth and a
hearing impairment, that were facially neutral
- not "peculiar to any race"-and related to the
case at hand. 11 See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ~1~1
15, 19, 22,994 P.2d 177 (stating the neutrality
requirements and determining that the State's
proffered reason for its peremptory strike of

I\)~· -

step two); ll. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769, 777 (Utah Ct.ApQ.) (indicating that one
minority juror had been excused for cause due
to hearing issues), cert. denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991 ). The State's proffered reasons also
satisfied Batson's second step requirements that
the reasons be specific and legitimate, i.e., no
"discriminatory intent [wa ]s inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation." Purkett, 514 U.S.
at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. See Colvvell, 2000
UT 8, '1[ 22, 994 P.2d 177. Therefore, we
conclude that the State presented a racially
neutral explanation that justified its peremptory
challenge.
[29] ii 32 Under Batson.'s third step, Defendant
initially claims that the State's reasonin g that
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the stricken juror was "to[ o] young" was just
a pretext and points to several potential jurors
that the State did not strike who were about
the same age. See Cantu, 778 P.2d at 51812 (stating that one factor that "will tend
to show that the state's reasons are ... an
impermissible pretext [is] a challenge based on
reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were
not challenged"). However, only one of those
other potential jurors was also not manied,
had no children, and was not attending college.
That other potential juror, however, rather than
subscribing to "Car and Driver," subscribed
to "Time" magazine and did not indicate that
he had a hearing impainnent. Accordingly, as
the State points out, no other juror had all key
characteristics in common with the stricken
juror. See United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d
227, 231 - 32 (7th Cir.1992). And based on a
comparison of the stricken juror with the other
potential jurors, the State legitimately could
have concluded that his youth, limited life
experience, and reading interests made him one
of the less sophisticated potential jurors and,
therefore, not a person it wanted on the jury,
irrespective of his race. See generally State v.
~ey. 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah Ct.Appj
("[T]he selection of a jury is inevitably a
call upon experience and intuition. The trial
lawyer must draw upon his own insights and
empathetic abilities.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 883
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

Ll.fil 7[ 33 Second, Defendant suggests that the
State's stated reason for striking the prospective
juror, namely that he is deaf in one ear, ,vas
also pretextual because the State "could have
questioned him fortber" after be responded
affirmatively when the court asked if he was

..,_
'

able to hear the judge. Although "failure to
examine the juror or perfunctory examination"
by the State is one factor the court considers
when detem1ining if the strike was a pretext
for racial discrimination, "the prosecutor's
failure to voir dire [the prospective juror] does
not make his facially valid explanation for
dismissing [him] pretextual as a matter of
law." State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 15556 (Utah Ct.App.1997). And, although the
stricken juror indicated that he had thus far
been able to hear the proceedings, from the
cold record we have no way of knowing if
his bearing or mannerisms indicated otherwise
or at least suggested cause for concern. Cf
Cosev. 873 P.2d at 1179-80 ("This comi
has ... recognized the difficulty of trying to
assess what counsel was thinking during jury
selection, because of our inability, on appeal,
to view the jurors and assess their potential
bias. Only those present, the court and counsel,
have that advantaged view .... [T]he transcript
reveals nothing about [the juror1s] demeanor or
other intangible characteristics that constitute
the collage of attributes attorneys assess
in choosing jurors. For all we know [he]
was ... the only one who glanced disparagingly
at the prosecution or sympathetically *917
toward the defendant. Our review of counsel's
performance is inherently hampered by our
necess ary reliance on only the lifeless transcript
to assess the dynamic and highly judgmental
process of jmy selection.") (second and third
alterations in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). In any event, the fact
the stricken juror was deaf in one ear provided
a specific and legitimate basis, irrespective of
his race, that would wmTant the prosecution in
being concerned about whether he would, in
ach1ality, be able to fully hear and understand
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the proceedings . See State v. Colwell. 2000 UT
8.~~ 15-19,994P.2d 177

il 34 Given

all the evidence and circumstances
before the tria l court, and with due deference to
the trial. court's ability to judge the credibility
of the attorneys and to personally observe
the prospective juror peremptorily stricken by
the State, see Cosev. 873 P.2d at 1179-80,
we affirm the court's determination that the
evidence as a whole did not suggest racial
motivation in striking him from the jury. 12

CONCLUSION

1 35

Even if the trial court erred in admitting
hearsay and pho tographs, Defendant has not
demonstrated any prejudice caused by such
evidence. Defendant has also failed to establish
that, in light of balancing the relevant factors,
fundamenta l fairness required dismissal of
his case after evidence in the vehic le was
destroyed. The tri al court did not err in
reopening the case to give the State an
opportunity to conclusively prove Defendant's
identity with regard to the aggravating

circumstance. Defendant requested additional
briefing on the aggravating circumstance and
gave no indication that identity was an
issue until the additional briefing. Defendant's
counsel also made statements at h·ial fostering
the court's and the State's misconception that
identity was not at issue. The decision imposing
consecutive sentences is sustainable because
the record shows that the trial court had
evidence on all the relevant sentencing factors
before it and adequately considered those
factors. F inally, the trial court's determination
that Defendant's Batson challenge fai led
because the State was not racially motivated
in peremptorily striking a pros pee ti ve juror is
supported by the evidence.
~

36 Affim1ed.
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GREENWOOD, Senior Judge.
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Footnotes
*

1
.2.

J

Judge Pamela T. Greenwood participa ted in this case as a regular member of the Utah Court of Appeals. She retired
from the court on January 1, 2010, before this decision issued. Hence, she is designated herein as a Senior Judge. See
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-103(2 (2008); Sup.Ct. R. of Prof! Practice 11-201 (6).
Th is amended opinion replaces our opinion in this case issued on May 27 , 2010. Having granted the State's petition for
rehearing, we have revised footnote 16. The opinion is otherwise unchanged .
Ou r recitation of the facts is drawn from the testimony of the victims and eyewitnesses, presented in the light most
consistent with the jury verdict. See generally State v. Hales. 2007 UT 14, '!I 36. 152 P.3d 321 ("[W)e review the evidence
and all inference s which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most fav orable to the verdict of the jury .") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant did not testify at tri al. In stating the facts , we have not drawn on testimony
presented by lhe investigating officers lo which Defendant objects.
In raising his self-defense theory, Defendant pointed to the son's size . The son weighed approximately 320 pound s and
stood over six feet tall.

1· '· .•·
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In support of his theory that the so n and pit bull actually started the altercation when the son approached the car, and
that Defe ndan t was only defending himself, Defendant challenged the credibility of the victims' version of events as thu s
far outlined. In argument at trial , Defendant's counsel pointed to Defendant's history with the victims, including that he
and the mother had been "on again, off again lover[s]," that he and the son had recently had a confrontation, and that
the mother sustained relatively minor injuries for having been hit by a car. Defense counsel also suggested that it was
unlikely the son would have given the mother the pit bull before approaching Defendant's car. Defense counsel posited
that the victims concocted their version of events to avoid criminal liabi lity for the son's having first attacked Defendant. As
indicated in our discussion of the evidentiary issues, however, the evidence presented by the State sufficiently negated
Defendant's se lf-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt.

_Q

Defendant apparently had been helping the victims move and, according to the mother, was angry because she originally
had refused to tell him where she was moving.

Q

To avoid unnecessary repetition in detailing what each eyewitness observed or heard , we describe the eyewitnesses'

7

testimony as a whole, while acknowledging that not every eyewitness saw or heard the entire incident as we have
summarized it.
We cite to the current versions of the statutes as recent amendments have no bearing on our analysis. See Utah Code
Ann.§ 76- 5-202 amendment notes (2008 & Supp.2009); id.§§ 76-4-101 amendment notes , -102 amendment notes
(2008); id. § 76-9-301 amendment notes (2008) ; id. § 76-5-102 history (2008).

-8_

g

In State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 140 P.3d 1219. the Utah Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the issue of
whether this court applied ihe correct standard of review in State v. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214. 95 P.3d 291. See 2006
UT 39, ,i 12. 140 P.3d 1219.
Under Utah's self-defense jurisprudence, it is true that "a person does not have a duty to retreat" when the incident occurs
"in a place where" he has a lawful right to remain . Utah Code Ann .§ 76-2-402Q} (2008). However, the fact that Defendant
was in his car and could have simply driven away to safety after the son retreated from Defendant's car does bear on the
issue of whether the perceived danger was imminent and whether Defendant reasonably feared death or serious injury
so as to justify th e force he used. See id.§ 76-2-402( 1): State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct.App .1989).

1Q

Witness test imony reflected that the pit bull "was bleeding profusely" and "continually." and that "the blood was just
squirting out of his neck."

11

At oral argument, the State indicated for the firs t time that the blood evidence in the vehicle had been "destroyed" earlier
than it had previously thought . Counsel for Defendant made a motion in open court for further briefing on the issue of
bad faith in light of this new information . We deny counse l's motion because, as indicated. the facts here simply do not
suggest bad faith when the evidence was only destroyed after numerous photographs and blood samples were obtained,
especially when it appears that such photographs and samples could have been made available to Defendant upon
request. Nor was the evidence destroyed for its own sake but. rather. as a resu lt of delivering the ca r to the lienholder
entitled to its possession.

12_

Defendant also has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State time to gather evidence
in light of the reason for reopening the case and the fact that the witness who could authenticate photographs from the
1982 case was on military leave . Contrary to what Defendant suggests through limited argument on the issue, we do
not see that the Double Jeopardy Clause was implicated here, see generally U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. I,
§ 12; Tibbs

v. Florida , 457 U.S . 31. 41,102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed .2d 652 (1982), because there was never an acquittal

or dismissal fo r insufficient evidence, see State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267. 269 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1993). In this case.
the trial court delayed ruling on the agg ravating circumstance to allow additiona l argument and briefing by the parties
as Defendant requ ested. As the tria l court indicated at the subseq uent hearing, which hearing was contemplated at the
conclusion of the trial. it questioned whether the proceedings had even been completely closed based on the additional
briefing and argument it allowed. And although State v. Gregarious. 81 Utah 33, 16 P.2d 893 (1932), and State v. Seel.
827 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct.App_J. ce,t. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). both mentioned , in affirming the trial courts'
decisions to reopen in those cases, that no delay was entailed by reopen ing. it does not necessarily follow that if some

13_

delay wi ll occur. the trial court ab us es its discre tion in reopening. See Gregarious. 16 P.2d at 895~ Seel. 827 P .2d at 962 .
In a single sentence. without legal argument beyond mere citation to authority, Defendant also claims that the trial court
"improperly lim ited the [Parole] Board's discretion 'to release· [Defendan t] when he is rehabilitated." We decline to address
the issue further, especia lly given Defendant's failure to demonstrate preservation of this issue. See Utah R.App . P. 24(a)

fill

14

(requiring briefs to contain legally supported arguments and record citations) .
The State has raised the issue of whether Defendant's Batson challenge was timely or, more accurately. whetl1er
Defendant waived the Batson chal lenge in not pressing the trial court to rule on the issue prior to swearing in the jury

r.1--,
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and dismissing the venire. In light of our decision to address the merits of the challenge, we do not reach the interesting
issue of whether prior case law clearly required defense counsel to insist upon a ruling prior to dismissal of the venire.
See State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 140 P.3d 1219 (decided before Defendant's trial); State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, 190
P.3d 1259 {decided after Defendant's trial). See generally Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 1119, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing that
the United States Supreme Court has declined to "set forth ... specific guidelines regarding [the] timeliness" of Batson
challenges but that it has "held that 'only a firmly established and regu larly followed state practice may be interposed by
a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim'") (second omission in original) (quoting Ford
v. Georgia, 498 U.S, 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850. 112 L.Ed .2d 935 (1991 )). See also Rosa-Re. 2008 UT 53. 1J 1J 1314. 190 P.3d 1259 ("clarify[ing] that in the future ... trial courts have an obligation to resolve Batson objections before
the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed," that "defense counse l also has an absolute obligation to notify the court that
resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed." and that defense counsel's "[f]ailure to do so ...
will in the future constitute a waiver of the original objection"); Valdez, 2006 UT 39. ,r 33 n. 19, 140 P.3d 1219 ("We note
that this procedure. whereby an objection was made prior to the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until
after the jury was sworn in and dismissed, will generally not meet the standard we set forth today.").
We recognize that Utah case law is not entirely clear on whether a trial court is supposed to consider these additional
factors under step two of the analysis (as bearing on whether the proffered reason for the strike is facially neutral), or
under step three (as bearing on whether the purportedly facially neutral reason is actually a pretext for discrimination).
Compare State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517. 518-1 9 (Utah 1989) (listing and considering these factors as part of its analysis
under step two and not identifying step three), and State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 463-64 (Utah Ct.AQ.Q.j (listing and
considering these factors as part of its analysis under step two), cert. denied. 857 P .2d 948 (Utah 1993 ). with State v.
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 111111-16, 41 P.3d 1153 (discussing these factors under step three of the analysis). and State
v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.ApQ.1997) (same). Based on Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.C!. 1769.
131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). we conclude the best place to consider these factors is at step three of the analysis
when the persuasiveness of the prosecution"s reason is appropriately considered by the trial court.
In Purkett. the United States Supreme Court determined that the federal court of appeals had "erred by combining
Batson's second and third steps into one" and emphasized that the persuasiveness of the reason is only relevant at step
three. Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. It also recognized that the court of appeals was probably led astray by language in
Batson indicating that to be race-neutral "the proponent of a strike must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation
of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Purkett
court clarified that "legitimate" did not refer to whether the reason made sense. but whether it denied equal protection.
See id. at 768-69, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Notably. the cases we cite that discuss the factors at the second step were decided
before Purkett, see Cantu. 778 P.2d at 517: Pharris, 846 P.2d at 454. and the cases discussing the factors at the
third step were decided after Purkett, see Cannon. 2002 UT ApQ 18. 41 P.3d 1153: Bowman, 945 P.2d at 153. The
decision in the later cases to adjust the analysis was likely in response to the clarification of the required analytic steps
in Purkett. In any event. based on Purkett, we conclude that the factors bear on the persuasiveness of the reason and
are appropriately considered at the third step.
We also clarify. however. to the extent the later cases indicate otherwise, see Cannon, 2002 UT Agp~1J 9, 12-13.
41 P.3d 1153: Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155-56, that whether the reason is "(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried.
(3) clear and reasonably specific. and (4) legitimate." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8. 1J 22. 994 P.2d 177 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). is appropriately considered at step two under Batson and Purkett. See Purkett, 514
U.S. at 768- 69. 115 S.Ct. 1769: Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 98 & n. 20. 106 S.C!. 1712, 90 L.Ed .2d 69 (1986).
As discussed in paragraphs 31-33. infra, case law supports that these reasons were racially neutral and that the trial
court properly determined the reasons were not a pretext under step three.
Whether a juror can hear the proceedings is a relevant concern because a lack of hearing always could affect the outcome
of the case if such a juror caught only a portion of the evidence and arguments. See State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8. 1T 22.,
994 P.2d 177 (stating that a "juror's hearing capacity ... wou ld have affected the case to be tried"). Although the State did
not elaborate on why hearing was particularly relevant to its case when presenting its reasons to the trial court. whether
jurors can hear does seem necessarily relevant. At certain times during the trial, the State asked witnesses to step away
from the witness stand, and thus the microphone. to review and mark certain exhibits and continued to question those
witnesses during those times.
This court. however. ultimately remanded in Cannon based on the trial court"s failure to adequately explain its ruling
regarding the prosecution's explanation and credibility. See State v. Cannon. 2002 UT Ap.Q_lli,Jl,i 14- 16, 41 P.3d 1153.
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Although the trial cou rt's rul ing cou ld have been more detailed , see State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, '!11111-1 2, 14-1 6
41 P .3d 1153 (discussing the necessity of a comple te record and assessment of the relevant facts and law with regard
to a Batson challenge), Defendant has not challe ng ed the adequacy of th e tria l court's ruling, but only the sufficiency
of the evidence to support it.
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West Headnotes (5)
[1]

V.

Milan OTKOVIC,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20120197-CA.

Criminal Law
•:= Arguments and conduct of
counsel
Criminal Law
•~= Arguments and conduct of
counsel

March 13, 2014.

Whether the State's destruction
of potentially exculpato1y evidence
violates due process is a question
of law that the Court of Appeals
reviews for conectness, but it
incorporates a clearly erroneous
standard in reviewing the necessary
subsidiary factual detem1inations .
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Robin \1/. Reese, J., of aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated robbery. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Cami of Appeals, Davis, J.,
held that:

Cases that cite this headnote

LU

the tTial court's exclusion of all evidence
of the victim's involvement in a "fencing
operation," on the basis that the probative value
of the evidence was outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, was an abuse of discretion;

I21

the trial court's enor in excluding all
evidence of the victim's involvement m a
fencing operation was not harmless; and

Ill the trial court's determination that evidence
was sufficient to authenticate text messages
was not an abuse of discretion.

Reversed and remanded.
Voros, J., filed a concurring opinion.

[2]

Criminal Law
,:;p Evidence calculated to create
Rmiudice against or sympathy for
accused
Kidnapping
,;= Evidence
Robbery
•>· Circumstances and condition of
person robbed

The trial court's exclusion of all
evidence of the victim's involvement
in a "fencing operation," on the
basis that the probative value of
the evidence was outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice,
was an abuse of discretion , during
prosecution for kidnapping and

State v. Otkovic , 322 P.3d 746 {20 14)
756 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2014 UT App 58
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robbery; evidence of the fencing
operation was central to the defense
that defendant had been part of the
victim's criminal enterprise and that
his involvement in that enterprise
had given the victim a motive to
frame him, and omitting all evidence
of the fencing operation was likely to
confuse the jury. Rules ofEvid., Rule
403.
Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Criminal Law
•i'= Exclusion of Evidence

The trial court's error in excluding all
evidence of the victim's involvement
in a fencing operation was not
harmless, during prosecution for
kidnapping and robbery; bad the
jury been presented with evidence
supporting defendant's assertion that
the victim was a fence, it may
have been more inclined to believe
defendant's allegation that he was
framed.

defendant was in possession of the
phone at the time the text messages
were sent. Rules of Evid., Rule
90 I (a).
Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Criminal Law
if.."'' Excuse or justification for
destrnction or loss

Defendant was not entitled to
dismissal of the kidnapping and
robbery charges against him based
on the loss or destruction of the
automated teller machine (A TM)
video; defendant failed to establish
that the lost or destroyed A TM video
would have been exculpatory. Rules
Crim.Proc., Rule 16(a)(4).
Cases that cite this headnote
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Criminal Law
,,,.,, Telecommunications

The trial couds determination
that evidence was sufficient to
authenticate text messages was
not an abuse of discretion; the
State presented evidence indicating
that the text messages came from
defendant's phone, and evidence
that could support a finding that
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1 Milan Otkovic challenges his convictions
and sentences for aggravated kidnapping, a first
degree felony, Utah Code Ann . § 76- 5-302(1).,

ill (LexisNexis

Supp.2013), 1 and aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, id. § 76-6302(1)-(2) (20 12). We reverse and remand for
a new trial.

BACKGROUND
~

2 On May 24, 2009, Otkovic sent a text
message to Travis Hawkins offering to sell

*748 him a television and a computer. 2.
Accordin g to Otkovic, be and another man
named Matt Shields were involved in a multistate theft ring with Hawkins. Otkovic, Shields,
and others would create receipts for highpriced items they had not purchased and use
the receipts to walk out of the store with
stolen merchandise . They wou ld then sell the
merchandise to Hawkins, who would resell it
for a profit. Otkovic maintains that he and
Shields met Hawkins at Hawkins's brother's
window tinting shop and sold the television and
computer to him for approximately $ 1,600 and
that Hawkins voluntarily drove to an ATM to
obtain cash to pay them. l

if

3 Hawkins reported and later testified that
he believed the text message came from
Shields and that he bad never met Otkovic
but bad seen him once before in Shields's
company. According to Hawkins, it was not
Otkovic and Shields, but Otkovic and an
unidentified woman, who met him at the
tinting shop . He maintained that Otkovic had
not brought anything to sell but instead held
Hawkins at gunpoint and demanded money.

After stealing $1,680 in cash from Hawkins's
wallet, Otkovic ordered Hawkins to drive them
to an A TM to get more money. Hawkins
drove them to an ATM about six blocks
away and withdrew $300 from one account
but avoided withdrawing more money from
other accounts by pretending to have forgotten
his PIN numbers. Eventually, Otkovic relented
and had Hawkins return them to the tinting
shop, whereupon he stole Hawkins's phone,
threatened him, and ordered him not to report
the robbery. Otkovic then forced Hawkins to
stand in front of an upstairs window holding
up a broom while Otkovic made his escape,
threatening to come back to "take care of'
Hawkins if he saw the broom drop.
~

4 Hawkins's girlfriend claimed that he anived
home "frantic" and "shaking" and announced
that he bad been robbed. Hawkins reported that
be used his son's phone to call Shields and get
Otkovic's name and phone number. He then
called Otkovic and told him that he would not
involve the police if Otkovic would return his
money and phone. Hawkins and his girlfriend
asserted that Otkovic then threatened to kill
Hawkins's children.

ii 5 After talking to Otkovic, Hawkins contacted
police to rep011 the robbery . A short time
later, Hawkins provided the police with a
cell phone that he claimed to have received
from Shields. The cell phone contained text
messages received from Otkovic's phone. The
first was sent at 7:57 p.m., about two minutes
before the ATM withdrawal occurred. It read,
"I'm Robbin[g] Travis. Don't tell him my name
or anything, not my phone number, not a work,
[sic] I'm serious." Additional messages were
received later in the evening: an 8 : 11 p .m. text
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read, "Don't snitch on me niga"; an 8: 12 p.m.
text read, "I told him I was fightin with you ha
ha ha don't listen to him I told him I robbed
you too. But don't bring my number or name
up"; a 9: 16 p.m. text read, "U gave that niga
my number?"; and a 9:51 p.m. text read, "Ha
ha ha ya I told him ima rob you too. I'm playin
tho. I mean u still owe me 15 00 don't forget."
Hawkins rep01ied that he had seen Otkovic
using a white Blackben-y cell phone at various
points during the robbery but that he had not
noticed Otkovic using it while they were at the
ATM.
~

6 When Otkovic was atTested, police searched
his home and found a white BlackbeITy and
a pistol that matched Hawkins's description
of the gun Otkovic had used. They also
found $1,6 16 in cash. The phone number
associated with the Blackbe1ry was the
same phone number used to send the text
messages discovered on the phone Hawkins
had delivered to police. At trial, Otkovic
testified that he had loaned his phone to Shields
a "few times" while they were meeting with
Hawkins and then later that night before they
separated around 10:00 p.m. When the State
began questioning a police ""749 witness about
the text messages, Otkovic objected, arguing
that the State bad failed to lay a sufficient
foundation for the text messages to be admitted.
The trial court overruled the objection and
admitted the texts.

il

7 In the course of their investigation,
the police reque sted that U.S. Bank provide
copies of surveillance video from the A TM.
A representative from the bank sent an email
describing the footage: "Here is what I have:
Now you can see that there is someone else in

------

the car but there is no way to tell who it is since
the camera is (theoretically) aimed at the driver.
The driver also puts his hands up periodically."
Three photographs were attached to the email,
but no passenger was visible in the photographs
and none of them portrayed Hawkins holding
up his hands. The State did not disclose the
photographs or the email to Otkovic until
the week before tr·ial. Upon receiving this
information, Otkovic's counsel attempted to
obtain the surveillance video from the bank
but was infonned that only the photographs
had been retained and that the video had
been destroyed. Based on the email describing
footage not contained in the photographs
and the bank's representation that the video
was destroyed, Otkovic moved to dismiss the
case due to loss or destruction of evidence.
The trial court denied the motion because it
concluded that Otkovic could not demonstrate
a reasonable probability that the video footage,
if it existed, contained exculpatory evidence.
However, the trial court did fault the State for
failing to timely disclose the photographs and
prohibited the State from using the photographs
at trial.
~[ 8 Prior to trial, Otkovic also moved
to admit evidence relating to Hawkins's
criminal enterprise both to impeach Hawkins's
credibility and to suppmi the defense theory
that the money Hawkins claims Otkovic stole
from him was actually given to Otkovic
by Hawkins as payment for stolen goods.
Otkovic also asserted that the evidence would
demonstrate that Hawkins was familiar with
Otkovic 1s gun before the alleged robbery and
that he had a motive to frame Otkovic out
of loyalty to Shields, who was becoming
paranoid because Otkovic was outperforming
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him. The court permitted Otkovic to introduce
evidence of his dealings with Hawkins and
Shields and of the rivalry between Otkovic and
Shields, but it excluded other general evidence
of Hawkins's criminal activity under rule 403
of the Utah Rules of Evidence because of
its potential to mislead the jury and delay
the trial. Shields was unavailable to testify at
trial, so evidence relating to Hawkins's criminal
involvement with Shields and Otkovic was
limited to Otkovic's own testimony.

,i 9 When Hawkins was asked about his
business at trial, he admitted to buying and
reselling things but maintained that he was
unaware whether the merchandise was stolen
and that in ten years he had never had a
problem with merchandise he had purchased
and resold turning out to be stolen. In response
to this testimony, Otkovic sought to introduce
evidence that during the previous ten years,
Hawkins had been convicted of burglary,
charged with stealing golf carts, and anested
several times for receiving stolen property,
as well as evidence gathered by investigators
indicating that Hawkins had continued to
act as a fence 4 after the incident with
Otkovic. However, the trial court reaffirmed
its earlier ruling and prevented Otkovic from
presenting any of this evidence. During closing
argument, tbe prosecutor relied on Hawkins's
representation that he had never had any
problems with stolen property, reminding the
jury, "Mr. Hawkins testified, ' I have had no
problems with stolen goods.' ... [D]id you
ever hear any ... evidence introduced that
Mr. Hawkins lied about that? Any evidence
introduced that Mr. Hawkins has had any
problems? No . Because he hasn't."

if IO The jury convicted Otkovic of aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated robbery. He had
also previously pleaded guilty to possession
of a weapon by a restricted person. The trial
court sentenced him to prison ten11s of six
years to life for aggravated robbery, sixteen
years to life for aggravated kidnapping, and
zero to five years for possession of a weapon.
At the time, Otkovic was *750 already
serving sentences for previous convictions. The
trial court ordered that his sentences for his
convictions in this case run concunently with
each other but consecutive to the sentences he
was already serving. Otkovic appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
~

11 First, Otkovic challenges the trial court's
decision to exclude relevant evidence regarding
Hawkins's history as a fence under rule 403 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence 2 "We review a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude evidence
under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard, and
will not ·overturn a lower court1s determination
of admissibility unless it is beyond the limits
of reasonability." Diversified Holdings, LC v.
Turner, 2002 UT 129, ~ 6, 63 P.3d 686 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

il

12 Otkovic further asserts that the trial
court e1Ted in finding the foundational evidence
sufficient to authenticate the text messages. We
review the trial comi 1s determination for abuse
of discretion. See State v. Silva. 2000 UT App
292, ~ 1 L 13 P.3d 604.

.W. ,i 13 Finally, Otkovic argues that his case
should have been dismissed due to the loss or
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destruction of the A TM video . "Whether the
State's destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence violates due process is a question
of law that we review for correctness," but
"we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard
[in reviewing] the necessary subsidiary factual
determinations." State v. Tiedeniann, 2007 UT
12._~ 12, 162 P.3d 1106 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). 6.

except where the evidence has an unusual
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame,
or mislead the jury.... [I]f the evidence is
prejudicial but is at least equally probative[,] ...
it is properly admissible." State v. Ramirez,
924 P.2d 366, 369-70 (Utah Ct.App.1996)
(second alteration and second omission in
original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also State v. Dunn. 850
P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993) (explaining
that "we indulge a presumption in favor of
admissibi Ii ty").

ANALYSIS

il 16 Throughout the proceedings, the trial court
expressed concern about "throwing the door
wide open" to Otkovic's "general effort to show
ill ~ 14 Otkovic asserts that evidence of that [Hawkins] is a fence and a bad guy."
In its pretrial ruling, the trial comi expressed
Hawkins's criminal history as a fence is
particular concern with evidence regarding
relevant to contradict Hawkins's claim at trial
"the vastness of Mr. Hawkins' operation and
that he had "never had a problem with anything
the money that he was raking in" as being
[he's] purchased" turning out to be stolen and
"abso lutely i1Televant." Given the trial court's
to support Otkovic's theory that his criminal
broad discretion to evaluate the admissibility of
involvement with Hawkins and Shields gave
evidence under rule 403, we do not consider the
them a motive to frame him. The State asserts
trial court's decision to limit general evidence
that the trial court acted within its discretion
in excluding the evidence under rnle 403 of regarding Hawkins's *751 fencing operation
to have been outside its discretion.
the Utah Rules of Evidence out of concern that
general evidence relating to Hawkins's fencing
~ 17 However, we agree with Otkovic that the
operation would "confuse the jury and unduly
extent of that limitation was umeasonable. The
delay the trial."
question of whether Hawkins was a fence was
not raised simply to show that Hawkins was
~ 15 Under rule 403, "[t]he court may
a criminal; rather, it was central to Otkovic's
exclude relevant evidence if its probative
defense that he had been part of Hawkins's
value is substantially outweighed by a danger
criminal enterprise and that his involvement
of . .. unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
in that enterprise had given Hawkins and
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
Shields a motive to frame him. See Utah
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (providing that evidence
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. "Rule 403 ...
of prior bad acts "may be admissible for
is an inclusionary rule. Specifically, Rule 403
[noncharacter] purpose[s], such as proving
presumes the admission of all relevant evidence

I. Exclusion of Evidence Under Rule 403
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rnoti ve"); id. R. 608( c) (providing that a
"motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of
the witness or by other evidence"). Evidence
demonstrating the basic fact that Hawkins
was a fence was at least equally probative
as it was prejudicial, especially after Hawkins
asserted that he had "never had a problem"
with stolen property. Cf State v. Thompson.
2014 UT App 14, ~ 30. 318 P.3d 1221 ("[O]nce
the defendant offers evidence or makes an
assertion as to any fact, the State may crossexamine or introduce on rebuttal any testimony
or evidence which would tend to contradict,
explain or cast doubt upon the credibility
of his testimony." (emphasis, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Whi le it
may not have been necessary to introduce
evidence demonstrating the size of Hawkins's
operation and the money he made, proving
that Hawkins was knowingly involved in a
fencing operation was necessary to Otkovic's
defense. Because Shields was not available to
testify, Otkovic was prevented from presenting
any other evidence to corroborate his own
testimony that Hawkins fenced goods stolen by
Otkovic and Shields.

if

18 In particular, the probative value of
evidence contradicting Hawkins's assertion
that he had "never had a problem" with
stolen property far outweighed any danger
of confl.tsing the jury or delaying the trial.
If Otkovic were seeking to disprove the
truthfulness of a statement relating to a
collateral matter, we might be inclined to
defer to the tTial court's ruling under rule 403.
But given that the statement concerned a fact
at the heart of Otkovic's defense- whether
Hawkins was a fence who had purchased stolen

i'-!-'-:

property from Otkovic-Otkovic's inability to
contradict it significantly undercut his defense.
In fact, preventing Otkovic from presenting any
general evidence that Hawkins was a fence
was likely to result in the very outcome the
trial court was trying to avoid-confusing the
jury. In closing argument, the State used this
lack of evidence to bolster Hawkins's testimony
and make it appear as though there was no
evidence available to contradict Hawkins's
assertion that he had never had a problem with
stolen property: "Mr. Hawkins testified, 'I have
had no problems with stolen goods.' ... [D]id
you ever hear any ... evidence introduced that
Mr. Hawkins lied about that? Any evidence
introduced that Mr. Hawkins has had any
problems? No. Because he hasn't."

Ul

~

19 The State asserts that even if the trial
court erred in excluding evidence under rule
403, the error was harmless in light of damning
evidence against Otkovic, namely the text
messages in which Otkovic admits to robbing
Hawkins and the fact that he lied to police by
claiming not to have been with Hawkins on the
night of the alleged robbery. However, neither
piece of evidence is determinative. Although
sufficient foundation was laid for the texts to
be admissible, see i11fra 'i! 21 , the evidence of
their authenticity was not conclusive. Otkovic
testified that Shields was present when he
met Hawkins and that he loaned his phone
to Shields during the time when the text
messages were sent, and Hawkins testified
that he did not see Otkovic using the phone
while they were at the ATM. Furthermore,
the number to which the texts were sent did
not match either of the numbers stored in
Otkovic's phone as belonging to Shields or the
number Otkovic used to call Shields after the
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robbery. And the texts warned Shields not to
give Hawkins Otkovic's phone number, despite
the fact-demonstrated by phone · recordsthat Hawkins already had Otkovic's phone
number. Given Otkovic's defense tbat he bad
been framed, this evidence could have raised
a reasonable doubt as to who actually sent the
messages from Otkovic's phone. Additionally,
evidence that Otkovic lied to police about
being with Hawkins does not necessarily
prove that he *752 robbed Hawkins; it
could also be explained by Otkovic's desire
to keep police from finding out about his
selling stolen property. Had the jury been
presented with evidence supporting Otkovic's
assertion that Hawkins was a fence, it may
have been more inclined to believe Otkovic's
story, including his assertions about the text
messages . Thus, the blanket exclusion of this
evidence undermines our confidence in the
verdict. 1 See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920
(Utah 1987) ("For an en-or to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict."). We therefore find it necessaiy to
reverse Otkovic's conviction and remand for a
new trial.

II. Other Issues Likely to Arise on Remand
~

20 Because Otkovic will receive a new
trial , we need not address the majority of his

remaining arguments . .8. However, we find it
necessary to address two legal issues that are
likely to arise on remand and were fully briefed
on appeal , namely, the admissibility of the text
messages and the impact of the missing A TM
video. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795
(Utah 1991 )_ ("Issues that are fully briefed on

appeal and are likely to be presented on remand
should be addressed by this court.").

A. Admissibility of the Text Messages
HJ ~ 21 Otkovic argues that the trial court
should not have admitted the text messages
between his phone and the phone allegedly
provided by Shields because the messages
were not properly authenticated. "To satisfy the
requirement of authenticating or identifying an
item of evidence, the proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the item is what the proponent claims it is."
Utah R. Evid. 901 (a); see also id. R. 90 I (b)
(providing examples of how evidence may be
authenticated).

if

22 We have not previously had the
opportunity to consider the foundational
requirements that must be met in order
for text messages to be admitted. However,
a number of other jurisdictions have held
that text messages may be "authenticated
by circumstantial evidence establishing the
evidence was what the proponent claimed it
to be." State v. Thompson, 2010 ND 10,
ii 24, 777 N.W.2d 617 (collecting cases);
see also Commonwealth v. Ko ch, 39 A.3d
996, 1005 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011) (holding that
"authentication of electronic communications,
like documents, requires more than mere
confirmation that the number or address
belonged to a particular person," and that
"[ c ]ircumstantial evidence, which tends to
conoborate the identity of the sender, is
required" as a foundational prerequisite to
admissibility), appeal granted, 615 Pa. 612, 44
A.3d 1147 (2012) (No. 947 MAL 2011); cf
State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, ,i 25 , 250
P.3d 69 (explaining that a telephone caller's
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identity may be authenticated by circumstantial
evidence).

ii

23 In this case, the State presented not
only evidence indicating that the text messages
came from Otkovic 1s phone, but also evidence
that could support a finding that Otkovic
was in possession of the phone at the time
the text messages were sent. The texts were
sent from the phone number assigned to
the white Blackbe1Ty police discovered in
Otkovic's apartment, which Otkovic admitted
was his. That phone matched Hawkins 1s
description of the phone he saw Otkovic use
during the robbery, and the robbery occurred
during the same time frame when the text
messages were sent. A lthough Otkovic's own
testimony that Shields was also in the *753
car when they went to the ATM and that
he let Shields use his phone during that
time period tended to contradict Hawkins's
testimony, the contradictory testimony goes to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
By presenting evidence that the phone from
which the text messages originated belonged
to Otkovic and that he had possession of it
at the time the messages were sent, the State
met its burden to make a prima facie showing
of authenticity. See United States v. Tank._
200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining
that under the substantively identical rule
901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "(t)he
government need only make a prima facie
sbowing of authenticity ... so that a reasonable
juror could find in favor of authenticity or
identification" (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)) . Accordingly, the trial court
did not exceed its discretion in determining that
the evidence was sufficient to authenticate the
text mess ages. 2

B. Loss or Destruction of the ATM Video
ill ~ 24 Otkovic also argues that the
case should be dismissed based on the
loss or destruction of the A TM video.
The destruction of exculpatory evidence may
support a motion to dismiss criminal charges.
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,r 41, 162
P.3d 1106; see also Utah R.Crim. P. l 6(a)
ill (requiring that the prosecutor disclose
"evidence lrnown to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused"). However,
to prevail on such a motion, a defendant must
first demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that
there is "a reasonable probability that lost
or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory."
Tiedeniann. 2007 UT 49, ~ 44, 162 P.3d 1106.
Otkovic has failed to make such a threshold
showing. lQ The only evidence regarding the
contents of the video is the email from the
bank, which states, "Now you can see that
there is someone else in the car but there is
no way to tell who it is since the camera
is (theoretically) aimed at the driver. The
driver also puts his hands up periodically." 11
While there is certainly a possibility that a
video of the ATM transaction could have been
exculpatory, there is nothing in the record
from which we can conclude that there was
a reasonable probability of such an outcome.
Cf State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ~~
47, 106 P.3d 734 (holding that a defendant
was not entitled to a remedy where laboratory
evidence that was only "potentially useful ," in
that it "might have exonerated the defendant"
upon testing, was lost by the State Crime
Lab (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation
marks omitted)) . Indeed, the email suggests
otherwise. If the video showed Hawkins putting
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up his hands , that could actually con-oborate
Hawkins's story that he was held at gunpoint.
Furthermore, since it was impossible to identify
the passenger, there would be no way to know
whether it was Otkovic, Shields, or the alleged

*754 female accomplice. 12 Because Otkovic
cannot make the threshold showing that the
video had a reasonable probability of being
exculpatory, the trial court con-ectly declined
to analyze the evidence further, see generally
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ~~ 44-45, 162 P.3d
1106 (outlining the sliding-scale test trial courts
are required to engage in once the threshold
showing is made), or to dismiss the case based
on destruction of evidence. Ll.

CONCLUSION
~

25 We conclude that evidence of Hawkins's
history as a fence was improperly limited
under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
We therefore reverse Otkovic's convictions
and remand for a new trial. We further
detennine that the trial court did not enin concluding that the text messages were
sufficiently authenticated to be admissible or in
declining to dismiss the case based on the loss
of the ATM video.

VOROS, Judge (concuning):
~ 26 I concur in the lead opinion. I write
separately to mention an additional issue that,
together with the rule 403 issue identified
by the majority opinion, undermines my
confidence in the outcome of this trial.

il

27 Something went down the night of May
24, 2009. According to Otkovic, he delivered
merchandise to Hawkins, who paid him
approximately $1,600 for it. Otkovic claims
Shields was also present. This transaction was
not unusual , Otkovic maintains, as Hawkins
ran a fencing operation, and Otkovic and
Shields regularly supplied him with stolen
electronics for resale. When picked up by
police, Otkovic explains, he lied about having
met with Hawkins that night for fear the
police would discover his role in the fencing
operation.
~

28 According to Hawkins, Otkovic and a
woman robbed him at gunpoint as Otkovic livetexted the robbe1y to Shields. Hawkins denied
running a fencing operation, denied having
received stolen goods, and denied having
previously met Otkovic (other than at a single
meeting in which Otkovic gave a different
name).
~

29 As the majority opinion explains, excluded
evidence of Hawkins's fencing operation would
have supported Otkovic's version of events
and discredited Hawkins's . But Otkovic claims
many other inegularities at trial. In particular,
he contends that his trial counsel failed to
exploit telephone records from Hawkins's cell
phone.

if

30 The phone records are telling. The
incident occurred around 8:00 p.m. on May 24,
2009. But Hawkins called Shields's number at
4:04 p.m. (a four-minute call), then Otkovic's
number at 4: 10 p.m. (also a four-minute call).
Hawkins called Otkovic's number again at 6:55
p.m . (a two-minute call), and Otkovic's number
called Hawkins at 7: 11 p.m. (a one-minute call)
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and again at 7:35 p.m. (a one-minute call).
Hawkins also received two text messages from
Otkovic's number at 1:55 p.m. , texted Otkovic's
number at 3:01 p.m., and received another text
from Otkovic's number at 3:08 p.m. These calls
and texts undennine Hawkins's testimony that
he did not know Otkovic before the robbery.
They also cast doubt on the authenticity of the
robbery texts, which suggest that Hawkins did
not have Otkovic's number until Shields gave it
to him after the incident.
~

31 Otkovic credits his trial counsel with
introducing these phone records but claims
that not using them to impeach Hawkins's
testimony constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
both "that counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard ofreasonableness" ·J:755
and "that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional eITors,
the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undennine confidence
in the outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 466
U.S. 668, 688. 694, l 04 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984); see also State v. Clark. 2004 UT
25, ~ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
~

32 The State does not contend that
trial counsel's perfonnance fell within the
wide range of professional ass istance. Rather,
it contends that Otkovic cannot show a
reasonable probability of a different result
for at least two reasons. First, the State
asserts, "the alleged inconsistency is likely
more illusory than real" because "Hawkins
testified that he mistakenly believed he was
communicating with Shields." However, a

f Ji::'.

.

jury aware of the phone records might
reasonably have questioned whether Hawkins
could converse by phone with Shields for four
minutes, immediately call Otkovic's number,
and, thinking he was again speaking with
Shields, converse for another four minutes with
a stranger who, as it happens, was born and
raised in Croatia.
~[ 33 Second, the State argues that in
any event, other evidence firmly established
Otkovic's guilt. This evidence included texts
sent from Otkovic's phone during the robbery,
a photograph ofHawlcins's driver license found
on Otkovic's phone, a gun matching the one
Hawkins described and cash in the approximate
amount Hawkins reported as stolen found
in Otkovic's bedroom, and Otkovic's false
statements to police. However, the cash, the
fact that Hawkins could describe Otkovic's gun,
and Otkovic's false police statements are all
consistent with Otkovic's version of events,
namely that he was selling stolen merchandise
to a familiar associate. Furthermore, while
the texts incriminate Otkovic, they also imply
that Hawkins obtained Otkovic's phone number
from Shields after the incident-an implication
refuted by phone records showing that Hawkins
had placed calls to that number before the
incident. The State is coITect that how Hawkins
obtained Otkovic's number was a "tangential
detail. " But the fact that Hawkins called Shields
before the incident and spoke for four minutes,
then hung up and called Otkovic and spoke for
another four minutes is more than a detailit undermin es Hawkins's version of events and
corroborates Otkovic's .

if

34 Otkovic's trial counsel never brought
these discrepanci es to the jury's attention. This
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omission, especially viewed in tandem with
the exclusion of evidence of Hawkins's fencing
operation, undermines my confidence in the
trial outcome.

All Citations
322 P.3d 746, 756 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2014 UT
App 58

Footnotes
1
Because the provisions of the

Utah Code under which Otkovic was convicted have not substantively changed, we cite
the current version for the reade r's convenience.

2
.3_

1
.5_

Q
7

8

g

1O

jj_

12
13

"On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and present conflicting
evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised on appeal." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 112, 52 P .3d 1210 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted) .
When initially arrested, Otkovic claimed not to have been with Hawkins at all on the night of the robbery, but he later
adm itted to having met Hawkins for the purpose of selling him stolen property.
A "fence" is "a person who receives and disposes of stolen goods." Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference .com/
browse/fence (last visited Feb. 19, 2014 ).
Although Otkovic also asserts the admissibility of this evidence under rules 404(a), 404(b.}, 405(b). and 608(c) of the
Utah Ru!es of Evidence, the t;ial court's ruling was based solely on rule 403, and the State has not raised an alternative
argument that the evidence shou ld have been excluded under any other rule of evidence.
Otkovic ra ises a number of additional claims on appeal that we need not address in light of our ruling on the rule 403 issue.
Otkovic also raises arguments regarding prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. We are
concerned that a number of statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument appear to have misstated the
evidence . Trial counsel's fa ilure to effectively use the phone records in support of Otkovic's case is also troublesome,
as discussed in Judge Voros's concurring opinion. Taken together and considered in light of the erroneously excluded
evidence, these errors further undermine our co nfidence in the verdict. However, we find it unnecessary to address these
additiona l errors in detail because the exclusion of evidence that Hawkins was a fence alone warrants a new trial.
For the sa me reason, we deny Otkovic's rule 23B motion to remand the case for additional findings regarding his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See generally Utah R.App. P. 23B .
The trial court also did not err in rejecting Otkovic's hearsay argument. If the jury determined that the texts were sent by
Otkovic, then the texts wou ld not be hearsay. See generally Utah R. Evid. 801 (d)(2) , (d)(21IB.} (providing that a statement
"offered against an opposing party" and "made by the party in an individual or representative capacity" is not hearsay).
If the jury determined that the texts were sent by someone other than Otkovic, then it could not possibly determine that
Otkovic had made the admissions conveyed in the text messages.
Because Otkovic has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the evidence was exculpatory, we need not
exami ne the extent of the State's duty, if any, to obtain evidence before it is destroyed by a third party. However, we
do observe that other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have declined to impose such a duty. See, e.g., State
v. Allum, 2005 MT 150, '1]'1] 34-35, 327 Mont. 363, 114 P.3d 233 (ho lding that the prosecution's failure to obtain bank
surveillance video before it was destroyed by the bank did not violate the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence) ; People v. Banl<s, 2 A.D.3d 226, 768 N.Y.S.2d 467,468 /2003) ("The People have no constitutional or statutory
duty to acquire , or prevent the destruction of, ev idence generated and possessed by private parties .... ").
The State maintains that the bank representative cou ld be describing the photographs that were attached to the email
and that there is no indication that any video actually existed. Given that the photographs received by police apparently
did not portray either Hawkins putting his hands up or a passenger in the vehicle , the State's position is questionable.
We need not resolve this question, however, and simply assum e, for purposes of our analysis, that the bank had a video
recording in its possession at some point and that the police either misplaced or never received it.
Because the passenger was apparently unidentifiable, it would not even help for the video to show someone texting,
since the person texting could be either Shields, Otkovic, or the female accomplice.
For the same reason, Otkovic cannot demonstrate prejudice in conjunction with his alternative claim that his counsel
performed ineffectively by failing to obtain th e ATM photographs and vid eo directly from the bank. See generally State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76_,J"[ 19. 12 P.3d 92 (explaining that an ineffective assistance claim requires a showing "that counsel's
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deficient performance was prejudicial- i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case" (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed .2d 674 (1984))).
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Pictures of Uinta 2, Section 6 (State's Exhibits la & 2a)
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Picture of the shank (State's Exhibit 4)
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Utah Department of Corrections
Incident Photos

Incident Case Number 277554

Information in th is report considered PRIVATE or PROTECTED under the Government Records Access Management Act (GRAMA),
Utah Code Annotated 63-2-101 , except for the information which also appears in the Initial Contact Report(ICR).
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